Final Report

Review of the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy

21st November, 2013

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK

Executive Summary and Recommendations

Since its creation, DIPD has made impressive progress in establishing effective party-to-party and multi-party projects in a range of countries. DIPD was created in response to an identifiable need: domestically, it responded to a desire amongst politicians and party staff to play a more active and coordinated role in the development of political parties in other countries; internationally Danish representatives were frequently asked to provide support to parties and democracy, but had no vehicle through which to channel these requests. However, DIPD is encountering problems common in the early years of an institution's life, especially one which is attempting to create an organisational structure at the same time as design, deliver and monitor projects in many parts of the world. During the next phase of DIPD's development it will need to establish the distinctive characteristics of its approach, refine and consolidate its procedures, and start to demonstrate impact.

These challenges can be grouped under three main headings:
- **Strategic focus and programme logic**

During the next phase, DIPD will need to distinguish itself in the field of party assistance, building a strategy and approach which reflects its comparative advantage.

- **Organisation, administration and capacity.**

DIPD has achieved a large amount in a small space of time, but it is now straining the limits of its own capacity, and needs a clearer internal delineation of responsibility and more capacity.

- **Implementation and measurement of projects**.

The challenge in the next few years will be to ensure quality and coherence across the projects, and identify where it is making a difference to the quality of party politics.

Part I: Strategic focus and programme logic

In the last two decades the international donor community has paid increasing attention to the role of governance in the achievement of their development objectives. Although assistance to political parties remains a small part of international aid, it has grown in recent years. As DIPD notes itself, in its strategy document 2011-13, "The DIPD is beginning its work at a time when there is intense debate about the role of political parties in the development and democracy processes …"

In this context DIPD should retain enough flexibility to ensure that it has a diverse range of programmes, and is able to respond to political developments as they emerge. But flexibility is not a substitute for strategy. Equally, a strategy does not mean doing the same thing in every country. The political parties, in particular will want to retain enough flexibility to decide the most suitable entry points and activities in particular countries. But the strategy does need to provide some organisational coherence, especially between multi-party and party-to-party work.

r. 1: DIPD staff, board members and political parties should develop a strategy which should seek to do five things (paras.27- 33)
- Identify the distinctive features of the DIPD approach to party strengthening.
- Provide guidance how and when DIPD should intervene. DIPD will need to develop sets of principles and guidelines as to how and when DIPD will intervene during the next phase.

- Cohere the different elements of DIPD's work. We expect DIPD will continue to run a range of different activities, but they should be informed by clear strategic objectives.

- Improve measurement of results. The strategy should give each project a better sense of likely outcomes and an exit strategy, to avoid a permanent presence built around ever-evolving objectives.

- Inform DIPD's position in the field of party assistance. The next phase of DIPD's life will mean defining what it does differently and better than any other party assistance provider.

Part 2: Organisation, administration and capacity

DIPD has achieved a remarkable amount of progress on a modest budget. But it needs to reflect on the roles of the constituent parts of the organisation, its internal processes and its staffing requirements if it seeks to continue at this pace. We make recommendations in three areas, on the role of the Board and Secretariat, staffing requirements and communications.

Role of Board and Secretariat

Although there is a division of responsibility, we were told be several interviewees that in order to get through the volume of work the Board needed to help the secretariat. These roles need to be more clearly divided, so that it is clearer who is the ultimate decision-maker and arbiter in the case of disagreement.

r. 2.1   The roles of Board and Secretariat need further clarifying (paras. 41 and 42)

It appears that many decisions about project approval are formalities during Board meetings. The Board should have a stronger executive function, as the ultimate decision-maker and arbiter in disputes. The secretariat should play a role in advising the Board, and once projects are approved the Secretariat should have the authority to ensure the quality of their implementation.

r. 2.2   To improve Board meetings, members should have formal induction and paperwork be reduced (paras.40 and 43)

New members to the DIPD should go through formal induction, around DIPD's strategic objectives especially in anticipation of Board membership's increasing turnover as the Institute's enters future phases. In addition, given that it is not clear whether the current volume of reading material is improving the Board's functioning, we believe that paperwork at Board meetings should be reduced.

Staffing requirements

The organisation is straining the limits of its capacity. A clearer strategy is likely to give the organisation a better sense of where it can be most effective and how it can best deploy its resources. But we make four specific recommendations.

r. 2.3   DIPD needs more project and admin staff to carry on at the current level of activity (paras. 45-47)

DIPD needs more project and administrative staff to carry on at the current level of activity. DIPD and MFA could consider allocating a portion of project funds to hire more project staff to meet the Secretariat's increasing workload.

r. 2.4   DIPD needs to create the role of Chief Operating Officer (para. 48)

DIPD needs a Chief Operating Officer to oversee project management, internal structures and processes, and office management. The COO post would improve internal functioning and communication.

r. 2.5   DIPD should seek greater in-house political expertise (paras. 49 and 50)

The fact that the majority of staff come from a development background has not presented particular problems for DIPD, but greater political expertise would improve project planning and management, and links with the political parties. This expertise might be through the employment of new staff or the secondment of party staff to the secretariat.

r. 2.6   DIPD needs more in-house financial expertise (paras. 51-53)

DIPD is dependent on external accountancy support to fulfil auditing and accounting requirements. But DIPD needs in-house finance support to help staff to analyse project finance, forecasting and budgeting.

Communications

DIPD is very advanced in terms of its communications strategy, especially in comparison with others working in the field. However, it is not clear how far the communications strategy has been absorbed, and operationalized by the constituent parts of the organisation.

r. 2.7   DIPD needs to ensure its communication strategy runs through the organisation (para. 54)

DIPD needs to ensure that the communications strategy is absorbed and operationalised by the various parts of the organisation. The internalisation of that communications strategy depends on clear messages being reinforced from the Board and through the staff and political parties.

r. 2.8   Communications material should highlight multi-party and party-to-party work (para. 55)

DIPD's communications material should emphasise both the multi-party and party-to-party aspects of its work, highlighting consistently the links between the two strands of work and the aspects that are common to both as part of the Danish approach to party strengthening.

r. 2.9   Communications material should emphasise DIPD's strengths (para. 56)

Much of DIPD's communications appears hesitant about its work, and the likelihood of success. In the next phase DIPD should be clearer in its publications about what it is doing, why it is doing it and what results it expects to achieve.

Part 3: Project implementation and measuring results

In terms of project initiation, management and delivery, there are distinctions between the party-to-party projects and multi-party projects. This diversity is a strength, but in the next phase of DIPD's development the institute should seek to ensure a coherence of approach that informs both multi-party and party-to-party programmes.

Project management and delivery

r. 3.1   DIPD should continue to support the parties to build their capacity to initiate and manage projects (paras. 61 and 62)

The ability of the parties to run party-to-party projects varies significantly. In developing the DIPD approach to party-to-party work we believe DIPD should continue to develop best practice amongst the parties, and encourage the sharing of knowledge and lessons learnt within and between the parties.

r. 3.2   Political parties should have a greater involvement in the planning and implementation of multi-party projects (para. 67)

The institute risks not properly utilising the expertise of the political parties in the design of multi-party projects, unless there is a more systematic and routine form of discussion on such projects. This might be achieved by including the party project managers in a pattern of Board meetings, consultations by the secretariat, or extraordinary meetings of the Board to examine opportunities identified by the parties.

r. 3.3   The secretariat's role in advising, monitoring progress and ensuring quality across all projects needs to be more clearly defined. (paras. 62 – 64)

At present the secretariat is performing multiple roles in designing, amending, approving, managing and monitoring all projects. The secretariat is the only part of the institute that can ensure proper process and progress. The secretariat should be given clear authority by the Board to monitor and call to account.

r. 3.4   The secretariat needs to encourage flexibility in project implementation (paras. 62 and 65)

DIPD has emphasised the importance of flexibility in its approach. But project implementation is occasional inflexible. We believe that refinements to the reporting system should allow project managers to vary activities and outputs, but still retain a focus on the project's outcomes

Multi-party partnerships and collaborations

r. 3.5   Involvement of local project partners (para. 69)

DIPD should seek to involve project partners more closely in the development of projects. We hope that as DIPD evolves so it will develop a format for developing proposals which incorporates partners at every stage.

r. 3.6   Partnerships with implementing agencies (paras. 70- 72)

Communication and collaboration with other implementing agencies should be a priority in country. We recognise that DIPD has sought to engage with other agencies and we hope that DIPD will continue to make great efforts to co-ordinate and collaborate with other agencies.

Reporting and measuring results

r. 3.7   Reporting procedures should be streamlined so they create less work (paras. 63/73-74)

Although we commend DIPD on developing a very thorough system of reporting, we believe that this is overly elaborate. We urge the MFA and DIPD to identify ways in which the level of reporting can be reduced without compromising accountability.

r. 3.8   An effective progress management system should combine quantitative and qualitative indicators (paras. 75-78)

Providing DIPD with the 'holy grail' is way beyond the scope of an evaluation. We suggest that DIPD seek a system which combines measures of quality and quantity, distinguishes between correlation and causation, and is aware that the wrong indicators mean you end up doing the wrong things.

We believe that DIPD has made remarkable progress in its first three years. It has, to quote one of our interviewees, been "paving as it moved". The purpose of this report is to highlight the challenges that we believe are starting to emerge. Most of these are simply 'growing pains'. In the early years of an organisation, there is a lot of good will and desire to make things work. However, in the next phase of the institution's life it will face greater pressure to clarify its strategy, consolidate its organisational structure and to show results. The recommendations above identify some of those challenges so that the organisation can go from strength to strength.

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Introduction

1. Global Partners Governance (GPG) was commissioned to conduct a review of the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in March 2013. According to the Review Terms of Reference (Appendix 6), this review is prescribed by the Institute's founding Law to take stock and assess the Institute's performance with regard to its "results, selection […] ownership and anchoring in partner countries, administration and future funding needs".

2. Details of the review methodology and the staff who formed the review team can be found in Appendix 1. The review consisted of an extensive desk review of DIPD documents and publications (listed in Appendix 2) and direct and remote consultations with a range of internal and external stakeholders (listed in Appendix 3). These consultations were conducted under conditions of anonymity, so the quotations used in this report are not attributed. DIPD programmes in Tanzania were examined more closely with a field visit to Dar Es Salaam in early June, where first-hand evidence of DIPD's work in the country were gathered. Examples from Tanzania are used in this report to illustrate our findings, but a fuller report on the field trip can be found in Appendix 4. The review also considered DIPD interventions in Nepal and Kenya and the Institute's programmes in partnership with the Netherlands Institute for Multi-party Democracy (NIMD) in Myanmar and Zimbabwe.

3. The Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) was established by the Danish Parliament on 26 May 2010 to support and strengthen political parties and multi-party systems in developing countries. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) approved 75 million DK for the DIPD to run its projects and Secretariat in its first three year phase from 2010 to 2013. DIPD has apportioned 60 million DK to its projects, which it has split equally between its party-to-party and multi-party strands, and 15 million DK to cover Secretariat costs.

4. The DIPD has made remarkable progress in the first three years of its life. It has created and built an organisation with identifiable structures, comprehensive procedures, and a growing reputation in the field of international political party assistance. It is now running projects in thirteen countries, which have been carefully designed to meet the objectives set out in its initial strategy for 2011-13.

5. However, DIPD is encountering problems common in the early years of an institution's life, especially one which is attempting to create an organisational structure at the same time as design, deliver and monitor projects in many parts of the world. During the next phase of DIPD's development it will need to establish the distinctive characteristics of its approach, refine and consolidate its procedures, and start to demonstrate impact.

6. The review is structured around these challenges which have been grouped under three main headings:
   - **Strategic focus and programme logic.**
   During the next phase of its life DIPD will need to distinguish itself in the field of party assistance, building a strategy and approach which reflects its comparative advantage.
   - **Organisation, administration and capacity.**

DIPD has achieved a large amount in a small space of time, but it is now straining the limits of its own capacity. It needs a clearer internal delineation of responsibility and accountability, more capacity and its strategy should give DIPD a sense of priorities, so that it is clearer when it can (and should) say no to potential projects.

- **Implementation and measurement of projects.**

DIPD has succeeded in establishing nineteen projects, with all but one Danish parliamentary party now running at least one international programme. The challenge in the next few years will be to ensure quality and coherence across the projects, and identify where it is making a difference to the quality of party politics.

The evaluation report is structured around these three areas. It starts with a brief analysis of the international context and how this has shaped the early development of the DIPD.

International context and establishment of DIPD

7. In the last two decades the international donor community has paid increasing attention to the role of governance in the achievement of their development objectives. Although assistance to political parties remains a small part of international aid, it has grown in recent years as donor agencies have recognised that, a) weaknesses in the party system have an effect on the quality of representative politics at every level of government, and b) providing support to civil society organisations is not an adequate substitute, or alternative, to having properly functioning political parties. Yet Western governments are still nervous of being accused of interfering in the domestic politics of a sovereign nation, and of appearing to take a colonial attitude to that country. These concerns have applied as much in Denmark as elsewhere. As DIPD notes itself, in its strategy document 2011-13, "The DIPD is beginning its work at a time when there is intense debate about the role of political parties in the development and democracy processes …"

8. Attempts to support political parties have been part of international assistance to developing countries for over half a century. Initially characterised by party-to-party support, particularly led by the German *Stiftungen*, the field has grown as new actors have emerged, each with particular strengths. A number of countries have followed the party-to-party model, where political parties have sought ideological soulmates in developing countries. The US works predominantly through the NDI and IRI who, due to their high level of funding, are able to undertake a wide variety of activities but are most often engaged in helping emergent political parties with internal organisation, policy-making and campaign techniques.

9. At the beginning of the 1990s the UK established the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), in response to the fall of communism and a desire to support democratic party politics in central and eastern Europe. The WFD provided funds to the British political parties to engage with their sister parties, and the central office made grants to run other projects with complementary aims. It has since branched out in to running more projects centrally itself, and seeking to combine multi-party and sister-party support.

10. The emergence of the NIMD in 2000 introduced a new type of party assistance which focused on dialogue and negotiation. As such, it drew on many of the strengths of Dutch politics, and its emphasis on the consociational model was in sharp contrast to the majoritarian (and adversarial) tradition which characterises UK and US politics. The distinctiveness of their approach, and clear methodology, meant

that they were quickly able to carve out a place for themselves in the party assistance field. The NIMD methodology was a deliberate attempt to avoid many of the failings associated with the traditional approach to international party assistance. In his 2006 book, *The Weakest Link*, Tom Carothers documents many of the problems that beset such work, including unrealistic objectives, dependence on templates and too great an emphasis on training[1]. The most damning criticism of such work though is that there is very little evidence that it has had much impact. This is partly to do with the way in which implementers delivered projects, and measured results. But it was also related to the outlook of the international donor agencies that commissioned and designed such programmes. They themselves placed too great an emphasis on technical support and capacity building, as opposed to engaging with the deep-seated political problems that undermined the functioning of the party system.

11. That perspective started to change following the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 which set out five key principles for aid (ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results and accountability). The search for impact, particularly in the field of governance, prompted many donors to reflect on the causes of many of the problems that undermined their development objectives. It led several international agencies to prioritise different forms of political economy analysis, with many agencies, including those in Sweden, UK and Holland, developing their own distinct approach.

12. The logical conclusion of much of this analysis was that international assistance in the governance field could not avoid politics. Rather it had to engage with the incentive structures within the political system that shaped outcomes. In the last five years, the argument that international assistance needs to be aware of - and engage with - politics is all but won. Within the party assistance field it is now commonly accepted that the purpose of such work is not just to enhance capacity but to help parties think and act politically. Again, Tom Carothers has captured this trajectory in his most recent work *Development Aid Confronts Politics*[2].

13. However, the subtitle of Carothers' book, *The Almost Revolution*, captures the current state of the field. Although almost all international donor agencies now sign up to the principles of political analysis and project design, almost all of them are also struggling to insert this logic into projects on the ground. While the theory is strong, there are diplomatic implications for a European government's Embassy in supporting the development of political parties. Frequently such efforts are designed to improve the chances of the opposition political parties, which is rarely popular with the governing party. Western Embassies are also accused of interfering in the domestic politics of a sovereign nation, and of taking a colonial attitude to that country.

14. These concerns have applied as much in Denmark as elsewhere. The creation of DIPD was preceded by long discussions about the merits of party assistance, and how to avoid diplomatic rows. To this end DANIDA produced a How to Note on Political Parties in 2010, which was specifically designed to address many of the concerns about political interference and impartiality[3].

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[1] Thomas Carothers (2006), *Confronting the Weakest Link, Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies.* pp. 112- 141.
[2] Thomas Carothers and Diane de Gramont (2013), *Development Aid Confronts Politics, The Almost Revolution.*
[3] We should declare an interest here, in that the note was written by GPG Director, Greg Power.

15. As DIPD reflected to us in their comments on the first draft of this paper there was initial resistance to the idea of Denmark establishing an institution to conduct political party assistance, within some (but not the majority of) political parties, the academic community and civil society organisations. But there was (and continues to be) strong support for the idea of Denmark having its own institution to promote political party work. The creation of DIPD was a response to political pressure to create such a body. But the area of party assistance continues to be contentious amongst diplomats. There is nervousness about such work in every foreign ministry we have encountered, and a feeling that DIPD, along with every other party assistance organisation, needs continually to prove its worth to its own foreign ministry.

16. The circumstances of the Institute's birth appears to us have had three effects on its development in the first three years:

- **Pressure to perform**. Several interviewees mentioned the need for 'early victories', so that the organisation could demonstrate early signs of progress. As such, it has been deliberately opportunistic in project choices at times. We recognise that DIPD is seeking to refine its strategy. We believe this is essential in the next phase so that it is clear about the strategic objectives that inform all its decisions, and allow it to remain flexible.

- **Need to explain**. DIPD's existing strategy is, in part, an argument as to why it should exist. This is entirely understandable, and the document is a powerful argument to that end. The tone of much of DIPD's publications is also deliberately to downplay expectations, stressing that its work is, by definition, slow and incremental. However, at times this rhetoric has made the institution sound hesitant and uncertain.

- **Concern for compliance**. Given the political attention on DIPD it is obviously essential that it does things the right way, and it has made great efforts to conform to the MFA's reporting structures. However, some of these processes have created rigidity and an administrative burden for the organisation which may, in the long-run, undermine its ability to deliver.

17. DIPD has achieved a significant amount in establishing an organisational structure, and running projects in thirteen countries in a short space of time. Parts I, II and III examine how DIPD operations and performance have developed in the context and circumstances described above, and suggest a number of recommendations for DIPD to consider for future funding phases.

Part I: Strategic Focus and Programme Logic

18. DIPD's dual mandate is to support emerging democracies by working both directly with political parties and also in support of multi-party programmes. Its mandate has four parts: "to support party cooperation and build up democratic parties in developing countries; support independent media, think tanks and non-governmental organisations (…); enter into cooperation agreements with local partners in developing countries; and cooperate with international multiparty support institutions and other international partners". [4] In its initial strategy document, DIPD defined its vision as: "to contribute to the development of effective political parties and well-functioning multiparty systems"[5] and stated that it would adopt an approach of "local anchoring, local ownership and local knowledge".[6]

19. DIPD's first Annual Report described the Institute's planned strategy for the countries in which it would work. In regard to party-to-party projects, the Report stated that "Being new and small indicated that we should not spread our investments too thinly, but rather focus on a limited number of countries, and preferably countries where Denmark has previously been active with governance and democracy programmes".[7] For multi-party projects, the historical links with Denmark were also seen to be key: "Four of the five countries identified for multiparty support by the end of 2011 all belong to the relatively small group of developing countries Denmark has given a high priority for several decades. This is not accidental. The law passed by Parliament to establish the Institute indicates that DIPD should focus on countries where Denmark already has been engaging in the area of democracy and governance".[8]

20. At the time of this review, the Institute was running six multi-party and thirteen party-to-party programmes spanning thirteen countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East, in which all but one Danish parliamentary political party has been involved[9]:

- The **Danish Liberal Party** is working in Kenya with the Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMD), and in Zambia with the small opposition party, the National Restoration Party (NAREP).

- In Tanzania, the **Conservatives** and the **Social Liberal Party** have partnered with the two largest opposition parties, CHADEMA and CUF respectively.

- The **Social Democrats** have developed party-to-party programmes in Ghana, with the National Democratic Congress (NDC), in Swaziland with Swazi Democratic Party (SWADEPA), and in Egypt, with the Egyptian Social Democratic Party (ESDP).

- In Honduras, the **Red-Green Alliance** is training party members through its programme with the National Popular Resistance Front (FNRP).

- In Bolivia, the **Socialist People's Party** entered into partnership with a hybrid political party, Movimento al Socialismo (MAS), to work on organisational development and youth participation. The **Liberal**

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[4] Act no. 530 of 26 May 2010. See Terms of Reference, p. 7.
[5] DIPD Strategy 2011-2013, p.5.
[6] *Ibid*. p.14.
[7] Annual Report 2010-11, p.18.
[8] *Ibid*. p.28.
[9] The DDP is the only parliamentary party which has chosen not to develop a programme with DIPD.

Alliance has also been collaborating with the small and new opposition party, Verdad y Democracia Social (VERDES), as part of its appraisal to identify a party-to-party partner in the country.

21. As these programmes demonstrate, DIPD's party-to-party strand operates in a diverse range of countries, and came about through a variety of routes, but we heard that all more or less aim at capacity building and enhancement of internal democracy, with different emphases depending on local circumstances. There are projects aiming to strengthen women's representation, support the development of youth wings, and enhance local party organisation. In one case (the Liberals' project in Kenya) a Danish party is working to support a multi-party platform, due to the restrictions on party-to-party support in that country.

22. There is considerable diversity in DIPD's multi-party portfolio, adapting projects to local circumstances. As a result, there is no 'standard DIPD model of implementation'. Instead, a range of formats has been established:

- In Tanzania and Malawi, DIPD is partnering with a local multi-party democracy centre working with political parties.
- In Bhutan, DIPD is partnering mainly with the Bhutan Network for Empowerment of Women, but also provides support for a number of other partners working in the field.
- In Nepal, DIPD has created and supports the 'JOMPOPS' multi-party platform through local staff.

23. DIPD has also developed programmes in collaboration with NIMD in several countries and in different formats:

- In Myanmar, DIPD is leading an inter-party dialogue project in collaboration with NIMD which is also supported by local DIPD staff.

- In Zimbabwe, DIPD is supporting the project NIMD is leading with the Zimbabwe Institute (ZI).

- In Egypt, DIPD invited NIMD to share its experience with democracy schools in its programme with DEDI.

24. DIPD has entered a crowded field and is working in countries where there are many other actors. During our review, we sought to examine how well DIPD's strategy documents set out a logic of intervention for the organisation, and to test with our interlocutors whether they thought that DIPD had brought a distinctive focus to its work that differed from that of other international organisations.

25. Whilst DIPD's initial strategy document sets targets for the number of partnerships and programmes the Institute aimed to create in its first phase, little is said about the nature of those partnerships, with the exception of the requirement that "At least half of the total number of partnerships will visibly contribute to increasing women's participation in the work of the political parties".[10]

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[10] DIPD Strategy 2011-2013, p.21.

26. Rather than providing thematic guidance about the nature of the projects to be established, the Strategy reads more as a founding document for the organisation with a focus on processes to be established and justifications for the organisation's existence. Indeed, both DIPD's initial strategy document and its more recent Annual Reports strike a note of caution about what can be achieved in the field of political parties' assistance. For example, its Strategy states that "The DIPD is beginning its activities at a point in time when the previous experience with support for political parties and party systems is being vigorously debated. Foundations, organisations and institutes in other countries have worked in this field for decades, and evaluations of projects and programmes indicate that there has been a large gap between the objectives and the results that have actually been achieved. This is the reality in which the Institute must operate".[11]

27. In consultations, there was no overall consensus that DIPD had developed and finalised an overarching strategy to guide interventions in such a way that would distinguish the Institute's work from that being delivered by other international organisations. In the absence of a clear initial strategic direction however, respondents identified a number of focal areas as potential DIPD-specific strengths which the Institute could capitalise on in its future strategy development.

    These include:
- Developed structures of local government
- High political representation of women
- Involvement of young people in politics, including active youth wings of parties
- A culture of voluntarism
- Historical links with particular countries (Tanzania, Bhutan, Nepal)
- A "non-threatening", non-imperialist history in international development
- Representation of minority voices, through the Danish system of proportional representation
- Experience of building and sustaining political coalitions

Country portfolio
28. Whilst DIPD began with the aim of working in a small number of countries, it is now in fact working in many different places around the world. This is partly because of the more or less unrestricted ability of the Danish political parties to work wherever they choose and to create partnerships or develop existing relationships with parties they find sympathetic. This relationship is clearly a vital part of the effectiveness of any party-to-party partnership, and it would be extremely counter-productive to require any party to work in a particular country if the circumstances were not conducive.

29. The ways in which the first party-to-party projects were initiated varied considerably. Some Danish parties had existing contacts in international party organisations, or through personal contacts. Others conducted systematic needs assessment or profiling processes. In general most parties did not seek assistance from DIPD staff in relation to their initial choice. The secretariat was involved to an extent in suggesting 'suitable' countries in which to work for some of the parties (for example in Tanzania, which was considered a 'safe' option for two of the smaller Danish parties), but here too, personal contacts clearly still played an important part.

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[11] *Ibid*, p.17.

30. DIPD's multi-party programme has also grown from the initial four projects to include Myanmar, Zimbabwe and a small project in Malawi, making a total of seven countries, which represents a sizeable load for a small secretariat. It is clear from our consultations that DIPD felt it was important to begin work quickly in order to present some tangible results as soon as possible. However, respondents were not always sure of the political and analytic rationale underlying some of the country choices DIPD had made. Rather, they described a primarily "opportunistic" approach in which DIPD took advantage of opportunities that presented themselves either through professional networks or like-minded organisations. The project in Tanzania (discussed in further detail in the Appendix) exemplifies this approach, as DIPD effectively "took over" a partnership previously supported by NIMD, taking advantage of a "ready-made" project to adopt. Other examples are provided by the project in Myanmar, where there was understandably high political interest in starting work to support the reform process after the release of Aung San Suu Kyi; and the project in Nepal, in which DIPD initially agreed to provide support for a cross-party platform ('JOMPOPS') along with a number of other international donors. Unfortunately, DIPD is now the sole supporter of this platform due to the withdrawal of the other donors. In consultations, DIPD spoke of their moral obligation to continue support for this initiative and not to "abandon" the Nepalese parties involved.

31. In all these cases, whilst DIPD may have carried out a political and strategic analysis of the project country, it is not clear that these considerations were the main motivator of the decision to begin work. No resource planning process took place to estimate the approximate requirements of taking on an additional project in staff terms. Indeed, we found that DIPD does not estimate the staff time either required or actually being taken up for any of its projects.

DIPD's dual focus

32. DIPD's two Annual Reports highlight the dual nature of the institute (supporting both multi-party and party-to-party projects) as a strength, suggesting that this "unique" perspective allows it to combine the "best of two worlds".[12] It is not clear whether DIPD intended this to translate into the co-location of multi-party and party-to-party projects, but so far, interaction between the two arms of DIPD's work has been limited. Even where there are multi-party and party-to-party projects in the same country (such as Tanzania) there has been little collaboration. As our interlocutors recognised, there are potential risks to locating multi-party projects in the same country as party-to-party work, as the Institute's support for partisan work could be perceived as undermining the cross-party trust essential to its multi-party projects. On the other hand, there are opportunities for mutual support and sharing of political insights, in-country if the context allows it, but otherwise, between the different staff involved in managing the projects in Denmark.

33. In the case of party-to-party projects, there was a feeling among the political parties that in DIPD's start-up phase, there was little incentive for different parties to co-ordinate their work and that as a result, their efforts had been spread quite widely. They thought that during the next phase, as more party-to-party projects come on stream, there would be merit in refocusing DIPD's projects in a smaller range of countries and seeking to co-ordinate different parties' work where possible. Those parties that had already been working in the same country as another party spoke positively of the opportunities for

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[12] Annual Report 2012, p.12.

mutual support and learning that this afforded, even though they were partnering with very different and indeed opposing parties.

Independent media

34. As part of this exercise, the review team was asked to assess the potential for DIPD's work to expand into the field of independent media, given that this forms part of the Institute's mandate, but it has not yet begun any activities in this area. Our preliminary analysis suggests that there would be space for projects supporting the independent media in many of the countries in which DIPD is working, should it wish to enter this field. There is demand, and there are viable partners, some of whom are already working with DANIDA. However, we would question the extent to which this work fits with the rest of DIPD's mandate, particularly given that a number of specialist organisations are already working in the field (including Danish International Media Support) and DIPD's limited level of resources.

Conclusion and recommendations

35. For very practical reasons DIPD has sought to retain a large amount of flexibility in the development of its projects. As mentioned above, we recognise that the Institute has faced significant pressure to start its work in a large number of countries, both in multi-party and party-to-party projects. We believe that DIPD should seek to retain enough flexibility to ensure that it has a diverse range of programmes, and is able to respond to political developments as they emerge. But flexibility is not a substitute for strategy.

36. A strategy does not mean doing the same thing in every country. The political parties, in particular will want to retain enough flexibility to decide the most suitable entry points and activities in particular countries. But the strategy does need to provide some organisational coherence, especially between multi-party and party-to-party work. The DIPD should clarify what is distinctive about DIPD's approach to party strengthening and should be built around DIPD's comparative advantage in the field of party assistance.

37. Developing a strategy or theory of change for an organisation is beyond the scope of this (or any other) evaluation exercise, but we highlight some of the issues that a strategy needs to address. We know that DIPD staff and Board are reflecting on these issues and on developing the organisation's distinctive theory of change. As the organisation extends its reputation and role in the next three years, the DIPD logic will become more apparent. We believe that DIPD staff, board members and political parties should develop a strategy which brings greater clarity in four areas:

r.1: We believe that DIPD staff, board members and political parties should develop a strategy which brings greater clarity in five areas (paras. 27-33):

i.   Identify the distinctive features of the DIPD approach to party strengthening
Most other institutes working in the field of party assistance have identifiable characteristics to their approach (summarised at the start of Part i). DIPD staff and board members have acknowledge that the organisation is still working out the distinguishing characteristics of Danish assistance to political parties. This is entirely to be expected at this stage.

We discussed with internal and external stakeholders what these characteristics might be. There was some discussion about work with local government, women in politics and youth. We can see the potential in

each of these, but most other party assistance programmes usually include activities with local government, women and youth. They have the advantage in that donor agencies seem particularly keen to fund each of these areas, but it is not clear to us where DIPD enjoys a comparative advantage to use as the basis for a strategy. That is not to say that it does not exist, but that DIPD will need to be clear about what they will do in these areas that differs in approach from other party assistance organisations.

We believe that there may be scope for DIPD to build on the suggestion around Denmark's culture of voluntarism, and to bridge the gap between civil society and political parties in many developing countries. Other organisations are attempting to work in this area, but it is sporadic. It is also an area where there are identifiable gaps. The tension between civil society and parties is problematic in many developing countries, and often an adversarial relationship which undermines public faith in the political system as a whole. DIPD could draw from key aspects of the Scandinavian social model in developing a distinct approach in this area.

ii.   Provide guidance how and when DIPD should intervene
DIPD has made a virtue of flexibility in the first three years, seizing opportunities as they arise, and developing a range of different projects in different countries. There is much that is beneficial in the first few years of this approach. However, it will need to develop sets of principles and guidelines as to how and when DIPD will intervene during the next phase.

DIPD has so far not had to say 'no'. It has moved quickly, and sought to set up many projects in a short space of time. But it is hitting the limits of its capacity to deliver projects. DIPD could deliver an effective project in almost any developing country, but very soon it will need to prioritise one project over another, and one country over another. This has to be informed by a logic of intervention, whose principles will determine the likelihood of success in a particular situation.

iii.   Cohere the different elements of DIPD's work
We believe that DIPD should retain flexibility in the sense that no two countries are the same, no two parties are the same and projects need to a) respond to local conditions and b) be flexible enough to respond to changing conditions over time in those countries.

But, again, flexibility is not an alternative to strategy. The two are complementary. In the next phase DIPD will need to find the features that link its multi-party and sister-party projects in particular. We expect they will continue to run a range of different activities, but they should be informed by clear strategic objectives.

The organisation will still be free to initiate projects which are entirely outside DIPD's strategic objectives. But this will then be a conscious decision of the Board, Staff and parties, rather than an act of omission.

iv.   Improve measurement of results.
As mentioned above, a strategy should give DIPD a common set of guidelines as to how and when to intervene. Part of this consideration will be an assessment of the local conditions, the capacity of local partners and the likelihood of achieving its intended goals. In short, the project should start by identifying what success looks like in that particular context. There will always be things that DIPD could do to support political parties. As local politics change, so assistance can be directed towards new activities. The strategy should give each project a clearer set of indicators by which to judge success, and an exit strategy, to avoid a permanent presence built around ever-evolving objectives..

v. Inform DIPD's position in the field of party assistance.

As mentioned in section 1, most of the actors in the field of party assistance have developed distinguishing characteristics and defined themselves by what they do differently from everyone else. The next phase of DIPD's life will mean defining what it does differently and better than any other party assistance provider. This will have two benefits.

First, it will emphasise the distinctiveness of the Danish approach to party assistance and make it easier for DIPD to pitch for funding on the basis of this comparative advantage. Second, effective international assistance depends on co-ordination and collaboration. Yet, many donor agencies are territorial and defensive. This is much less so when an implementer has a specific expertise and approach, as it becomes clearer what they will do, and thus present less of a perceived threat to other donors.

Part II: Organisation, Administration and Capacity

38. DIPD's dual mandate requires a governance structure that brings together many different interests. It must represent the interests of a number of political parties of greatly varying political views, sizes and capacities, who are responsible for running party-to-party programmes in a diverse range of countries. Equally, it relies on a secretariat with limited resources to support its growing portfolio of multi-party programmes, to advise on and monitor party-to-party programmes, and to provide support for the Board itself. In this section, we consider the roles of the DIPD Board and its secretariat.

The Board: steering not rowing

39. The DIPD Board is composed of fifteen members, with nine members appointed by the Danish parliamentary political parties, two by the Danish Youth Council, and one each by the Danish NGO Forum, Rektorkollegiet, Danish Centre for International Studies and Human Rights and the Minister for Development Cooperation.[13] The members are appointed for a four-year period with the possibility of re-election. The Chair is elected by the members and they also elect two Vice Chairs. The Chair and Vice Chairs form a Steering Committee, which guides the organisation's work between formal Board meetings.

40. Our consultations found that the Board is generally perceived to operate effectively and usually inclusively. In the main, there is a high degree of engagement from members, although it was noted that the members nominated by the Danish Youth Council did not often attend. Board members very much appreciated the approach of the Chair of the Board, which was felt to have contributed significantly to ensuring that all parties were effectively engaged in the Institute's work, particularly in the early days. The inclusion of development and academic representatives was seen as an advantage and it was felt that these representatives had brought a useful external dimension to the work of the political parties. Looking forward, the turnover in board members will become more important and DIPD could consider providing a formal induction process for new members in order to preserve and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of board.

41. There is clearly a high degree of co-operation between the Board and the Secretariat and a good working relationship between the Chair and Director, which has been vital to ensuring that the organisation built up a successful programme of activities despite some external hostility in its early days. Now, however, the Board has begun to reflect on the division of responsibilities between itself and the secretariat, which was described to us as having become "blurred" in some cases. In particular, the secretariat's role in advising on party-to-party projects has been larger than originally anticipated, making it hard to draw a clear line between the Board's role of steering and guiding the overall direction of the Institute and that of the Secretariat in developing and implementing programmes. Although there is a division of responsibility, we were told by several interviewees that in order to get through the volume of work the Board needed to help the secretariat. The secretariat is effectively policeman, judge and jury on projects. It is advising the board, managing projects and attempting to ensure quality control. These roles need to be more clearly divided. It is not entirely clear who is the ultimate decision-maker within the organisation, nor who is the arbiter in the case of disagreement.

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[13] DIPD Strategy 2011-2013, p.25.

42. This issue had been identified by the DIPD Board before our review began, with Board members acknowledging that "formally, the two functions are separate and undertaken separately" but "in practice the separation is not so clear".[14] The problem is compounded in some cases by an apparent lack of communication between party representatives on the Board and party staff implementing projects in the field, which has reinforced the impression for some that the Board and Secretariat operate as one body rather than occupying distinctive functions.

43. For its part, we were told that the secretariat has "never not delivered" work requested by the Board, despite its limited resources and the many other demands on its time. Some board members suggested that the secretariat should not automatically say yes to all requests from the board but rather question whether these items of work will add significant value.

The Secretariat: aligning ambitions with resources

44. DIPD's secretariat performs multiple functions, including:
   - Direct support for multi-party projects
   - Provision of advice and monitoring for political parties on party-to-party programmes
   - Secretariat functions for the board
   - Administrative functions relating to the establishment and running of a new organisation

45. The work of individual members of the secretariat is clearly highly appreciated by political party staff, members of the Board, and partner organisations. There is an appreciation that DIPD staff are always willing to provide help and advice, even when they may be busy, and that the leadership shown by senior staff has given DIPD a high profile nationally and internationally in a short space of time. However, there are concerns that the limited resources of the secretariat do not match the demands of an ambitious overall programme, and that a clearer delineation of individual staff roles may be desirable as the organisation develops. During our consultations, we were told that it was vital in the next phase that DIPD should take steps to "align its ambitions with its resources" and that the opportunistic approach to taking on new projects, described in section 1 above, combined with insufficiently developed resource management systems (there is at present no record of the amount of staff time being spent on different tasks), had led to a risk of overstretch which could in the future start to affect the quality of project delivery.

46. The secretariat's limited resources have restricted DIPD's capacity to adequately respond to staff's heavier workload and increasing project management and implementation responsibilities. At the time of this review, the secretariat had supplemented its core staff by taking on a student intern and a temporary member of staff undertaking a work placement. Local staff support in DIPD's multi-party projects in Nepal and Myanmar have also helped lighten the load at the centre. In respect of job roles, DIPD's Annual Report explains that "Both the director, the senior adviser and the two project officers are responsible for certain administrative matters, but most of their time is dedicated to programme advice for the political parties, programme planning for the multi-party activities, monitoring of progress in projects, etc. The opposite is the case for the administrator of DIPD"[15]. All DIPD's multi-party

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[14] Board meeting 01/03/2013 – Quality Assurance in DIPD – Bilag 3C.
[15] Annual Report 2012, p.64.

projects are managed by staff in the secretariat, although in most cases, implementation is largely the responsibility of local partners, and local staff in the cases of Myanmar and Nepal, with remote support from DIPD staff.

47. Although no formal records are kept, we were told that project work was time-consuming and took up a significant proportion of the secretariat's staff time. We also heard that under the current administrative arrangements, it is not possible to use project funds to create additional posts within the secretariat. However, it is possible to employ local staff and consultants through project allocations and to take on temporary staff such as student interns and DIPD has used these options as the only available routes by which it can increase its staff resources. Some thought that this approach, whilst it has provided an increase in overall capacity, had led to a 'patchwork' of staff, which was becoming increasingly difficult to co-ordinate and manage. Local and temporary staff require support from the centre to be really effective, but the secretariat is already stretched and there is a feeling that the extent of their workload sometimes isolates them from project work on the ground (they noted that "we could be more involved if we had more time").

48. We identified a particular risk of overload in the post of DIPD Administrator, whose role appears to us to be more akin to a Chief Operating Officer in overseeing the set-up and smooth running of the Institute. Whilst this is in itself a complex and demanding task, within DIPD, this role is also expected to provide support for Board activities and undertake some project work. In a new and small organisation, there will be times when staff need to work beyond their normal job descriptions, however, as the Institute grows and develops, and its functions become clearer, there should be space for a clearer delineation of roles as well as a time management and recording system to warn of potential bottlenecks before any problems arise.

Political expertise

49. It is not only the number of core staff which is significant for DIPD's success, but also the type of skills and expertise the secretariat has access to. One theme raised by many of those to whom we spoke was the perception that most DIPD staff have "development" rather than "political" experience. They thought that DIPD would benefit from having more staff with previous experience in political parties, citing in particular the following issues:

- Political analysis of countries prior to starting a project would be enhanced by greater awareness of party issues.
- Certain aspects of project design focus on generic capacity building but do not extend to include how these skills would be deployed in political campaigns on the ground. Some project objectives aimed at reaching consensus between opposing parties or even sharing skills and information are unrealistic – they are neither feasible nor even desirable where the aim is for parties to compete with one another on the basis of different ideological platforms.
- Support provided to the political parties by the secretariat has sometimes been hampered by a lack of understanding of the realities of working in political parties and the resources it is possible to deploy.
- The administrative requirements and paperwork for party-to-party projects seems to have been drawn from a development model which is not always suited to a small project taking place in a political context. For example, respondents queried how it would be possible to measure impact in the forms

requested in a fragile political context over the lifetime of what are often very short-term projects (some under a year in duration).

50. We heard that DIPD does have the power to second political party staff into its secretariat, but that it was understandably reluctant to do this in the early stages, when the organisation was politically contested. Equally, DIPD is currently reviewing its guidance on the administrative requirements relating to party-to-party projects with the aim of making it more unified and user friendly. Nevertheless, there may be a case in future for enhancing the in-house knowledge and experience of political parties within the secretariat itself.

Financial expertise

51. Another area in which DIPD lacks internal expertise is finance. Overall, DIPD had a budget of 75 million DKK for its first three years. This is likely to be underspent, primarily due to the time taken to recruit key staff and establish institutional structures before DIPD could begin work on programmes. It is not the remit of this review to recommend funding levels for the next phase, but our respondents were generally of the view that if a similar allocation were provided for the next three years, there would be unlikely to be any significant underspend.

52. Financial issues are clearly a source of concern for DIPD. The Institute is highly aware of its duty to spend public money responsibly and to account for it scrupulously. The sceptical atmosphere into which DIPD was born and recent instances of financial irregularities in other Danish organisations are clearly a concern for the Institute, even though it has already been audited by the Danish State which has not found any evidence of impropriety or irregularity in the Institute's financial dealings.

53. In fact, the emphasis on overall financial regularity may be a diversion from DIPD's actual financial weaknesses, which lie more in the area of individual project budgeting and forecasting. DIPD's finance functions were restructured at a very early stage, which clearly caused significant disruption for the organisation, including for a time a high degree of uncertainty about the kind of support, if any, it might be able to access. At present, the Institute has no real in-house financial expertise, relying on bought-in consultants and other external accountancy support. Whilst this allows it to fulfil auditing and accounting requirements, it does not allow staff to analyse project finance flows or access support with budgeting at project level. It also places a significant burden on the post of DIPD Administrator to oversee and co-ordinate these functions (a post which we have already identified as at risk of overload) and affects the ability of DIPD secretariat to advise political parties on these issues. DIPD's capacity in these areas could be certainly increased by the addition of in-house financial support staff.

Internal and External Communication

54. DIPD is very advanced in terms of its communications strategy, especially in comparison with others working in the field. For example, it has a distinctive image and branding. The Institute has devoted considerable efforts to communicating its work through a series of thematic publications, a well-developed website and seminars and activities with interested parties in Denmark (including the annual Christiansborg seminar) and internationally. DIPD's publications are intended to provide "ideas that inspire",[16] and they contain original and interesting material that could be used in a variety of

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[16] Annual Report 2010-2011, p.4.

programme contexts. In our consultations, we heard evidence that DIPD was concerned about the level of media penetration in its work. We do not believe that this is a major concern. However, it is not clear how far the communications strategy has been absorbed, and operationalized by the constituent parts of the organisation.

55. The political parties are expected to contribute to the communications through their own resources, and there does not appear to be a high level of awareness within the parties of the communications strategy. The extent to which each party advertises its international work varies, but some have developed strategies to inform the wider party membership, and the general public of their activities. A more co-ordinated communication strategy could form part of efforts to draw the political parties more closely into a coherent DIPD approach.

56. The team also found the content of much of DIPD communication material to be highly tentative and was struck by the somewhat apologetic tone which characterises some of it. It is not always clear to which audience its publications are directed, and the organisation seems wary of 'selling itself' to the general public. Much is made of previous failures in the field of party assistance and the desire to lower expectations is evident. Whilst this is again understandable in the context of the sceptical atmosphere in which the Institute was created, in order to sustain levels of support for its activities, DIPD will need to move on to identifying and celebrating the successes which have arisen from its programmes. This will mean presenting a more nuanced position, acknowledging that party support is complex and difficult, and results sometimes unpredictable, but arguing that donors need to have realistic expectations and that change is possible with a long-term approach that combines strategy and flexibility.

Conclusions and recommendations

DIPD has achieved a significant amount of progress on a modest budget. This has been possible due to the commitment of staff, Board members and the political parties in order to make things happen. However, we get a strong sense that the organisation is straining the limits of its capacity. It needs to reflect on the roles of the constituent parts of the organisation, its internal processes and its staffing requirements if it seeks to continue at this pace. We make recommendations under three headings.

Role of Board and Secretariat

Although there is a division of responsibility, we were told be several interviewees that in order to get through the volume of work the Board needed to help the secretariat. The secretariat is policeman, judge and jury on projects. It is advising the board, managing projects and attempting to ensure quality control. These roles need to be more clearly divided. It is not entirely clear who is the ultimate decision-maker within the organisation, nor who is the arbiter in the case of disagreement. We make 3 specific recommendations here:

r. 2.1 The roles of Board and Secretariat need further clarifying (paras. 41 - 42)

It appears that many decisions about project approval are formalities during Board meetings. The Board should have a stronger executive function, as the ultimate decision-maker and arbiter in disputes. Some of these roles are currently being performed by the secretariat. The secretariat should play a role in advising the Board, and once projects are approved the Secretariat should have the authority to ensure the quality of

their implementation. The secretariat should be able to challenge project managers within the political parties about progress against indicators.

r. 2.2   To improve Board meetings, members should have formal induction and paperwork be reduced (paras. 40 and 43)
New members to the DIPD should go through formal induction, around DIPD's strategic objectives especially in anticipation of Board membership's increasing turnover as the Institute's enters future phases. In addition, given that it is not clear whether the current volume of reading material is improving the Board's functioning, we believe that paperwork at Board meetings should be reduced.

Staffing requirements
As we have mentioned elsewhere, DIPD has taken on a large amount of work in its first three years. This has been possible due to the commitment of staff, Board members and the political parties in order to make things happen. However, the organisation is straining the limits of its capacity. A clearer strategy is likely to give the organisation a better sense of where it can be most effective and how it can best deploy its resources. But we make four specific recommendations.

r. 2.3   DIPD needs more project and admin staff to carry on at the current level of activity (paras. 45-47)
DIPD needs more project and administrative staff to carry on at the current level of activity. The decision that it should limit staff was taken for the right reasons, but DIPD needs to recognise that it needs more capacity to maintain its current level of work. DIPD and MFA could consider allocating a portion of project funds to hire more project staff to meet the Secretariat's increasing workload.

r. 2.4   DIPD needs to create the role of Chief Operating Officer (para. 48)
DIPD needs a Chief Operating Officer to oversee project management, internal structures and processes, and office management. At present this role is being performed by an 'administrator'. This downplays the size and importance of the role in an organisation undertaking the volume of work of DIPD. The COO post would improve internal functioning and communication.

r. 2.5   DIPD should seek greater in-house political expertise (paras. 49 and 50)
At present the majority of staff come from a development background. This has not presented particular problems, but greater in-house expertise would improve project planning and management, and strengthen links with the political parties. It is telling that the most effective international party assistance organisations utilise the skills of those who have experience of working in politics. This expertise might be through the employment of new staff or the secondment of party staff to the secretariat.

r. 2.6   DIPD needs more in-house financial expertise (paras. 51-53)
DIPD's finance structures are well designed to meet their reporting requirements, but these are diverting attention from the more important issue of individual project budgeting and forecasting. DIPD is dependent on bought-in consultants and other external accountancy support who help fulfil auditing and accounting requirements, but does not allow staff to analyse project finance flows or access support with budgeting at project level. To improve project management DIPD requires in-house financial support staff.

Communications

DIPD faces two main challenges in the next phase. First, DIPD is concerned about the level of media penetration. We do not believe that this is a major concern, but it is not clear how far the communications strategy has been absorbed, and operationalized by the constituent parts of the organisation. Second, the content of much of its communication material is highly tentative. We commend the organisation's recognition of the difficulties in achieving change in this field, but at times organisation appears uncertain and nervous about its own ability to achieve success.

r. 2.7 DIPD needs to ensure its communication strategy runs through the organisation (para.54)

DIPD needs to ensure that the communications strategy is absorbed and operationalised by the various parts of the organisation. The internalisation of that communications strategy depends on clear messages being reinforced from the Board and through the staff and political parties.

r. 2.8 Communications material should highlight multi-party and party-to-party work (para. 55)

DIPD's communications material should emphasise both the multi-party and party-to-party aspects of its work, highlighting consistently the links between the two strands of work and the aspects that are common to both as part of the Danish approach to party strengthening.

r. 2.9 Communications material should emphasise DIPD's strengths (para. 56)

Much of DIPD's communications appears hesitant about its work, and the likelihood of success. Addressing this will come, in part, from a strategy which defines DIPD's approach and its distinctive model. In the next phase DIPD should be clearer in its publications about what it is doing, why it is doing it and what results it expects to achieve.

Part III: Project implementation and measuring projects

57. Since its creation, DIPD has planned and developed seven multi-party and thirteen sister-party projects spanning thirteen countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East.[17] This is a significant achievement in a short time for a small organisation with limited resources. Programmes aim to foster multi-party dialogue, deliver support and capacity-building services in local politics and to strengthen the role of women and youth in politics. Whilst the party-to-party programmes were somewhat slower to get started than DIPD's multi-party work, the Institute has achieved its target that each political party that wanted to have a project should be able to begin one within its first three years.[18]

58. This section presents the review team's findings concerning the planning, development and implementation of DIPD's programmes, based on our consultations with project participants, stakeholders and other observers. As noted in the introduction to this report, all DIPD's projects are at a very early stage of implementation, so the available evidence to assess is limited and any evaluation of impact would certainly be premature. In Appendix 5 to this report, we include a report in the review team's field visit to Tanzania, a country in which DIPD has both multi-party and party-to-party projects. This case study considers in greater detail the challenges and achievements of DIPD's programming so far and provides specific examples to illustrate the overall findings of this report.

Project management and delivery: Party-to-party projects

59. The political parties are both direct implementers of DIPD projects and key drivers of its overall strategy, through the mechanism of the Board. It is the centrality of political parties within DIPD, which was described to us as giving the organisation its political "bite" and setting it apart from other like-minded organisations.

60. Whilst most parties have found common ground with their partners, there is often not an exact ideological match – in many developing countries, parties are defined more by personality than ideology. The Danish parties have not found this to be problematic, however, as long as there is a degree of sympathy with the aims of the party concerned. In one case (the Liberals' project in Kenya) a Danish party is working to support a multi-party platform, due to the restrictions on party-to-party support in that country. This project is very well-regarded and has been successful in developing Kenyan parties' youth and media work. Both the Danish and Kenyan partners are keen to continue with the project; however they both spoke of their impression that DIPD was not happy with the relationship because it does not conform to the single party-to-single party model for such assistance. They felt under pressure to find a different arrangement which would satisfy DIPD whilst allowing them to continue their work, which they thought benefitted significantly from being delivered by party members with real political and campaign experience. Whilst the focus of this strand of DIPD's work should be on party-to-party support, it would be unfortunate if a successful project were not renewed due to a narrow vision of project requirements.

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[17] See Appendix 5 for a full list of DIPD projects.
[18] DPP has decided that it does not wish to have any projects.

61. Danish political parties display a lot of variation in their capacity to conduct international project work. The larger parties (particularly the Liberals and Social Democrats) have a strong history of international work and already had staff and management structures in place to undertake this work at the time of DIPD's creation. Other parties took time to develop these capacities, and often needed considerable advice and guidance from DIPD staff. Apart from through the Board (whose functions are discussed above) the main interface between the political parties and DIPD secretariat is in the day-to-day advice and guidance that DIPD staff provide to party-co-ordinators on developing a project proposal and then running their project on the ground. Whilst both sides have appreciated the willingness of the other to engage positively in this relationship (every Danish political party, bar one, now has a project partnership running through DIPD, and party staff expressed their gratitude to DIPD staff for their willingness to provide advice) some tensions have arisen, particularly concerning the administrative requirements for party-to-party projects.

62. We were told by many of our interlocutors that, apart from in the largest parties, the capacity within Danish parties to organise and manage projects had been much weaker than originally expected and had led to a significant demand for support from DIPD centrally. Conversely, we were also told that the administrative requirements for a project proposal imposed by DIPD are lengthy and cumbersome. It is clear that during its start-up phase, DIPD was very alert to the possibility of criticism for its use of public money, especially the possible allegation that parties might be diverting money to themselves or be taking 'holidays' at the taxpayer's expense. The emphasis on rigorous administrative requirements is understandable in this light, but it has disadvantages. Whilst parties have always appreciated DIPD staff's willingness to assist them, some have felt "micro-managed" and that they were being asked to complete a "box-ticking exercise" that become irrelevant once project delivery had actually begun. In contrast to the close focus on initial project proposals, they noted that during project implementation, unless the parties encounter problems, DIPD staff rarely get involved.

63. The time and effort devoted to administrative requirements represents a significant burden for both DIPD staff and party staff. In recognition of this, and in an effort to lighten the load, DIPD has recently produced revised guidance on the administrative requirements for project proposals for political party staff. A number of our consultees thought that this was an important step and that DIPD should continue to focus on building capacity to initiate and manage projects within the parties themselves during its next phase. Suggestions included reviewing administrative requirements to streamline the application process and perhaps using template forms from other sectors, such as the voluntary sector, which are suited to small organisations and programmes.

64. In addition, there was a demand for a higher level of support in project delivery. Some of the problems parties have encountered, particularly in dealing with weak or questionable administrative and financial capacities of their partners, have been the source of concern and stress for the programme officers involved. The parties agreed that there would be room for more information sharing on commonly-encountered problems, as well as on notable successes, as a form of mutual support. The DIPD secretariat already arranges a monthly meeting of project co-ordinators, which is much appreciated by party staff, but currently functions more as a conduit for the provision of information to parties from DIPD staff than the sharing of experiences and learning between them. This could develop into a higher-level forum in which to share best practice and address challenges.

65. We have also found that the interpretation of project rules, on the part of both the parties and the secretariat, is sometimes inflexible. We heard examples of project staff wishing to alter activities in the light of experience, but being told that they were required to stick to the agreed plan. It was suggested to us that in these cases, there was a concern to monitor expenditure and ensure that funding was spent on the purposes for which it was allocated, but this is not always a helpful approach and DIPD needs to ensure that a balance is struck between accountability and flexibility in cases where the project would benefit. Any effective project will need to change and react to changing circumstances, particularly in the political field

66. In the next phase of DIPD's development, parties' capacities to manage projects need to be consolidated. Some parties already have long-established processes, but others are less confident. All parties could benefit from mutual support and information-sharing on issues of common interest.

Project management and delivery: Multi-party projects

67. The Danish political parties have limited involvement in multi-party programmes and there was a feeling that their lack of involvement was symptomatic of the more general tendency for these programmes to eschew party politics and indeed to regard it with a degree of suspicion. This view was also held by a number of other observers and stakeholders who described DIPD's multi-party programmes as being "development-focused" rather than political in nature. The parties spoke of being asked to "provide" MPs or other politicians for events connected to multi-party programmes, but said that they were not usually involved in project planning or design. Overall, the multi-party programmes were generally regarded by the political parties as being inspired, conceived and delivered by the DIPD secretariat. When asked, the Danish parties expressed a wish to be more involved in DIPD's multi-party work. Whilst it is clear that some parties initially found the experience of managing their own party-to-party programmes challenging, and may not have had the capacity to take on further work, the parties are now at a stage where it would be possible to increase their involvement in the multi-party work without detracting from their own programmes.

Multi-party partnerships and collaborations

68. DIPD's approach to working with partner organisations in project countries was described to us as relatively "hands off" compared to other similar organisations. This was particularly apparent in the projects it took over from NIMD, which has tended to work in what was described as a more "interventionist" manner with its partners. An example of some issues raised by the transition from one approach to the other is provided by the experience of the Tanzania Centre for Democracy and is explored in more detail in the Appendix. In short, DIPD told us that it would prefer its partners to stand on their own and not to become too dependent on outside guidance. However, where a partner organisation has weak capacities in certain areas, it may be that more targeted support would reap rewards.

69. As DIPD recognises in its approach, it is equally important that local partners, whether parties or NGOs, should be closely involved in project design and planning of activities. During our consultations we probed the extent to which this was true in practice. Whilst we were reassured that local partners were very involved in, and indeed usually inspired the choice of subject area and activities, we are less convinced that they were always involved in planning the format of activities, or even less in writing up proposals, which seemed to be drafted or at least "re-drafted" several times in Denmark. Given the

relative complexity of the administrative requirements for DIPD projects referred to in the previous section, this is understandable, but there is a risk that it limits the inclusion of Southern voices in project design. This is another factor for DIPD to bear in mind as it continues its review of project documentation and guidance.

70. DIPD's strategy and Annual Reports lay a good deal of importance on collaboration with like-minded organisations. The Institute has been very active in establishing contacts with other international organisations, particularly in the Nordic Community, but also worldwide, and our consultations confirmed that this approach is appreciated and DIPD is regarded as a welcome addition to the sector.

71. Inevitably, there have been some instances in particular project areas where co-ordination on the ground could have been better. DIPD is working in areas where there are many other actors (particularly, for example, in its projects focusing on women and youth) and is entering a crowded field. In some cases, where other organisations are already working on a given objective, this can give rise to an element of resentment if the existing actor feels that their work is not recognised, or their territory is being "invaded". There is no evidence to suggest that any DIPD project seeks deliberately to duplicate existing work; on the contrary, the Institute is highly aware of the need to co-ordinate. However, in busy projects where staff are overloaded, it is easy to lose sight of the need for communication.

72. Communication and collaboration must be a particular priority for DIPD in those projects where DIPD is formally working in collaboration with another organisation (i.e. with NIMD in Egypt, Zimbabwe and particularly Myanmar). This will be a crucial relationship for these projects to be really effective and sufficient attention needs to be given to communication and information-sharing to ensure that it remains balanced and productive for both sides.

Reporting and measuring results

73. It is far too early for this evaluation to judge the effectiveness of DIPD's projects, but it is clear that DIPD has expended significant effort in developing a comprehensive system for monitoring and measuring results. The project application documents are robust and considered, and mid-point evaluations seem to be a routine part of the running of DIPD and in 2014, the DIPD is planning to establish a comprehensive Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation System.

74. DIPD's fulfilment of its reporting obligations has been admirable. It has sought to make sure that it complies with all the requirements of the MFA in terms of reporting. This rigour may have been a result of MFA's concern to validate DIPD's existence in its early days, however, the second phase should allow for a more moderated approach to reporting procedures. The current volume of paperwork is burdensome and if it continues at this level it is likely to effect DIPD's ability to deliver results in the next few years. (See also para 60, above.)

75. The challenge for all organisations working in the field of international assistance to governance is to find reliable and meaningful ways of measuring impact. Some interesting initiatives are being pursued by international agencies such as USAID in conjunction with the University of Pittsburgh and Higher Education for Development. The collaboration resulted in the formulation of an evaluation tool and assessment process to analyse the impact of USAID assistance on political party development and democratization. Challenging conventional approaches to M&E, organisations such as ODI have started

to apply the concept of complexity science to international development as a means of understanding the complex processes by which change occurs (the topic has been extensively dealt with by ODI Research Fellow Ben Ramalingam in *Aid on the Edge of Chaos*[19]) and potentially providing a platform to measure change. Tools inspired by complexity science, such as outcome mapping have been adopted by organisations such as AcT Tanzania to effectively develop mechanisms to monitor and evaluate projects. We do not intend to (and cannot) provide DIPD with an M&E model, given that it is eluding some of the most significant players in international assistance. However, we suggest that DIPD's approach is guided by three insights.

76. First, the pressure for measuring impact has increasingly driven donor agencies to look for quantifiable outputs, rather than qualitative outcomes. Although numbers offer some indication of activity they rarely give a sense of impact. Any measurement system needs to combine quantitative and qualitative indicators.

77. Second, correlation is not the same as causation. Political change rarely happens because of the act of one international assistance project, it is often the result of a confluence of factors occurring at the same time. Although analysis of a programme measurement might suggest a link between project activity and outcome, this needs to be treated cautiously.

78. Third, indicators often alter the direction of a project, because once they are in place all project activity is focused on meeting them. Using quantitative indicators means that project managers will be judged by their ability to meet them. Over time, as circumstances change, such indicators may not be the right ones to achieve the intended outcomes. In short, set the wrong indicators and you end up doing the wrong things.

Conclusions and recommendations

In terms of project initiation, management and delivery, there are distinctions between the party-to-party projects and multi-party projects. The secretariat has a central role in the development of all such projects, and has done an impressive job in ensuring that a diverse range of projects have been initiated in a wide variety of countries. This diversity is a strength, but in the next phase of DIPD's development the institute should seek to ensure a coherence of approach that informs both multi-party and party-to-party programmes. In particular, we believe the political parties could have greater involvement in the multi-party projects, and that the secretariat should have clear authority to ensure quality and progress chase on multi-party and party-to-party programmes.

Project management and delivery

r. 3.1 DIPD should continue to support the parties to build their capacity to initiate and manage projects (paras. 61 and 62)

The ability of the parties to run party-to-party projects varies significantly. The larger parties seem to have dedicated staff and robust procedures to run projects. Others are more dependent on the secretariat. We believe all the parties should have enough resources to be self-sufficient and thus be able to run their own projects. In developing the DIPD approach to party-to-party work we believe DIPD should continue to

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[19] Ben Ramalingam (2013) *Aid on the Edge of Chaos*

develop best practice amongst the parties, and encourage the sharing of knowledge and lessons learnt within and between the parties.

r. 3.2   Political parties should have a greater involvement in the planning and implementation of multi-party projects (para. 67)

DIPD has stressed to us that all of their projects are designed to be political, however, there seems to be limited engagement with the political parties in the development of multi-party projects. This may be due to the speed with which DIPD has had to move in the first three years of its life. However, the institute risks not properly utilising the expertise of the political parties in the design of multi-party projects, unless there is a more systematic and routine form of discussion on such projects.   (Through their international work, all parties are likely to identify opportunities for DIPD.) This might be achieved by including the party project managers in a pattern of Board meetings, routine consultations by the secretariat, or creating extraordinary meetings of the Board to examine opportunities identified by the parties. The political parties need a greater presence at Board meetings. Party project co-ordinators should, at the very least, be able to present their projects to the Board for approval and be available to answer questions from the Board about progress against indicators

r. 3.3   The secretariat's role in advising, monitoring progress and ensuring quality across all projects needs to be more clearly defined. (paras. 62 – 64)

At present the secretariat is performing multiple roles in designing, amending, approving, managing and monitoring all projects. This may create difficulties in the future. It needs to reduce its role in helping to deliver party projects as party capacity increases. The secretariat is the only part of the institute that can ensure processes are being followed, and the progress is in line with the project design. We believe the secretariat should be given clear authority by the Board to monitor progress and call to account party projects which are not progressing as planned.

r. 3.4   The secretariat needs to encourage flexibility in project implementation (paras. 62 and 65)

This is again linked to compliance and reporting requirements. DIPD has emphasised the importance of flexibility in its approach. However, the evaluation discovered a couple of occasions where what seemed like logical alterations to project design were rejected as they did not comply with process, although they seemed to us to be line with project objectives and outcomes. We know that DIPD is striving for projects built around outcomes rather than activities. We believe that refinements to the reporting system should allow project managers to vary activities and outputs, but still retain a focus on the project's outcomes

Multi-party partnerships and collaborations

The involvement of project partners is central to DIPD's stated objectives of ensuring local ownership of its work. This can be problematic, especially where those partners have limited capacity and resources, and faced with high levels of reporting. We have also discussed with DIPD the sometimes difficult relationship between international donor agencies operating in the same country.

r. 3.5   Involvement of local project partners (para. 69)

DIPD should seek to involve project partners more closely in the development of projects. We recognise that DIPD has had lengthy discussions with project partners in designing programmes, but that much of the detail in proposals had to be drafted by staff, which has led to concerns amongst some of the partners. We

hope that as DIPD evolves so it will develop a format for developing proposals which incorporates partners at every stage.

r. 3.6   Partnerships with implementing agencies (paras. 70 and 72)

Communication and collaboration with other implementing agencies should be a priority in country. We recognise that DIPD has sought to engage with other agencies and implementers in the countries within which they work, and often been frustrated by them. However, we hope that DIPD will continue to make great efforts to co-ordinate and collaborate with other agencies. As a new entity, some other implementers may feel threatened, but we believe that as DIPD refines its strategy and its approach, it will be clearer where and how collaboration will evolve with other organisations.

Reporting and measuring results

r. 3.7   Reporting procedures should be streamlined so they create less work (paras. 63/73-74)

The level of reporting needs to be reduced. Although we commend DIPD on developing a very thorough system of reporting, we believe that this is overly elaborate. It is of course important for project managers to account for their activities, but there is a danger that project managers spend too much time reporting and not enough delivering projects. We recognise that this is partly due to the reporting requirements of the MFA, and we urge the MFA and DIPD to identify ways in which the level of reporting can be reduced without compromising accountability.

r. 3.8   An effective progress management system should combine quantitative and qualitative indicators (paras. 75-78)

Developing a coherent system for measuring impact in governance is the holy grail for donor agencies and implementers. Providing DIPD with such a system is way beyond the scope of an evaluation. However, we would suggest that three insights guide DIPD's efforts, namely that the system should combine measures of quality and quantity, distinguish between correlation and causation, and be aware that the wrong indicators distort project effectiveness.

Part IV: Conclusion

79. We believe that DIPD has made impressive progress in its first three years. It has, to quote one of our interviewees, been "paving as it moved". It has developed a well-regarded programme of multi-party projects organised through local partners and in collaboration with like-minded organisations. It has supported all the Danish political parties to create party-to-party partnerships in a wide range of different countries. It has established a new organisation from scratch and built an international reputation, whilst simultaneously navigating logistical and administrative challenges which posed a considerable threat to its operation.

80. DIPD's achievements have been realised because those who work with and within the organisation were prepared to put aside the political controversy surrounding its birth and get on with the job. The prime concern at this early stage was to demonstrate that DIPD could function effectively in its role of bringing the parties together to work internationally, that it could be trusted to spend public money responsibly and that it could be effective.

81. In the next phase of DIPD's development, the pace of change should slow, allowing it the breathing space to reflect on its activities so far, to identify and articulate the key elements that make DIPD's work distinctive, and to consolidate these elements into a strategy for future development which is both practical and political in nature.

82. The purpose of this report is to highlight the challenges that we believe are starting to emerge. We believe that most of these are simply 'growing pains'. In the early years of an organisation, there is a lot of good will and desire to make things work. However, in the next phase of the institution's life it will face greater pressure to clarify its strategy, consolidate its organisational structure and to show results. In particular we believe it must define itself as distinctive in the field of party assistance. The recommendations are an attempt to identify some of those challenges so that the organisation can go from strength to strength.

Summary of conclusions and recommendations

Part I: Strategic focus and programme logic

r. 1: DIPD staff, board members and political parties should develop a strategy which should seek to do five things (paras 27-33):

- Identify the distinctive features of the DIPD approach to party strengthening.

- Provide guidance how and when DIPD should intervene. DIPD will need to develop sets of principles and guidelines as to how and when DIPD will intervene during the next phase.

- Cohere the different elements of DIPD's work. We expect DIPD will continue to run a range of different activities, but they should be informed by clear strategic objectives.

- Improve measurement of results. The strategy should give each project a better sense of likely outcomes and an exit strategy, to avoid a permanent presence built around ever-evolving objectives.

- Inform DIPD's position in the field of party assistance. The next phase of DIPD's life will mean defining what it does differently and better than any other party assistance provider.

Part II: Organisation, administration and capacity

Role of Board and Secretariat

r. 2.1   The roles of Board and Secretariat need further clarifying (paras. 41 and 42)

r. 2.2   To improve Board meetings, members should have formal induction and paperwork be reduced (paras. 40 and 43)

Staffing requirements

r. 2.3   DIPD needs more project and admin staff to carry on at the current level of activity (paras. 45-47)

r. 2.4   DIPD needs to create the role of Chief Operating Officer (para. 48)

r. 2.5   DIPD should seek greater in-house political expertise (paras. 49 and 50)

r. 2.6   DIPD needs more in-house financial expertise (paras. 51-53)

Communications

r. 2.7   DIPD needs to ensure its communication strategy runs through the organisation (para. 54)

r. 2.8   Communications material should highlight multi-party and party-to-party work (para. 55)

r. 2.9   Communications material should emphasise DIPD's strengths (para. 56)

Part III: Project implementation and measuring results

Project management and delivery

r. 3.1   DIPD should continue to support the parties to build their capacity to initiate and manage projects (paras. 61 and 62)

r. 3.2   Political parties should have a greater involvement in the planning and implementation of multi-party projects (para. 67)

r. 3.3   The secretariat's role in advising, monitoring progress and ensuring quality across all projects needs to be more clearly defined. (paras. 62 – 64)

r. 3.4   The secretariat needs to encourage flexibility in project implementation (paras. 62-65)

Multi-party partnerships and collaborations

r. 3.5   Involvement of local project partners (para. 69)

r. 3.6   Partnerships with implementing agencies (paras. 70- 72)

Reporting and measuring results

r. 3.7   Reporting procedures should be streamlined so they create less work (paras. 63/73-74)

r. 3.8   An effective progress management system should combine quantitative and qualitative indicators (paras. 75-78)

Appendix 1: GPG Review Methodology and staff biographies

The review of DIPD was conducted from April to October 2013. The team's findings were drawn from an extensive desk review of DIPD documents and publications (Appendix 2) and from direct and remote consultations with a range of internal and external DIPD stakeholders (Appendix 3). DIPD programmes in Tanzania were examined more closely with a field visit to Dar Es Salaam in early June, and the team was also asked to look at DIPD's work in Kenya and Nepal in more detail to inform wider programmatic findings.

Methodology for this review

GPA's expertise in party-to-party collaboration and agency support work in the wider democratic development field has allowed us to devise an evaluation framework based around three main components of assessment:

- **Congruence analysis** has been used to assess levels of integration between the DPID Board of Directors, Secretariat staff, MFA, Danish political parties as well as Danish and International partners and relevant resource persons. Congruence analysis allows for evaluation of the levels of fit between an organisation's overarching goals, the objectives of organisational programmes, the programme activities and specific deliverables on the ground. In order to be effective, it is important to have a clear understanding of how programme activities and the outcomes that they deliver connect to programmatic objectives and wider overarching goals.

- **Internal evaluation** is a process measuring outputs. This enables us to assess how effective the deliverables are in terms of quality, measured against the set goals and objectives of DIPD. Has the project met its objectives? Is the internal structure of the organisation, including its resource management, financial processes and project planning, working effectively to achieve the organisation's objectives? How effectively are resources being deployed? What is the standard of outputs, both with reference to industry standards and other international benchmarks?

- **External evaluation** has been used to assess how effective the programmes' deliverables are in reality: on the ground, do they achieve objectives? Are these objectives relevant in the local context in which project activities are being implemented? Have stakeholders benefited from the work, and to what extent do they own it? What real impact have the deliverables had?

 The evaluative framework has been implemented through three main stages, set out in the table below. These are:

- **Desk review and research**: In close consultation with DIPD and MFA staff and with reference to documentation and information provided by DIPD, this stage assessed the relevance of programme activities to contextual needs, and mapped out DIPD's staff, resourcing, internal systems, partners, programmes and activities. This review covers all material listed in the Documentation Section of the Terms of Reference.

- **Evaluation and field visit**: Interviews with staff, stakeholders and partners allowed us to gather data for all three stages of the evaluative framework. We placed particular emphasis on interviewing direct and indirect beneficiaries of programme activities to gather qualitative data to assess impact. This stage included a field visit to assess DIPD's work in Tanzania and its linkages with other forms of support.

- **Consultation, review and final report**: To ensure that the final report accurately reflects the input of DIPD and MFA and responds to their needs, GPA places great importance on the debriefing and consultation process prior to finalising the review.

Review team:

Greg Power, GPG Director

Greg Power has been involved in political and parliamentary reform for around 20 years. He co-founded Global Partners in 2005 to deliver projects to strengthen representative politics, and has since worked in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America.

He provides direct support to politicians and ministers in such countries, developing strategies and managing the process of political reform. He has also provided advice to a variety of international organisations and donor agencies helping, amongst others, the Danish foreign ministry to establish their multi-party institute, and International IDEA to evaluate their work on political parties. He writes widely on issues such as the application of political economy analysis, donor approaches to reform, and parliamentary transparency. He was the author of the first Global Parliamentary Report, published by the UNDP and IPU in 2012.

He was previously a special adviser to British ministers Rt Hon Robin Cook MP and Rt Hon Peter Hain MP, working on strategies for parliamentary reform, constitutional change and the wider democratic agenda in conjunction with the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit and Downing Street policy staff. Greg directed the Parliament and Government Programme at the Hansard Society, the UK's leading think tank on parliament and parliamentary reform. He also ran their Commission on Parliamentary Accountability.

Sue Griffiths, GPG Deputy Director

Sue is responsible for oversight and strategic development of GPG's projects strengthening parliamentary democracy and political parties, working in particular on support to political parties and parliament in Egypt and Jordan.

Sue was previously a Senior Clerk in the House of Commons, where she provided support for select committees and individual Members of Parliament in a variety of roles, developing specialist knowledge of parliamentary procedure and processes. She worked on a number of proposals for parliamentary reform, including for the Modernisation Committee and, most recently, the new Backbench Business Committee.

Sue has a PhD in eighteenth-century French literature and a degree in French and Arabic.

Nicholas Sigler, Expert Associate

Nick Sigler was the Head of International Relations for UNISON, Britain's largest public service union from 2003 until his retirement in 2013. His responsibilities included overall management and development of all the union's international activities and policies, including its international development fund and major projects funded through DFID.

Nick started work for the Labour Party in 1976 as a Research Officer with responsibilities for agriculture and Europe. In 1985 he was seconded to the Socialist Group in the European Parliament where he worked for a year as the British Liaison Officer. He was promoted to the position of Senior Research Officer for the Labour Party in 1986, with additional responsibilities for environmental policy. In September 1993 he was appointed the Labour Party's International Secretary. In 2002 he was seconded by the British Government to work as the Senior Parliamentary Officer at the OSCE Mission in Belgrade, Serbia. Nick is part of the GPG team working with the parliament and political parties in Jordan. He has also assisted with GPG's work with political parties in Egypt.

Rebecca Horsewell, Expert Associate

Rebecca is a skilled evaluation expert, who has 7 years experience of running large projects, dealing with clients at the most senior level, conducting fieldwork and making strong strategic and policy recommendations. Rebecca believes in the genuine power of evaluation work and couples this with a drive and dedication to making a difference to local and global social equality.

Rebecca was born in Denmark and now lives in Copenhagen. She is bilingual in Danish and English.

Nedjma Ouerdane, Research Assistant

Nedjma joined Global Partners Governance (GPG) in 2012 to work on the evaluation of the international network, Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), for the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida).Her work in evaluation continued in 2013 with the review of the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) for the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

Nedjma's role within the organisation involves providing research and strategic analysis for current projects, and drawing key insights from these and from wider governance support research to inform and develop the GPG knowledge base and practice.
Prior to working in democracy assistance, Nedjma's experience was in research and advocacy for women's and children's rights at the Young Foundation and for Child Rights International Network (CRIN). She also conducted extensive fieldwork for a landmark UK class action lawsuit representing victims of toxic waste exposure in Cote d'Ivoire in 2008.

She holds a BA degree in European Studies from King's College London, an International Diploma from Sciences Po Paris and an MSc in Comparative Politics from LSE. Her thesis examined the politics of self-determination in the Western Sahara and in East Timorin a comparative perspective within the framework of international legal standards.

Nedjma is bilingual in French and English, and is currently learning Arabic.

Appendix 2: List of documents included in the desk review

Strategies

Bilag 3D – Opfølgning på anbefalinger fra Strategi til Resultat
Bilag 5B – Fra Strategi til Resultat – Erfaringer
DIPD Strategy 2011-2013 (May 2011)

Thematic Papers

Bilag 3A - Det tværpolitiske samarbejde i DIPD
Bilag 3B - Strategic approaches likeminded organisations
Bilag 3B - Template TOR for Appraisal of Party-to-Party Cooperation
Bilag 3C - Kvalitetssikring i DIPD
Bilag 5A - Evaluering af Christiansborg 2012
Bilag - Notat-Rådgivning draft

Project Guidelines & Tools

Application formats
DIPD Ansøgningsskema forberedende aktivitet (Appraisal phase)
DIPD Ansøgningsskema projekter
DIPD Application format Multi Party Cooperation
DIPD Application Format Party-to-Party Cooperation
DIPD Solitud de Projecto (Spanish version)

Audit instruction
Revisionsinstruks for Parti-til-Parti puljen
Tjekliste til revision for Parti-til-Partipuljen

Format for partner agreement
Anexo 3 Acuerdo inancier
Anexo 4 Directrices para informes de avances
Anexo 5 DIPD Instrucciones para auditoria
Anexo 6 Documento de transferencia de inventario
Annex 3 Financial Agreement
Annex 4 Guidelines for status and final report
Annex 5 Audit instructions
Annex 6 Transfer document
Convinio de Cooperacion (Spanish version)
DIPD Party-Partner Agreement (Annex 1 DIPD Guidelines and 2 Original project document)

Guidelines for projects
DIPD Directrices para Solicitud de apoyo de proyectos
DIPD Guidelines for applying for project support
DIPD Retningslinjer for ansøgning om støtte til projekter
DIPD Retningslinjer for forberedende aktivitet
Notat om konsulentydelser af 25.1.2012
Notat om projektoplysningsaktiviteter af 19.6.2012
Tips til forundersøgelsesfasen

Report formats
Afsluttende rapport om projektforberedende aktivitet
Final Report Format Multi party cooperation
Final Report Format Party-to-party cooperation
Periodic Status Report Format Multi party cooperation
Periodic Status Report Format Party-to-party cooperation

Annual Reports & Organizational Annual Activity Plans

DIPD Activity Plan 2011
DIPD Activity Plan 2012
DIPD Activity Plan 2013
DIPD Activity Report 2011
DIPD Activity Report 2012
DIPD Annual Report 2011
DIPD Annual Report 2012 – draft

Finances & Administration

Aktstykke 148 af 24.6.2010
Årsrapport 2010-2011
Årsrapport 2012 (udkast)
Bestyrelsens forretningsorden
Bestyrelsens selvevaluering 2011
Bestyrelsens selvevaluering2012
Bestyrelsens vedtægter
Bilag 4A - Notat-Budgetstyring af DIPD
Bestyrelsesnotat vedr. flytning og DIPDs administrative systemer af 26.10.2012
Lov om etablering af Institut for Flerpartisamarbejde af 20.5.2010
Notat vedr. DIPDs bevillingsprocedurer (notat til bestyrelsesmøde af 1.3.2013)
Regnskabsinstruks 2012
DIPD Overordnet revisionsprotokollat alle underskrifter
DIPD Revisionsprotkollat 2010 2011
Påtegning 2010 2011 Rigsrevisionen
Samarbejdsaftale mellem UM og DIPD
Bestyrelsesnotat vedr. status på bevillinger ultimo 2012 af 1.3.2013
DIPD bevillingsprocedure Partipuljen
DIPD bevillingsproces vedr. Flerpartipuljen
DIPD Kommunikationsstrategi 2012-2013
DIPD Årsrapport 2010-2011
Indstilling bestyrelsesmøde 26.10.2012 vedr. nye adm. systemer for DIPD
Udkast - DIPD Årsrapport 2012
Årsrapport 2010 2011 - underskrifter

Knowledge Products & Publications

Christiansborg Seminar 2012: Women in Politics - Report
Christiansborg Seminar 2012: Women in Politics - Statement (2012)
Christiansborg Seminar 2012: Women in Politics - Background document
How to Build a Youth Wing (October 2012)
Idéer der kan inspirere (2012)
Political Parties at Local Level. A guide for inspiration. (March 2013)

Political Parties in Democratic Transition (September 2012)
Political Party Support - Synthesis of Lessons Learned(2012)
The Future of Democracy in Egypt (May 2011)
Danida How to Note
Creating effective party-based communication - CMD Kenya (2012)
DANIDA How to Note Political Parties (2010)

Communication
DIPD Kommunikationsstrategi-2012 2013 Final

Internal self evaluation report
Bilag 3B – Partiernes Selvevaluering Final m Resume

Tanzania

TCD-DIPD Cooperation
Bilag 3 D- Indstilling TCD- BM Dec 2011 (partly in English)
Bilag 7H - Tanzania-TCD Application to DIPD, BM Jan 2012
Progress Report - April - October 2012
Signed contract DIPD-TCD 2012
TCD Annual report for DIPD final version
Debriefing Note HLM Novembre 2011

Conservatives & Chadema
20130131 Afsluttende rapport på forberedende aktiviteter
DIPD-Party-Partner-Agreement-Konservative-CHADEMA-2013
Empowering women and youth towards multiparty Democracy in Tanzania
Vedtaget projektansøgning forberedende akt. Konservative Tanzania

Social-Liberals & CUF
20130109 Party-Partner-Agreement
Afsluttende rapport forberedende aktivitet Tanzania
Bilag 6C - Radikale Venstre Projektforslag Tanzania
Godkendt REVISED APPLICATION RV-CUF 2013
Projektansøgning - RV.Forb. Aktiviteter-Tanzania – Vedtaget

Provided by TCD
Amended Constitution
DIPD Budget 2013
Minutes of the Extraordinary Summit held on 19th December 2012
Report – Capacity Needs Assessment
Report – Multiparty Dialogue Platform
Steering Committee paper 11th January 2013
Steering Committee Paper 18th January
Strategic Plan 2011-2015
TCD 1 Internal Party Democracy Manual
TCD 2 Corruption Manual
TCD 3 Gender Manual
TCD 4 Party mobilisation manual
TCD 5 Policy development manual

Women mentoring – programmes & activities
Workplan Capacity building and mentoring programme
Workplan Interparty dialogue.

International Cooperation & Networking

2B Notat-12-10-2011-Washington Roundtable
Nordic Meeting 2012 - Final Report

Nepal

Delegations
Programme - Nepal Steering Committee Delegation to Denmark (16.05.2012)
Programme - Danish Delegation to Nepal (20.04.2012)

Missions
Bilag 8 - Notat - Nepal update (15.06.2011)
DIPD-Mission to Nepal (02.11.2012 – 09.11.2012)
Scoping Mission Report - JOMPOPS (23.08.2011)

Project Documents
Bilag 5A - DIPD-Ansøgning-Projektforslag-Nepal (JOMPOPS) (14.04.2011)
DIPD Nepal country programme - revised project document 2011-2013

Tools
DIPD brev til arbejdsgruppe (24.01.2012)

Myanmar
May 2012 Initial Report
June 2012 Identification mission report
August 2012 Programme Proposal to Board
October 2012 Mission Report
December 2012 Programme note
February 2013 Seminar Report
Knowledge Facility Information Sheet
Myanmar Multi-Party Democracy Programme Note July 2013
Results Framework: Political Party Assistance
Seminar on Electoral System Design July 2013

Egypt
SDP-ESDP Final Report
Annex 1 ESDP-DSDP Activities Report

Bolivia
Bilag 1 Status Report SF-MAS-IPSP
Periodic Status Report 01.2012

Zimbabwe
Bilag 6C – Zimbabwe Proposal 2012-2013
Bilag 7G – Notat-Zimbabwe – 02.03.2012
Bilag 7G – Rapport Zimbabwe

Appendix 3: List of stakeholders consulted

Name	Organisation	Position
Vidar Helgesen	International IDEA and DIPD	DIPD Board member
Anemone Birebaek	Radikale Venstre (RV)	International Project Coordinator
Henning Nielsen	RV	Chair of RV International Committee and DIPD Board Member
Troels Johansen	RV	Volunteer
Rolf Aagaard-Svendsen	Conservatives	Chairman of the International Committee/ DIPD Board member
Hanne Lund Madsen	DIPD Secretariat	Senior Adviser
Bjorn Forde	DIPD Secretariat	Director
Shrishti Rana	DIPD Nepal	Local Coordinator
Thazin Myint	DIPD Myanmar	Local coordinator "Local Programme Unit"
Birgitte Rasmussen	Venstre	Project Leader DLPD
Njeri Kabeberi	CMD Kenya	Executive Director
Ivan Doherty	NDI	Senior Adviser & Director of Political Party programmes
Kenza Aqertit	NDI Nepal	Country Director
Tiina Kukkamaa-Bah	Demo Finland	Director
Riikka Jalonen	Demo Finland Nepal	Country Director
Jerome Scheltens	NIMD	Programme Manager, Tanzania and Libya
Karijn de Jong	NIMD Myanmar (until April 2013)	Senior Programme Manager
Maaikke Van der Werf	NIMD Myanmar (since April 2013)	Programme Manager
Bishnu Adhikari	Enabling State Programme (Nepal)	Governance Adviser

Remote consultations

Direct consultations in Tanzania

Name	Organisation	Position
Augustine T. Magolowondo	NIMD	Africa Regional Programme Coordinator
Ave Maria Semakafu	Tanzania Cross-Party Women's Platform (supported by DemoFinland)	Co-ordinator
Maua Daftari	CCM	MP
Veni Swai	Friedrich Naumann Stiftung	Programme Manager
Daniel Loya and staff	Tanzania Centre for Democracy (TCD)	Executive Director
Mark Montgomery	DFID Tanzania	Governance Adviser
Victor P. Kimesera	CHADEMA	National Executive Secretary
Shaweji Mketo and staff	CUF	Political Director

Stefan Reith and Richard Shaba	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung	Resident representative and Programme Coordinator
Lars Bo Kirketerp Lund	DANIDA	First Secretary Governance & Political Issues
John Mrema	CHADEMA	Director
Benson Bana	REDET (independent media centre)	Professor of Media Studies
Susan Lyimo	CHADEMA	MP

Consultations in Copenhagen

DIPD Board

Name	Party / Organisation
Henrik Bach Mortensen, Chairman	Venstre
Jeppe Kofod, First Deputy Chairman	Social Democrats
Karsten Lauritzen, Second Deputy Chairman	Venstre
Hanne Agersnap	Socialist People's Party
Jane Alro Sorensen	Socialist People's Party – Board member until May 2013
Lisbet Ilkjaer	Danish Centre for International Studies and Human Rights
Dennis Normark	Liberal Alliance
Elsebeth Krogh	NGO Forum

DIPD Secretariat and staff

Name	Position
Bjørn Førde	Director
Hanne Lund Madsen	Senior Adviser
Ulla Gade Bisgaard	Administrator
Ole Grarup	Project officer (maternity cover)
Line Holmung	Project officer
Niels Pelle Wang-Holm	Project officer (work placement)
Majbritt Lagersted	Independent financial consultant
Asger Hougaard	Student assistant

International programme coordinators and resource persons

Name	Party
Birgitte Rasmussen	Liberal Party
Simon Redder Thomsen	Social Democrats
Anemone Birkebaek	Social-Liberal
Rolf Aagaard-Svendsen	Conservative
Dea Donkin	Socialist People's Party
Flavia Morales	Red-Green Alliance
Hans Aalborg	
Thomas Esilser	
Inger Johansen	
Jonathan Nielsen	Liberal Alliance
Carl Christian Ebbesen	Dansk Folkeparti

Other stakeholders

Kurt Mørch Jensen and Darriann Riber	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dorthe Deichmann Thybo	Statens Administration
Ellen Nina Hansen	Statens Administration
Jeef Bech	CISU

Introduction

The terms of reference for the review of DIPD specified that a field visit to Tanzania would be carried out as part of the consultation process. DIPD has both multi-party and party-to party projects in Tanzania, so the field visit allowed the review team to explore both aspects of the Institute's work, as well as considering the way in which the two elements interact on the ground. Participants from Tanzania have also been involved in some other aspects of DIPD's work, for example the annual Christiansborg seminar.

The findings from the Tanzania field trip offer an illustration of the issues discussed in the main body of the report. In this Annex, we provide further details about the individual DIPD projects on the basis of the consultations held with participants, stakeholders and others. The one-week field visit was undertaken in June 2013. A full list of consultees can be found at the end of this Annex.

1. **The Nature of DIPD's work in Tanzania**

DIPD's involvement in Tanzania began at an early stage of the Institute's existence, with an initial decision by the Board "to look into the possibilities of supporting democratization processes in Tanzania"[20] in August 2011. This was followed in November 2011 by a visit by DIPD staff to the Tanzania Centre for Democracy (TCD) to explore the potential for establishing a multi-party project. TCD was at that time being supported by NIMD, but it had decided to withdraw its support from 2012 as a result of re-orientation of Dutch Foreign Assistance policy which no longer categorised Tanzania a priority country. DIPD effectively 'took over' this support from NIMD (with some changes in the nature of the programming, which are explored in more detail below) and signed a Multi-Party Agreement of Co-operation with TCD covering the period March 2012 – December 2013. The two party-to-party projects that DIPD has established in Tanzania came much later in the development of the Institute and we heard from DIPD that parties were not initially interested in establishing programmes in the country. However, later in 2012, two of the smaller political parties decided to begin work in Tanzania - the co-operation between RV and CUF runs from October 2012 to December 2013 and that between the Konservatives and Chadema from March to December 2013.

Why Tanzania?

DIPD explained their decision to establish a multi-party project in Tanzania with reference to a number of factors, including the long history of Danish development co-operation with that country; the perception that Tanzania was generally an 'easy option' or a 'safe' country in which to operate; that because of this, the project balanced the potentially more risky projects in Nepal and Egypt which also formed part of DIPD's portfolio; and that there was good potential for co-operation with like-minded organisations, in particular by continuing support for TCD after NIMD's withdrawal.

In relation to the party-to-party projects, both are being carried out by relatively small political parties which have more limited capacities to run and manage projects than the largest parties in Denmark. DIPD told us that the choice of Tanzania suited these parties, again because it was perceived as a 'safe' option and also

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[20] Summary Debriefing Note, 15.11.11.

because of the additional support provided by the existence of a DIPD multi-party project in the same country.

Political context

During the field visit, the review team tested with interlocutors the extent to which Tanzania's reputation as a stable country, slowly progressing towards a greater degree of democratic freedom, was true in practice. There was general agreement that, although progress is being made, there are significant threats to democratisation and we were told that the period between now and 2015 will be crucial (the draft new constitution was published during the review team's visit; there are local elections in 2014 and a general election in 2015). Among the issues raised were:

- Increased willingness to challenge the government, particularly among young people, but coupled with a poor educational system and high unemployment which sometimes lead to violent incidents.
- Authoritarian reflexes, inside and outside government, including police brutality, media intimidation and human rights infractions.
- Significant gas deposits due to come on stream in the next 2 years.
- Risks of political and economic volatility combined with weak democratic institutions which may be unable to cope.
- Potential for conflict between Zanzibar and the mainland.

The consensus was that the next two years will be decisive for Tanzania.

In light of these factors, Tanzania seems to be a very appropriate country for DIPD to work in and the stakeholders consulted as part of the review were generally supportive of its presence. However, concerns were expressed that the Institute may not have undertaken this in-depth analysis of the political context prior to establishing its multi-party project. Instead, the coincidence of NIMD's withdrawal from Tanzania at the same time as DIPD's creation was perceived as having the most significant weight in its decision to start working in the country. Observers commented that the Institute appeared to be in a rush to make a mark quickly, in order to justify its existence. Many had also formed the impression that the organisation prioritises a traditional development approach over political considerations. They thought that these factors had led DIPD to design its project without sufficient analysis of the political situation, and that this did not necessarily get the best from their partner and in fact risked giving rise to issues and gaps in implementation. One example cited was the fact that all DIPD's project activities (both multi-party and party-to-party) are taking place on the mainland and none in Zanzibar, which appeared strange to some, given the political importance of the island. Although the Union character of political parties in Tanzania tends to orient activities to the mainland, political parties did express an interest in participating in more activities in Zanzibar. We consider the status of the multi-party and party-to-party projects in further detail below.

Recommendations:
- **Tanzania seems a very appropriate country for DIPD's work.**
- **The strategy and process for selection of partner countries and choice of activities needs to be clarified, so that it is always based on in-depth political analysis.**

2. DIPD's Multi-party project

The Tanzania Centre for Democracy (TCD)
TCD is a cross-party platform owned by the political parties themselves and established in 2005 to deepen and strengthen the multiparty political system in the country. Up to 2012, it operated with the support of NIMD. DIPD's project with TCD, which began in April 2012, is intended to strengthen individual political parties and the process of multi-party dialogue and has a particular focus on women and local politics. It includes the creation of local dialogue forums bringing together senior local figures such as police commanders and religious leaders and CSOs in high conflict areas, and a programme of mentoring for women politicians. TCD has so far had little to no interaction with DIPD's party-to-party projects in Tanzania. While we believe that it is important for TCD to preserve its multi-party focus, there are gains which could be made from encouraging more collaboration between TCD and DIPD's party-to-party projects in the country. This would not necessarily mean engaging in joint multi-party / party-to-party projects. Rather, it would involve establishing mechanisms between projects which would facilitate the exchange of information, insights and experience. This would provide a valuable resource for all project stakeholders to draw lessons and inspiration from. For instance, project management strategies and experience in forming local partnerships could be shared between projects in Denmark and Tanzania, and improve performance as a result.
TCD's own assessment of its work with DIPD so far was generally positive, although it acknowledged that there were challenges in some areas. The local dialogue forums had been successful, but had needed much more support from TCD to become operational than expected. However, the Centre much appreciated the opportunity to extend its work into local areas, describing this as 'something that was missing' in previous work. Similarly, the mentoring work with women politicians was thought to be potentially very innovative, and to offer a way to get around frequent problems with the 'per diem culture', which can result in parties supplying unsuitable candidates for training. However, it was hard work to establish in a country where there is no real culture of voluntarism or giving freely of one's time to mentor others.

Administrative requirements

DIPD has relatively demanding administrative requirements for project proposals, reporting, etc. The extent to which TCD was involved in originating this documentation was not entirely clear to the review team, but the impression was that DIPD provided significant drafting assistance and that TCD could benefit from support and training in this area, as well as in more general project management skills, particularly for new staff.

Project goals seem somewhat ambitious for a short-term project (under two years). In particular, the work with women politicians is unfamiliar and has not previously been part of TCD's core activities. The 50% 'target' set in project documentation for female participation in project work is clearly an aspiration towards which TCD is working, but its achievement seems unlikely in current circumstances, particularly because a lot of work is targeted at party leaders, who are all men.

Recommendation
   • **Re-examine project application forms with a view to making them more accessible, and ensure objectives are realistic for the length of project envisaged.**

One issue identified by a number of observers, as well as TCD and DIPD themselves, was the contrasting approaches of NIMD and DIPD in their support for TCD. DIPD was thought to take a much more 'hands off' approach, generally letting TCD get on with its work, and holding fewer in-country visits (although there is regular contact remotely by email and Skype). In contrast TCD had been used to working more closely with NIMD, which held twice-yearly round tables with TCD and the political parties to discuss political issues and strategy. This difference is also reflected in funding strategies – whilst NIMD provided some core funding for TCD's work, all DIPD funding is allocated to specified project activities.

DIPD's approach is grounded in the desire for TCD to take responsibility for and ownership of its project (although it is likely that workload issues also play a part, as DIPD acknowledged that 'we could be more involved if we had more time'). Staff noted that TCD risked becoming 'dependent' if funding structures remained unchanged. Conversely, NIMD's approach could be justified on the grounds that TCD needs support and guidance to discharge its role effectively and may not yet have the capacity to go it alone.

We sought views from external observers on the performance of TCD. Some of our interlocutors were critical of the Centre, in particular in respect of its administrative capacity and poor visibility. It was also noted that the Centre is almost exclusively male in membership, although this inevitably reflects the male dominance of high-level politics in Tanzania. Others were more positive, acknowledging some management shortcomings, but stating that TCD clearly plays a valued role in convening political parties to discuss important and often controversial issues (such as constitutional reform) and has succeeded in reaching consensus in difficult areas. Necessarily, a lot of this work takes place behind closed doors and is not public facing, so TCD does not necessarily get the credit for its work. It is notable that all the politicians we spoke to valued TCD highly, and that it is involved at the highest level of political leadership, including with the President and Prime Minister. One politician told us that TCD provides a 'safe' political space to discuss issues out of the limelight and without political game playing; it allows for personal connections to be made, breaks down barriers and acts as a testing ground for issues of national importance.

Regardless of their views on its effectiveness, all observers agreed that there is no other national platform playing this role at such a high level in Tanzania. There was a general feeling that TCD could do more to take advantage of this unique position, but that to do so would need a greater degree of practical support and strategic advice. It was described to us as a very well positioned organisation, which seems to be wondering where to go next, and an organisation with 'weak capacity not weak capabilities'. This analysis would lead to the conclusion that judicious investment in TCD at this stage could reap rewards in future.

Support might in particular be called for in the component of the DIPD project relating to mentoring for women politicians, which does not seem to fit comfortably with TCD's strengths and previous work. On the other hand, it is an innovatively designed project, which could improve on a lot of the traditional 'training' models. TCD expressed enthusiasm about the project, but it is not clear that the organisation has the support needed to deliver an ambitious programme in an area where they have little experience.

One potential complication of the current situation, where TCD receives project funding only, is that the Centre is hoping to obtain government funding to cover its core costs. Whilst this would diversify its funding

streams, it does present potential challenges to the organisation's perceived neutrality which is at the core of its work and its standing in the political system and needs to be monitored carefully.

Recommendations
- **Arrange regular in-person contact/mentoring conversations with relevant partner staff (perhaps twice yearly).**
- **Consider providing a tailored project management manual for partners. This could also be used in other countries and with partners in bilateral party programmes.**
- **Consider peer-to-peer exchanges/partnering with projects in same country.**
- **Organise regular, in depth, strategy round tables with key partners (twice yearly). This would have the added benefit of ensuring that DIPD staff keep up to date with political developments on the ground.**
- **Consider providing support through core funding where it represents a beneficial investment in the future of an organisation.**
- **Continue to encourage an innovative/creative approach to activities**

Co-ordination with other donors

During our consultations with donor and implementing organisations working in Tanzania, we asked our interlocutors about the extent to which they had contact with DIPD staff concerning the multi-party programme (co-ordination with political parties on their programmes is covered separately in the next section). Most representatives of similar organisations in Tanzania had not had regular contact with DIPD. Some reported an initial meeting when the project with TCD began but no contact thereafter. This sporadic approach to co-ordination with other donors may be part of DIPD's general decision to adopt a 'hands off' approach to its work with TCD, however a higher level of contact would be welcomed by others working in the field. A more proactive approach to communications on the part of DIPD might also be beneficial to TCD's reputation in the donor community, given the 'behind the scenes' nature of much of its work.

Recommendation
- **There is room for better co-ordination between DIPD and other donors and a clearer strategy for working with like-minded donors both in country and from Denmark.**

Independent media

As part of this exercise, the review team was asked to assess the potential for DIPD's work to expand into the field of independent media, given that this forms part of the Institute's mandate, but it has not yet begun any activities in this area. Our preliminary analysis suggests that there would be space for a project supporting the independent media in Tanzania should DIPD wish to enter this field. There is demand, and there are viable partners in the country, some of whom are already working with DANIDA. However, as noted in the main body of this report, we would question the extent to which this work fits with DIPD's general role and suggest that it might be better implemented by specialist organisations already working in the field.

Christiansborg seminar

A number of participants in the DIPD projects in Tanzania were invited to attend the annual Christiansborg seminar in 2012, on the theme of women. Participants had mixed views on the effectiveness of this event, which seemed to be linked to their own political and practical role. Overall, the event was found to be beneficial by senior women politicians, who appreciated the networking opportunities and were inspired by hearing about others' experiences. Participants looking for more 'hands on' practical advice were disappointed and found the event too high level.

Recommendation:
- **Review the role of the Christiansborg seminar. Define whether it is a practical and outcomes orientated seminar or a 'high level' event and select an audience accordingly.**

3. Party-to-party programmes

DIPD is supporting two party-to-party projects in Tanzania. Both programmes seem well designed and organised and are beginning to be implemented approximately on schedule. However, both projects are also at a very early stage of implementation, so the available evidence to assess is limited and any evaluation of impact would certainly be premature.
In this section we note some issues common to both projects before considering the detail of each of the projects in turn.

Ideological match

Although DIPD began with a vision of 'sister party' work, there is no close ideological match between the Danish and Tanzanian parties involved in the partnerships. The reason for this is also the root of the problem that these projects are designed in part to address: Tanzanian parties tend to be personality based rather than ideological. Even if party leaders do have a clear ideological position, this rarely translates to the membership as a whole.

This is not uncommon in developing countries and has not so far caused significant difficulties for either of the projects. Each of the Danish parties forged links with their partner party in different ways, and both are satisfied that although they have not found an ideological match for their own position, they have enough in common to be able to form a sympathetic relationship.

Project management by the Danish political parties

Both the Danish parties involved in the Tanzania projects are small and organising the projects has clearly been a challenge for them at times. Although party staff considered some project requirements overly bureaucratic and unsuited to a political context, they remarked favourably on DIPD's practical support for their project management role, in particular the regular joint meetings held for party co-ordinators, and its willingness to listen to feedback.
As an example, we heard different interpretations about the extent to which Danish parties can get involved in supporting electoral activities or which would have an electoral benefit for partner parties. Ultimately, all political parties are aiming to improve their electoral chances, so a strict interpretation of this rule would seem very unhelpful. However, its current formulation is ambiguous and should be clarified.

Administrative capacities of Tanzanian partners

Both CUF and Chadema described the administrative requirements for documentation as 'not that easy,' although both have been involved in similar partnerships before and had some experience of similar processes to fall back on. Both parties had significant input into the design of project activities, although they gave the view that the paperwork would be very hard to handle for a party with no experience. Overly demanding bureaucratic requirements are likely to mean that the Danish party takes the lead in drafting proposals at the expense of the partner party's voice. In addition, no DIPD funding is available for core costs or local project management.

Recommendations:
- **Re-examine project application forms and guidelines with a view to making them more accessible, with input from local partners and feedback from party staff.**
- **Clarify how the rule on not working with parties on election campaigns is to be interpreted.**

There have been particular difficulties with finance requirements in the CUF-RV partnership, which we explore in further detail below.

Links with DIPD's multi-party work

One of the reasons the smaller Danish parties chose to establish projects in Tanzania was its reputation as a safe place to work, and the presence of DIPD on the ground to provide additional support. Although DIPD staff support for these political parties has been significant, this has come from the Institute's secretariat in Copenhagen and there were no reported interactions between DIPD's multi-party project and the work of the political parties.

Recommendation
- **Consider peer-to-peer exchanges/partnering with projects in same country on issues of common interest (i.e. non-political issues, project management etc). This would not necessarily mean engaging in joint projects. Rather, the aim would be to establish greater collaborative and information sharing mechanisms between TCD and DIPD party-to-party projects in the country in order to exchange relevant insights, experience and information between them.**

Konservatives-Chadema partnership

The Konservatives - Chadema project focuses on work with local party branches and women's wings. It operates on a 'training of trainers' model, which is intended to trickle down to lower party levels. The issue it aims to address is the propensity at present for villages to vote as a bloc and to be dominated by the government. This project aims to increase the space for opposition voices leading up to national elections in 2015.

The partnership agreement began in March 2013 and during the review team's visit in June the first set of activities had only recently been completed. As such, this assessment is based largely on the inception phase and preliminary impressions of the first activities.

Chadema members appear to have been closely involved in the choice of focus and project design. We were told that the youth and women's wings of the party were responsible for shortlisting the activities to be supported. Good consultation between the Konservatives and other donors had taken place to ensure that duplication of activities was minimised, and emphasis was placed on the importance of transparency and awareness of others' activities.

Chadema are a relatively well-organised party and are clearly used to working with European parties and the reporting and financial requirements involved. The staff managing the project in country seemed competent to handle reporting requirements, though they noted that there is no contribution to local salaries within the project, whereas Danish salaries are paid, both for external consultants and project management. The review team also devoted some time to studying project budgets, and in particular the amounts allocated to 'consultants'. In most cases this money appears to be spent on Danish staff and politicians who are designing and managing the projects. We heard comments from both the Tanzanian parties that a relatively large amount of the funding had been earmarked to be spent on Danish party staff for undertaking tasks for which they had been told they could not receive funding. This issue has the potential to cause resentment in future, if guidelines and policies are unclear or left to parties' discretion.

RV-CUF partnership

The RV-CUF partnership focuses on local level party organisation. At the time of the visit, activities had mainly consisted of town hall meetings in five regional centres. These aimed to build the capacity of party members and identify leaders for the 2014 local and 2015 general elections as well as feeding into the development of a party manifesto, based on the views of local people. The project design is innovative in its relatively extensive use of RV volunteers (who are subject to a vetting and training process to determine their suitability).

During the field visit, we heard very positive views of project progress so far. CUF had originally suggested the focus on local level politics and the town hall meetings were considered to be 'successful beyond expectations'. CUF were seeking to extend them, including to Zanzibar, where they have a base of support (as noted above, no DIPD activities have yet taken place on the island). Unexpected gains, which CUF had been able to realise through this funding, included cross-fertilisation of ideas through bringing together party members from different regions of Tanzania and the involvement of non-party members such as academics and CSOs.

Whilst this also began as a generally well-run programme, it has run into particular difficulties regarding budgeting and funding, which have soured the relationship between the partners. CUF have been surprised at a refusal to pay per diems for participants in events, despite this being normal practice in Tanzania. They claimed to have funded participants themselves and felt out of pocket. They too noted that Danish participants and staff were eligible for salaries and allowances. They also said that they had asked for a planned exchange visit to Denmark to be cancelled and the money spent on more of the town hall meetings, which had been more successful than expected. This was refused and they were told the project could not

be altered. On their side, RV have been concerned by what they see as a lack of transparency in use of project funds and an absence of voluntarism on the part of CUF, particularly since volunteers are a large part of RV's side of project delivery. Lots of time has been taken up and worry caused by this issue on both sides, which detracts from project activities. A financial audit is currently taking place to bring some clarifications to the allocation of project funds and parties are liaising with DIPD to address outstanding unclear issues.

Recommendations

- **Clarify financial requirements for projects centrally – what can and cannot be allowed; what degree of flexibility is permitted; who can authorise budget changes. Produce a FAQ or guidance document on common issues, based on the parties' experiences to date.**
- **Clarify budget headings to avoid ambiguity (for example, what is included under the category of 'consultants').**
- **Consider providing funding for local project management costs where it represents an unreasonable financial burden on a local partner.**
- **Continue to encourage innovative/creative approach to activities.**
- **Encourage parties to communicate with other international organisations working with the same parties.**

Conclusions

Our conclusions concerning DIPD's work in Tanzania illustrate the findings of the main body of the report. The Institute is delivering good work both through its multi-party and party-to-party programmes, much of it in difficult circumstances. Our analysis suggests that the organisation could maximise its effectiveness by devoting more time to political analysis of the project country; reducing administrative requirements for local partners; joining up multi-party and party-to-party work where possible; and considering providing targeted support for local partners where there are specific areas of weakness although its ability to do all these things is constrained by the overall limit on its resources. As the projects in Tanzania develop, DIPD should ensure that lessons learned are disseminated throughout the organisation, including to political parties, and that successes are equally identified and recognised, with the aim of enabling all parties to build on these achievements.

Party-to-Party

Danish Liberal Party
Kenya, partner CMD
Egypt, Party Free Egyptians
Zambia, NAREP

Red Green Alliance
Honduras, FNRP
Swaziland, PUDEMO
Palestine, Youth Platform

Social Democrats
Ghana, NDC
Swaziland, SWADEPA
Egypt, ESDP

Social Liberal Party
Tanzania, CUF

Conservatives
Tanzania, CHADEMA

Socialist People's Party
Bolivia, MAS

Liberal Alliance
Bolivia, VERDES

Multi-Party

Nepal, JOMPOPS
Bhutan, BNEW
Myanmar, Programme with NIMD
Egypt, DEDI and ACPSS
Tanzania, TCD
Zimbabwe, ZI with NIMD
Malawi, CMD

TERMS OF REFERENCE
FOR
REVIEW OF THE DANISH INSTITUTE FOR PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY

1. BACKGROUND

Mandate

The Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) was established by the Danish Parliament in May 2010 (Act 530 adopted May 26, 2010 by the Danish Parliament). Its overall purpose is to strengthen and complement the Danish democracy assistance, particularly through support of political parties and multi-party systems in developing countries by seeking to:

A. Support party-to-party cooperation and the development of democratic parties in developing countries
B. Support independent media, think-tanks and non-governmental organizations in the developing countries, which seek to promote the development of a democratic political culture and multiparty systems.
C. Cooperate with local partners in developing countries, and finally
D. Cooperate with international institutions focused on the support of multiparty democracy as well as other international partners.

As an independent institution, the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy is to contribute to Denmark's democratisation efforts by actively involving Danish political parties, other Danish stakeholders and international partners in the support for political parties and multiparty systems in a number of selected developing countries.

According to the wording of the Act, the purpose of establishing an independent Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy is to further Danish democracy assistance in a number of developing countries, including to strengthen a democratic culture, political parties and multiparty systems in particular.

The Institute is to carry out its mission by involving the parties in the Danish Parliament 'Folketinget' in the democracy cooperation, by establishing direct forms of cooperation between Danish and foreign politicians based on a cross and multi-political platform, and by giving the Danish parties an opportunity for individually providing direct support to parties.

The DIPD is financed by way of a three-year appropriation totaling DKK 75 million through the MFA's framework for development assistance. The funding period 2010-2012 was extended until the end of 2013, as DIPD activities only started in the spring of 2011.

DIPD Strategy 2011-2013

The strategy for 2011-2013 'Political Parties in a Democratic Culture' was approved by the Board and presented at the official launch of the Institute in May 2011. It elaborates the mandate and fleshes out the vision, principles, experiences, objectives and targets for the institute in its initial years. The strategy mentions five goals: 1) support for sister parties, 2) support for multiparty systems, 3) other Danish

stakeholders, 4) international partnerships and 5) information. The five areas all have specific objectives and indicators attached.

<u>Vision</u>

The vision of the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy – *according to the above-mentioned DIPD Strategy* - is to contribute to the development of effective political parties and well-functioning multiparty systems as key elements in a democratic culture, in support of the aspirations for freedom and human development of citizens in developing countries. DIPD delivers on this vision through party-to-party and multiparty support in a limited number of countries around the world.

No single democratic institution or any one specific democratic process is decisive in itself. The establishment of a well-functioning parliament with clear rules of play is one important element. The election system and holding of free elections under the leadership of an independent commission are similarly important, as is the existence of the rule of law. Additionally important are independent media that can ensure citizens the necessary information and organisations in civil society that can set agendas.

But political parties are also important democratic institutions. Through dialogue with their members and the voters, they articulate various visions of how society should be shaped and how resources should be utilised, and through elections they periodically contribute to channelling the wishes and priorities of the citizens and voters forward to decisions in parliament and government. Effective democratic parties and well-functioning multiparty systems also contribute to peaceful solutions to the conflicts and contradictions that characterise every society.

The democracy support of the international community has tended to focus on support for parliaments, elections, systems of justice, independent media, public administration reforms, decentralisation and strengthening civil society. Support for political parties has been considered to be much too political and thus much too sensitive. But recognising that an effort in this area may be political, sensitive and challenging does not change the fact that it is both important and necessary.

Denmark's contribution in the field of development is robust and recognised. Efforts regarding social and economic conditions go hand in hand with support for governance and democracy, based on respect for the fundamental liberties and human rights. This is the platform on which the DIPD will base its work when supporting the development of well-functioning political parties and multiparty systems.

2. OBJECTIVE

In the Cooperation Agreement between DIPD and the MFA it was agreed that after the first three year the MFA would review the institute, and in particular review the results, selection of partner countries, ownership and anchoring in partner countries, administration and future funding needs.

With reference to the above context, the <u>objectives of this review</u> are 1) to the extent possible assess the general performance of the DIPD programme with regard to preliminary results, progress, challenges, developments in risk factors, need for adjustments, monitoring etc. within the existing framework of the DIPD mandate as laid down in Act no. 530 of 26 May 2010, 2) to provide recommendations for Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and DIPD on further programme implementation as well as 3) finally provide the MFA with a basis for decision-making regarding future support of the DIPD.

3. OUTPUTS

The outputs of the Review should be:
- A paper describing the methodology of the team to be discussed and agreed upon. The paper will be part of the mission preparation note, which will guide the review in terms of the key findings and issues based on the desk review of documents.
- Debriefing in Copenhagen after the country visit to MFA/DIPD.
- A report in accordance with ToR assessing DIPD's activities within the existing framework of the DIPD mandate in accordance with the above-mentioned objective of the review and "The Aid Management Guidelines".

4. SCOPE OF WORK

The Review will address but is not limited to:
1) Briefly describe the international context/environment for support to parties and democratisation within development assistance;
2) Review the overall strategic focus and progress of DIPD's work including the relevance of and balance between the five strategic goals: *1) support for sister parties, 2) support for multiparty systems, 3) other Danish stakeholders, 4) international partnerships and 5) information* focusing on:

   a) Partnership strategies, partnership selection procedures (incl. BNI), the ownership and anchoring of activities in recipient countries, capacity building and networking;
   b) The linkages and synergies between the five strategic goals;
   c) The relevance and quality of cooperation between DIPD secretariat, the board, and Danish political parties as well as the relationship between the parties and the partners in the South;

3) Based on the field visit*, review the relevance and quality of DIPD's work with the partners*, and assess, in the country context, the possible linkages/synergies with other Danish and/or international *support to democratization*;
4) Review overall the relevance, quality and effectiveness of the *communication and governance structures* in Denmark and in partner countries, including possible areas of conflict of interest;
5) Review the adequacy of the DIPD's *monitoring and supporting systems*;
6) Review the *assumptions and risks* and the possible consequences for the activities of DIPD;
7) Review status of the DIPD's *commitment and disbursement of funds* in particular in view of phase two;
8) Review the DIPD's overall *programme management, including financial management*;
9) Review the relevance and effectiveness of the DIPD's overall *administrative structures, including the staff capacity at the secretariat;*
10) Review the need for possible *further analysis* and *capacity development initiatives*.

5. METHOD OF WORK

The team will, based on a review of documentation, draft a mission preparation note (MPN) which will be shared to all relevant stakeholders.

The review will be three-phased: The first phase will be a preparatory desk study to review documents relevant to DIPD's activities under the framework and cooperation agreement. The second phase will consist

of direct consultations with DIPD (Board of Directors, Secretariat staff), MFA, Danish political parties as well as Danish and international partners and relevant resource persons followed by the <u>third phase</u> with one field visit to Tanzania.

DIPD will facilitate the planning of the field visit to Tanzania and provide the team with all relevant information/documentation for the review.

6. TEAM

The team conducting the Review will consist of:

Darriann Riber, overall team leader/task manager, Technical Advisory Services/MFA

A team of consultants including expertise on:

- Support party-to-party cooperation and the development of democratic parties in developing countries
- Organisational development/management, communication and advocacy
- Overall financial management

The proposal should contain relevant CVs as well as proposal for a methodology based on the terms of reference provided by Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The technical proposal will for this assignment will carry a value of 80% of the overall evaluation criteria and the technical proposals consist of a proposal for methodology as well as CVs of team members.

All CVs will be evaluated according to the following criteria:

- General qualifications: documented experience from reviews/assessments of organisations, preferably within human rights/democratization/good governance.
- Adequacy for the assignment: documented experience from working with support party-to-party cooperation and the development of democratic parties in developing countries.
- Experience from the region (Africa) and preferably also from other countries where DIPD have cooperation. One of the team members should be able to read and talk in Danish.

DIPD and Office of Legal Services and Human Rights in the MFA will participate in the review as resource persons.

The fee budget and reimbursable budget estimate should include among others:

- Work during weekends for the team during the field trip.
- Funds for local transport, i.e. car rentals from a reputable and safe company in Tanzania.
- The consultants should stay together with the Danida team leader during the field visits; EU allowances in Tanzania are sufficient to cover hotel expenses of up to 200 USD per night.

7. TIMEFRAME

The Review will be carried out during March-May 2013. A draft report will be presented to DIPD and the MFA and comments sought from all relevant partners, before the Final Review Report is submitted to the MFA by mid May 2013.

The number of man days proposed is an estimate and will be adjusted to the requirements specified in the technical proposal of the selected consultant.

Expertise	Total TA: 38 m/d	*Timing*
Support party-to-party	<u>Total 17</u>, of which:	March-May

cooperation and the development of democratic parties in developing countries	Five (5) days are for desk study and MPN, and consultations in Denmark; Seven (7) days for field visits - incl. two(2) days for travel; Five (5) days for reporting and feed back	2013
Organisational development/management, communication and advocacy	<u>Total 15</u>, of which Five (5) days are for desk study and MPN, and consultations in Denmark Seven (7) days for field visits – incl. two days for travel Three (3) days for reporting and feed back	March-May 2013
Overall financial management	<u>Total 6,</u> of which One (1) are for desk study and MPN Three (3) days are for work at DIPD Two (2) days for reporting and feed back	March-May 2013

8. DOCUMENTATION

- "Samarbejdsaftale mellem Institut for Flerpartisamarbejde og Udenrigsministeriet", December, 15, 2010
- Act 530 on the establishment of the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy adopted May 2010
- Annual report 2010-2011, DIPD, marts 2012
- Strategy 2011-2013: Political Parties in a Democratic Culture, DIDP, May 2011
- Political Party Support, Lessons Learned, January 2012
- Political Parties in Democratic Transitions, September 2012
- How to Build a Youth Wing, 2012
- How to Note on "Political Parties", MFA, Danida, 2011
- Application formats and guidelines, DIPD
- Rigsrevisionsprotokollat for DIPD, Juni 2012.
- Democratisation and Human Rights for the benefit of the People, Danish support for Good Governance, June 2009.
- The Right to a Better Life, June 2012

Darriann Riber
Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Technical Advisory Services
March 4th 2013