

## STUDY ON RESULTS FRAMEWORKS: **POLITICAL PARTY ASSISTANCE**

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## ABBREVIATIONS

|      |   |
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| DIPD | Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy              |
| EISA | Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa |
| IDEA | Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance        |
| LFA  | Logical Framework Approach                              |
| M&E  | Monitoring & Evaluation                                 |
| NDI  | National Democratic Institute                           |
| NGO  | Non-Governmental Organization                           |
| NIMD | Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy          |
| PMP  | Performance Monitoring Plan                             |
| RBM  | Results-Based Management                                |
| SILC | Swedish International Liberal Centre                    |

# 1 INTRODUCTION

In 2010, a group of political party assistance providers initiated a process at Wilton Park to improve the delivery of their assistance efforts. Strengthening the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of party programmes was identified as a critical area in need of attention. In the Wilton Park Process, a core group of these organizations - the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA or IDEA), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights (the Oslo Center), the Swedish International Liberal Centre, SILC, and the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) - agreed to look further into the use of indicators and share their respective results frameworks and collaborate with the broader party assistance community in this initiative.

In late 2012, DIPD took the lead in this effort by launching a modest study to compile and analyse results frameworks from participating party assistance organisations. The study set out to review how frameworks are designed and used by the party assistance community, and to identify the primary programme areas (i.e. multiparty dialogue, policy development, women's empowerment, among others) from both a party system and individual party level perspective. To the extent possible, the study also sought to identify common trends associated with the frameworks, and offer recommendations to the community on moving forward in this area. The findings of this exercise comprise this brief report, which has been circulated for comments in the core group before finalisation.

This report comprises three sections. The first outlines the methodology and approach employed by the Consultant for this study. The second section comprises the core findings of the study, and focuses on four areas: a) an overview of the types of organizations that are actively engaged in M&E reform; b) the main areas of focus that results frameworks are designed to measure; c) the types of framework components and how they relate to one another; and, d) how the frameworks are used for monitoring purposes. The final section offers reflection and recommendations of the Consultant on how to advance this process further. Two annexes are also part of this report: the first specifies the reference sources used for this study, and the second is a detailed account of the findings.

# 2

## METHODOLOGY

This project was designed to compile, categorize and analyse results frameworks currently used by political party assistance organizations. Building on the network established through the 2010 Wilton Park process, this project reached out to approximately 60 entities working in support of political parties around the world. This includes donor agencies, multilateral organizations, international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), party foundations, intergovernmental organizations, and academic institutions, among others. Of the 18 that responded, 15 organizations submitted materials, including almost all the members of the core group: NDI, International IDEA, NIMD, and DIPD. Submissions varied, and included programme documents, project proposals, research studies, and relevant reports, among other materials.

In addition to reviewing the written submissions, interviews with representatives of five organizations were conducted. These interviews sought to solicit more in-depth information on the materials themselves, but more importantly, on the use and utility of the project and programme results frameworks.

Modest in its scope, this exercise was not designed as a comprehensive analysis of all political party assistance programming, nor was it meant to catalogue and provide in-depth information about all the country programmes. Rather, the study focused on results frameworks themselves—as opposed to the programmes more broadly—and is based on information provided by those organizations that chose to participate in the study. Documents were shared with the understanding that they would not be made available to the larger community, and interviews were conducted off the record. To that end, none of the examples or quotes provided in the report is attributed to the organizations from which it came. The study explored the extent to which the existing frameworks use similar indicators, both at the system and individual party level. For example, is there agreement on what indicators or dimensions, which are relevant when gauging organisational strengthening of a certain party? Because so few organizations have (so far) developed institution-wide results frameworks, however, compiling and comparing indicators in this way was not possible. Given the documents submitted, an attempt to compile indicators would produce little more than a fragmented array of illustrative examples, and would fall short of constructing a meaningful categorization of indicators. Those seeking more information on standardized party assistance indicators should review the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa's (EISA's) report, "Setting Benchmarks for Enhanced Political Party Performance for Democratic Governance in Africa," and the Swedish International Liberal Centre's (SILC's) Party Assessment Tool (Annex 2)

For the purpose of this study, a results framework is understood to be a tool used to monitor and manage political party assistance programmes. Results frameworks comprise overarching goals, outcomes, outputs, and activities; quantitative and qualitative indicators are also included at each level. Output is the result of activities carried out in support of project objectives; an output indicator, for example, might include the number of training sessions held. An outcome is the change expected as a direct result of related outputs; an outcome indicator, for example, would include a measurement of the improvement in a party's ability to develop policy platforms. The overarching goal or impact of a project is the higher-level change expected as a result of meeting stated outcomes, including, for example, a change in behaviour or policy sustained over time. Robust indicators are generally defined as being SMART: Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Time bound.

Though not all organizations use the same terminology or specific tool, all strive to measure progress against stated objectives.

For a list of the organizations and the documents they submitted, please see the list of references.

# 3 FINDINGS

The results framework analysis focused on addressing four primary areas:

- A. Types of organizations that are actively revising and/or improving their approach to results frameworks.
- B. Results frameworks' primary areas of focus, both at the system and individual party levels.
- C. Types of framework components (outcomes, outputs, etc.) and how they relate to one another.
- D. How results frameworks are put into practice and used for monitoring purposes.

## A. Types of organizations that are actively revising and/or improving their approach to results frameworks

Most of the organizations that participated in this study were in a process of reviewing and/or strengthening the development of their results frameworks. Perhaps it was for this reason that they chose to participate in, and learn from, such a study. Self-selection notwithstanding, it appears that to a certain extent the type of organization providing party assistance does influence its approach to developing results frameworks.

Party assistance providers are reviewing their respective approaches to M&E primarily for two reasons. On the one hand, they appear to be responding to higher donor oversight of their work, as well as tighter donor requirements for reporting on programme progress. As part of the larger aid effectiveness agenda, many donor agencies are focusing on results-oriented programming. The party assistance field in particular has been subject to unusually intense scrutiny for not effectively demonstrating the impact of its work. On the other hand, the party assistance community itself recognizes the shortcomings of its respective programming and is therefore collectively seeking to improve the delivery of effective party assistance.

All types of organizations appear to be involved in such efforts, whether international NGO, multilateral, intergovernmental or party foundation. The only instance in which the type or structure of an organization influences its approach to M&E reform is on the question of developing institution-wide results frameworks (See example in Annex III).

Notably, organizations that rely on diverse funding sources—e.g. the US-based party institutes, such as NDI—are required to tailor their results frameworks to each donor. As a result, they develop programme-specific frameworks, which often differ greatly. Some donors require a robust logical framework, while others call for streamlined objectives and indicators. As such, not only would it be difficult to establish institution-wide frameworks, it is also unclear whether such an initiative would be a worthwhile endeavour.

Developing institution-wide frameworks is also a significant challenge for highly decentralized organizations, particularly when headquarter-based technical units do not necessarily review, let alone approve, project documents; this is further complicated by field offices that have the authority to raise their own funds and develop their own projects. Similarly, the larger assistance providers that house both regional and technical units often have an additional challenge in developing institution-wide frameworks. Regional units tend to drive programming, but are usually not required to consult with, let alone receive approval from, technical units (political party units, in this case). Thus, an organization's structure and programme development processes can matter a great deal: each unit can develop its own results framework without regard to other regional or technical units.

Finally, technical units may have their own programmes and therefore develop results frameworks that lie outside the work of the regional units. Such organizational and procedural realities may make the development of institution-wide frameworks both undesirable and challenging.

In contrast, organizations with a narrower funding base (typically European) often are freer to design their own results frameworks with less regard to competing donor demands. Additionally, smaller assistance providers may have fewer institutional constraints, either in terms of decentralization or the competing interests of regional and technical units. As such, these organizations can be more active in establishing institution-wide frameworks.

## B. Results frameworks' primary areas of focus, both at the system and individual party levels

Though the submissions of 15 party assistance providers comprise too small a sample from which to draw definitive conclusions about the broader party assistance community, certain trends and observations can be identified with regard to frameworks' areas of focus.

First, there do not appear to be any distinguishing factors between frameworks developed at the party systems level as opposed to those developed at the individual party level. That is, the outcomes, outputs and indicators established to measure the impact of programming at the systemic level do not seem to be any different than those developed at the individual party level. In fact, some organizations do not explicitly distinguish between the two levels even within their frameworks. For example, one organization sets out to provide "technical facilitation of cross party and intra-party dialogue and measures to prevent violent conflict." As multiparty and individual party assistance are combined, so too are the measures of achievement.

A second observation relates to the variety of programme areas found at the two levels of analysis. Namely, there is a more limited menu of programming options at the party system level than at the individual party level. At the system level, there are four primary areas of focus: multiparty dialogue, civil society partnership, legal frameworks, and the development of knowledge products.

From this sample group, by far the most common area of programming at the party system level is multiparty dialogues or platforms. The following examples are drawn from four different assistance providers and illustrate outcomes and outputs on multiparty dialogue:

- A functioning multiparty dialogue
- Multiparty dialogue strengthened and the ownership of multiparty platforms nurtured
- Enhanced capacity and cross-party cooperation of women politicians and women's wings of parliamentary parties
- Support for multiparty systems, with the goal of ensuring well-functioning, democratically-based multiparty systems

Though not as common as multiparty dialogues, numerous assistance providers are working to strengthen the relationship between parties and civil society. Though this can also be done with individual parties, several providers seek to do so on a larger scale. For example, one organization strives to establish a "fruitful interaction between political and civil society," while another seeks "enhanced engagement between political parties, civil society and the media."

A number of organizations are also working to strengthen the legal frameworks that underpin multiparty political systems. Such efforts often focus on party and electoral laws as the primary legal instruments affecting parties. As mentioned above, some organizations work at both the system and party level simultaneously; for example, one assistance provider seeks the “enhanced capacity of political and civil society actors to effect, implement and monitor reform regarding laws governing political parties.” A fourth category of assistance at the system level is the development of knowledge products. These products can target system-level issues, such as party finance, and are designed for use by multiple parties and political actors more broadly.

At the individual party level, assistance efforts cover a broader range of (traditional) programme areas. Though organizations categorize these areas differently, and there is no standardized agreement on said categories, a number of broad classifications can be made. Further, some overlap among and between the categories certainly exists, particularly on so-called “crosscutting” issues, such as those relating to women and youth. Based on the documents submitted, the following categories can be identified.

Perhaps the most common area of focus for assistance to individual parties is in support of their respective internal democratic practice. This category itself is fairly broad, as the examples below illustrate:

- Provide political parties with skills to advance reform and modernization efforts, including incorporating transparent, inclusive and accountable procedures.
- Foster more democratic, accountable and responsive political parties through improved internal democracy, transparency and outreach.
- Support sister parties and affiliated political movements and organizations, with the goal of ensuring well-functioning democratic political parties.
- Local decision making bodies and branches are functioning in a more democratic and open way.

As a sub-category of internal democratic practice, numerous providers seek to strengthen the structures and organizational capacities of individual parties. Such assistance may include “reforms in the internal governance structures of political parties to enhance internal party democracy,” “enhanced capacity of political parties to manage their organizational structures,” or help to establish “good financial practices...and internal communication between the national and local level.”

Not surprisingly, many organizations feature support for the role women and youth in political parties. This too is a broad category, and includes a wide variety of activities, including support to:

- Young women from political parties and civil society organizations [to] work together to promote and affect change on women’s and youth issues.
- Capacities of women and youth in [name of country] built to work effectively within and with political parties and parliament.
- Women have more influence within the cooperation partners and youth people’s interests are being considered to a greater extent.

Another common area of programming is on strengthening parties’ constituency outreach capacities. This may include assistance to parties to “improve their ability to reach out and respond to members and citizens locally and nationally,” or to strengthen “capacities of political parties to represent citizens.” Support to parties’ campaign or electioneering capacities is also common. Assistance varies from supporting parties to “conduct issue-oriented campaigns that address voter concerns,” to promoting the role of women and youth in campaign activities. Finally, a number of parties are working to support parties in parliament, including, for example, to “coalesce across party lines to resolve problems affecting citizens.”

## C. Types of framework components (outcomes, outputs, etc.) and how they relate to one another

Like many other sectors within the field of democratic governance, party assistance providers are generally seeking to be results-oriented, and employ a results-based management strategy to programming. The most common tool used for measuring impact is the logical framework approach (log frame or LFA). As such, most organizations establish a framework that details expected impact, outcomes, outputs and activities; they also include corresponding indicators for each level of measurement.

Though organizations take a similar approach to LFA and results frameworks, the terminology they use is quite varied. To describe higher-level results, the following terms are used, among others: “general objectives”, “overall goals”, “purpose”, “final result”, “vision”, “impact”, and “development objective”. At the next level of specificity, most organizations reference “results” or “outcomes” or variations thereof, including: “intermediate results”, “specific objectives”, “expected long-term outcomes”, and “programme objectives”. At subsequent levels of measurement, there is a high-level of commonality in terminology, primarily referencing outputs and activities. Only a few organizations include consideration of risks, assumptions, other actors in the field, data sources, and means of verification.

The terms used, naturally, matter less than the internal coherence of a results framework as a whole. After all, an LFA is merely a tool designed to demonstrate how outputs collectively result in outcomes (changes in behaviour, systems, etc.) that lead to higher-level impact. Whether an organization prefers meeting “goals”, “objectives” or “final results” is irrelevant if the framework as a whole is inherently logical, demonstrates causality and provides the necessary linkages among and between the levels of measurement.

This study is not an evaluation or comprehensive assessment of the design or use of results frameworks. Nevertheless, the review of available frameworks offers an opportunity to make some preliminary observations. It should be noted again that the commonalities identified in this section are based on a small sample of organizations that selected a small sample of their own programming and policy documents. As such, only modest conclusions should be drawn from these observations about the community of political party assistance organizations more broadly. Detailed examples of these observations can be found in Annex I below.

Four main observations can be made about the results frameworks under review. Namely, these frameworks: struggle to demonstrate causality between outputs and outcomes; include poorly developed or flimsy indicators; rely heavily on quantitative indicators; and demonstrate a lack of clarity on outputs, outcomes and indicators. These observations resonate with the volume of critical reviews of results frameworks of international development more broadly. That is, many other development sectors, from health to education to child protection, have struggled with these same issues for decades.

### CAUSALITY BETWEEN OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES?

A common trend found among numerous frameworks is an assumed causal relationship between outputs and outcomes where none exists. In such frameworks, it is unclear how or why certain outputs would result in related outcomes. A clear and common example of this suspect causality is the tendency to equate attending a workshop with an automatic gain in skills or knowledge. Equating participation with capacity building is as flawed as equating enhanced capacity with behaviour change. That is, it would be erroneous to assume that simply because party leaders attend a workshop, they would necessarily begin reforming their own protocols and systems.

In making these “leaps of logic” between outputs and outcomes, one fundamental unstated assumption is often made: that target parties have the political will for reform. Capacity

building initiatives *may* translate to actual reform if the leadership is committed to strengthening the party and is willing to assume the risks to do so. Few frameworks state such assumptions, let alone programme specifically to foster political will (discussed further below in Section 4).

Related to the challenge of causality is the problem of attribution. If an organization does not clearly establish the links between its activities, outputs and outcomes, it becomes very difficult to attribute impact to that organization when other factors—such as a shift in the political landscape or the interventions of other organizations—are considered. According to one party-assistance provider, “the problem is to determine the impact of each of these factors of interventions, and the relative effects they might have had. The difficulty of making exact attributions means making assumptions about the likely impact of a programme.”

### **CONFUSION BETWEEN OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES**

A second commonality is a lack of clarity on outputs, outcomes and indicators. This may both be related to issues of terminology, confusion on LFA and to the fact that log frames are often cascading depending on the perspective applied. For example, an organization’s intended output is that “political parties capacity [is] enhanced, political parties coordinated and conflict prevented.” Typically, a change in capacity, for example, is considered an outcome. Similarly, “conflict prevented” would usually be understood as a higher-level impact, rather than an output.

The lack of clarity regarding framework components also manifests in how outputs, outcomes and indicators are drafted; specifically, the tendency to cram multiple concepts into one component. Consider, for example, an objective that “Parliament uses newly-developed processes to improve government oversight, negotiate with the executive branch, and reach out to political parties and citizens, improving their efficiency in passing legislation that responds to the priorities of all parties and citizens.” With four or five different objectives in this one statement, it is difficult to imagine how such an outcome (or outcomes) can be measured accurately – let alone strategically targeted in the programmes.

### **FLIMSY INDICATORS**

A third common trait among results frameworks is the relatively frequent inclusion of poorly developed or flimsy indicators to measure outputs and outcomes. One trend in particular is evident in this regard: the reliance on feedback from participants as indicators of programme achievement. While self-evaluations and participant feedback forms can offer insight into the quality of a given activity or output, they say little of the impact or outcome of that activity. Nevertheless, such indicators are often used to measure both outputs and outcomes. Vague or general indicators can also be found in these results frameworks, including the odd trend of indicators that themselves require other indicators for measurement.

The appearance of such vague or general indicators is also curious given that at least some of the participating organizations have developed assistance manuals, policy documents or larger assistance frameworks that could help guide the development of programme-specific indicators. For example, an organization could use its own guidance materials to inform how indicators are categorized or specific areas of programming are developed. Yet, it is not clear that such materials were consulted or used in developing the results frameworks.

### **QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS**

The final observation relates to the reliance on quantitative indicators as measures of achievement. Though quantitative measures of achievement have an important role to play in results frameworks (particularly for outputs), such quantitative indicators are less

effective in measuring outcomes. Results frameworks that attempt to quantify outcomes often provide little if any qualitative information of the impact a programme has actually achieved. There is also a tendency for quantitative indicators to rely on static numbers, as opposed to a quantitative change over a baseline.

Though less prevalent, a number of additional observations are worth noting. A number of organizations fail to provide information on how indicators will be measured. Detailing data sources and/or means of verification can help staff plan how indicators will actually be captured; this may be particularly important in conflict and fragile contexts, in which security may prohibit travel or communication more broadly. A number of organizations also put forth seemingly unrealistic goals of what can be achieved by any single programme intervention. For example, the highly ambitious *intermediate* result that “political parties undergo strategic internal reforms to improve party organization and structure.” Though not explicitly a component of most results frameworks, very few organizations submitted documents that included theories of change for their programmes. Explaining the strategy for change or the so-called theory of change, an intervention logic or the fundamental rationale for programming, is increasingly understood as good practice in international development.

## D. How results frameworks are put into practice and used for monitoring purposes

As mentioned above, a number of the established organisations have been in the process of reviewing their respective approaches to planning, monitoring and evaluation, and by extension, their results frameworks. In doing so, some have revised their strategy documents, and have used updated vision statements to guide the development of outcomes and outputs. Some have sought to improve existing frameworks, including, for example, an organization that until recently had used 14 standardized, “one-size-fits all” indicators for all its programming. At least one donor agency has also recognized the need to strengthen its M&E efforts and recently commissioned an academic institution to conduct an extensive review of its political party programmes globally; one of the products developed for this study was an extensive matrix of illustrative indicators for a wide-variety of party programmes.

As part of this general effort, organizations have also begun to examine how results frameworks are used for monitoring purposes. Some organizations have brought field staff and partners further into the process, thus breaking from what has often been a headquarters-driven process. Some have hired M&E experts based in the field and/or headquarters to support the design and use of results frameworks. Still others have established structures and systems, such as entire M&E teams or bi-annual planning exercises to assess their respective programme monitoring efforts. One organization has gone even further, collecting information using “silent indicators” that staff have determined is important to monitor even if the donor has not mandated it.

Across the board, party assistance organizations are spending more time, effort and resources on improving results frameworks and how they are used to monitor impact. One significant trend is emerging from these new efforts: the tendency to report on outputs in the short-term (primarily on a quarterly basis), and outcomes in the longer-term (primarily on an annual basis). Though it may be intuitive that high-level outcomes could only be measured on a less frequent basis than the outputs, this appears to be a relatively new trend in party assistance. Perhaps this should not be surprising, given that for some organizations the reporting of outcomes—as opposed to only reporting on outputs—is itself a new phenomenon.

In terms of reporting on the frameworks, most seek to provide a reasonable level of detail that is not too cumbersome to produce. Several conceded that finding a streamlined re-

reporting approach is difficult. In striking this delicate balance, one strategy is to improve how in-country beneficiaries are engaged in both the design of the frameworks as well as the collection of data on the indicators. By engaging beneficiaries and partners in the initial stages of the programme, it is hoped that they will more actively contribute to M&E reporting. More concrete measures include, for example, integrating financial reporting with reporting on framework indicators. Some have also established online tools for reporting. Still other organizations are using rolling work plans and mid-term reviews to update and adjust programming in real time. At least one organization has placed M&E reporting as a top corporate priority and is providing training to staff and creating opportunities for peer learning to help the organization's overall M&E efforts.

At the same time, donors are changing their reporting requirements. Interestingly, some appear to demand less formal reporting, while others appear to demand more. One European donor only requires annual reports, and is satisfied with regular oral briefings otherwise. An American aid agency increasingly requires that grantees submit illustrative results as part of a programme proposal, but once an award is granted, a grantee has 30 days to develop a detailed Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP); depending on the nature of the programme, PMPs either serve as the basis for quarterly reports or they are accompanied by a narrative as well.

It should also be noted that a number of interviewees raised concerns about the inherent challenges in monitoring political party assistance programmes. Such critiques range from those who believe that the results-based management (RBM) approach should only apply to short-term programming, particularly at the output level. Others raised questions about attribution and whether it is possible, even under the best of circumstances, to scientifically measure political phenomena. Some argued that given the politically sensitive nature of the field, the relatively small amounts of funding available, and the often, short timeframes in which results are expected, that collectively, party assistance organizations should be more modest in their expectations of what can be accomplished and reported on.

# 4 MOVING FORWARD

One of the ideas that emerged from the Wilton Park process was to develop an M&E toolkit informed and used by the community of party assistance providers. Though the toolkit has not yet been developed (nor is it clear that it will be), some proposed developing a standardized set of benchmarks and/or principles that could guide the community's M&E efforts. Despite an initial enthusiasm for such an approach, it does not seem that—at this point in time, at least—there is an appetite for developing a comprehensive, all-encompassing tool for the entire community.

Some respondents questioned whether such a toolkit could be developed, even if there were support behind such a project. It seems unlikely that one toolkit could satisfy the wide range of providers, each with its own particular approach to party assistance, its own funding source and requisite mandate, its own political analysis and prescription, and each operating in highly sensitive political environments. Given the virtually endless types of environments in which these programmes are implemented, several respondents discussed the difficulty of developing a practical tool, one that struck the right balance by being neither too general (and therefore useless) or too specific (and therefore too constraining).

Though developing a comprehensive tool may not be desirable at this time, the party assistance community does recognize the need for to improve its M&E efforts. That so many organizations are revising their respective approaches to M&E suggests that this remains a timely and important endeavour. The community must now determine the most effective way of moving forward. To that end, this report offers a number of options for consideration.

Above all, the report's findings suggest that party assistance providers are encountering significant challenges with the current (dominant) LFA approach to monitoring and evaluation; few, it appears, have mastered the art of constructing a cohesive, comprehensive log frame. Many providers recognize this shortcoming and are consequently trying to improve how they develop results frameworks. In doing so, they are working within the LFA architecture. A second approach, however, may be worth considering: abandoning the LFA model and seeking alternative M&E approaches that are better suited to demonstrating the impact of their party assistance programmes. Both options will be explored below.

## Catalogue of ideas

If assistance organisations choose to work within the established log frame model, they may consider a number of options to improve their planning and monitoring efforts. One tool party organizations may find useful is a menu of illustrative examples of results frameworks. Such a menu could be consulted as part of providers' programme design and M&E processes. This could build on the (still draft) collections of results framework examples compiled and developed by a number of academic and party assistance providers. Such a catalogue could be organized by theme (internal reform, parties in parliament, etc.), by crosscutting issue (conflict, gender mainstreaming, etc.) or even by region. Examples could range from output indicators to impact-level outcomes, from innovative means of verification to sample theories of change. Ideally, brief narratives would be included as well, providing the user qualitative guidance on how the framework or framework components were put into practice.

The advantage of such an approach would be that organizations could choose what, if anything was appropriate for their needs and tailor the examples as necessary. There would be no imperative to integrate a foreign model into existing systems and procedures. Further, such a catalogue would not require buy-in or approval by the broader community, thus avoiding delays and over-bureaucratizing the initiative. The weakness would be that –

as shown by this study – the existing results frameworks are quite incomplete and incoherent thus not providing the best practice or example.

## Tool on result frameworks

A second, arguably more ambitious initiative would look beyond the menu of options outlined above. By helping organizations understand the logic, rationale and reasoning behind party assistance results frameworks, this tool (and related services) could enhance organizations' capacity to construct internally cohesive results frameworks. Though organisations develop results frameworks on a regular basis, this study suggests that assistance even at the basic level could be helpful.

Organisations using this tool could master the fundamental nature of results frameworks, and the particular nuances that relate to party assistance. Each organization could adapt the core principles that govern results framework to its own systems and procedures. In this way, the tool would allow organizations the flexibility to pursue their own approaches to party assistance, but with the rigor to monitor results in a meaningful manner. This tool would not only focus on the results framework as a matrix, but could outline a more comprehensive programme development process, and include guidance on establishing a problem statement or analysis, translating that to broader objectives and outcomes, defining a theory of change, and detailing risks and assumptions. Of course such a tool would have to be tailored specifically to party assistance. For example, while most organizations make assumptions about political will and elite buy-in, few (if any) incorporate these critical ingredients into their programmes. Similarly, though many organizations now recognize the political nature of this work, few actually programme for it. By explicitly and formally incorporating the political dimension of party assistance into a results framework, organizations are more likely to avoid the pitfalls associated with a technocratic approach to party assistance.

Guidance on results frameworks already exist for other disciplines of international development. Practitioners from other fields have been wrestling with many of the same issues identified in the findings of this report, and have important insights and lessons to share. Indeed, those very guides should be consulted and relevant experts invited to participate in developing this party assistance specific tool. Initially, the tool could be accompanied by hands-on training in developing results frameworks. Eventually, it could become an online, interactive platform that provides on-going organization-specific technical assistance on developing cohesive frameworks through the use of experts and practitioners.

## Narratives of change

Though based on a small sample of assistance providers' experience, this report may lead some to conclude that the LFA model simply is not suited to measuring the progress and impact of political party programming. And although donor agencies continue to rely heavily on the LFA approach for much of their development programming, the notion that democratic governance programming may not be well suited for the logical framework approach is not new.<sup>1</sup> In particular, questions of whether conventional evaluation approaches are appropriate for political development assistance have existed for some time.

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Gordon Crawford's "Evaluating Democracy and Governance Assistance," and SIDA's, "The Use and Abuse of the Logical Framework Approach."

Though little has formally been developed on alternatives to the LFA approach for democratic governance, the party assistance community could consider a combination with non-log frame options for monitoring and evaluation purposes. A non-matrixed framework may address some of the issues highlighted above, including for example the challenges of causality, reliance on quantitative indicators, and a lack of clarity on outputs, outcomes and indicators.

A “narrative of change” approach may allow—or require—providers to articulate explicit theories of change or an intervention logic that clearly demonstrate how selected activities are expected to lead to certain results and to identify if the effort made is both necessary and sufficient for bringing about the intended change. Since this has been so difficult to capture in a log frame, perhaps a less rigorous and formal technical process would lend itself better to reporting on the intended impact of party interventions. A narrative approach may also facilitate—and even explicitly draw out—how providers programme for such intangibles as political will, underlying incentives and power dynamics. The recent emergence of political economy analysis tools may be very helpful in informing such an approach.

This study was designed as a departure point for further discussion on how the party assistance community should move forward in its efforts to improve monitoring and evaluation of party assistance programmes. Though the LFA approach offers a certain rigor that may be difficult to find in other M&E approaches, as the findings of this report (among others) demonstrate, assistance providers struggle to make the log frame an effective tool for planning and monitoring. While there are clear areas in need of attention if this model is to remain relevant, providers would greatly benefit from exploring whether alternative approaches would better suit this type of political programming.

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## ANNEX I: DETAILED FINDINGS

### Section C: How framework components relate to one another

This annex is designed to provide greater detail and insight into Section C of the report on results framework components. Examples are used to illustrate and support the findings relating to issues of causality, lack of clarity regarding framework components, reliance on quantitative indicators and poorly developed indicators.

It should be noted again that this study is not an evaluation or comprehensive assessment of the design or use of results frameworks. Even though this annex delves into greater detail than the overview above, it still cannot be considered an evaluation. The commonalities identified in this section are based on a small sample of organizations that selected a small sample of their own programming and policy documents. As such, only modest conclusions should be drawn from these observations about the community of political party assistance organizations more broadly.

Questions of Causality: a common trend found in numerous frameworks is an assumed causal relationship between outputs and outcomes where none exists. In such frameworks, it is unclear how or why certain outputs would result in related outcomes. Perhaps the most common example of this suspect causality is the tendency to equate attending a workshop with an automatic gain in skills or knowledge. Equating participation with capacity building is as flawed as equating enhanced capacity with behaviour change. It would be erroneous to assume that simply because party leaders attend a workshop, that they would necessarily begin reforming their own protocols and systems.

Other examples from the submitted documents further illustrate the difficulty that providers encounter in demonstrating causality in their respective results frameworks.

#### *Example*

This construct suggests that regional cooperation will be strengthened if meetings and congresses are held and are attended by delegates.

Expected Outcome: Strengthened regional cooperation through the [re-moved] Federation, to provide support to the local national parties.

Expected Outputs:

- a) At least 70 [removed] delegates have participated at the [re-moved] Federation Congress.
- b) 2 congresses and 12 regional meetings...have been arranged.

It is likely that there are intermediate steps involved in this intervention that are not made explicit in this log frame; without articulating those steps, however, it appears as though the provider takes for granted that if meetings are held, delegates will necessarily have the will and authority to act to strengthen regional cooperation. Without further explanation, however, it is questionable whether the expected output would cause the expected outcome.

In making such “leaps of logic” between outputs and outcomes, one fundamental unstated assumption is often made: that target parties have the political will for reform. Capacity building *may* translate to actual reform if the leadership is committed to strengthening the

party and is willing to assume the risks to do so. Few frameworks state such assumptions, let alone programme specifically to foster political will (discussed further below in Section 4).

Related to the challenge of causality is the problem attribution. If an organization does not clearly establish the links between its activities, outputs and outcomes, it becomes very difficult to attribute impact to that organization when other factors—such as a shift in the political landscape or the interventions of other organizations—are considered. According to one party-assistance provider, “the problem is to determine the impact of each of these factors of interventions, and the relative effects they might have had. The difficulty of making exact attributions means making assumptions about the likely impact of a programme.”

Unclear Outputs, Outcomes and Indicators: another commonality among numerous frameworks is a lack of clarity on outputs, outcomes and indicators; on occasion, even activities are mistaken for outputs or outcomes. This is less an issue of terminology than it is a fundamental confusion over the basic components of a results framework and how they should relate to one another. Consider, for example, an organization’s intended output: “political parties capacity [is] enhanced, political parties coordinated and conflict prevented.” Typically, a change in capacity is considered an outcome. Similarly, “conflict prevented” would usually be understood as a higher-level impact, rather than an output.

#### *Example*

Goal: Political parties develop the strategies, policies, and relationships to aggregate and articulate the interests of citizens.

Output: Parties improve their respective abilities to affect change in local governance.

Measure of Achievement: Local party branches hold town hall meetings and multiparty roundtables.

Not only is “improving abilities” typically considered an outcome, but also the measure of achievement is clearly at the output level. It is also unclear whether the goal or the output should be geared toward the higher-level impact. It could be argued that by developing strategies, policies and relationships, parties improve their abilities to affect change. It appears entirely plausible, therefore, that the goal and the output are mislabelled.

A lack of clarity regarding framework components also manifests in how outputs, outcomes and indicators are drafted; specifically, the tendency to cram multiple concepts into one component. Consider, for example, an objective that “Parliament uses newly-developed processes to improve government oversight, negotiate with the executive branch, and reach out to political parties and citizens, improving their efficiency in passing legislation that responds to the priorities of all parties and citizens.” With four or five different objectives in this one statement, it is difficult to imagine how such an outcome (or outcomes) can be measured accurately.

Another example of cramming can be found in one organization’s efforts to achieve “enhanced capacity of political youth and student organizations to influence political decision-making through non-violent means and on socially inclusive basis.” Enhancing capacity to influence decision-making is clear; however, the second part of the objective conflates the method (non-violent means) with the substance (socially inclusive). Setting them as separate objectives would likely make measuring each more feasible; otherwise, it becomes quite a task to measure decision making that is both non-violent and socially inclusive.

There has been some discussion within the party assistance community of utilizing international democracy benchmarks as meta-level indicators of achievement. Some organizations have even begun to use such indicators, including, for example, the Bertelsmann In-

dex, the Freedom House Index and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index. Only one of the participating organizations in this study employs such measures, and therefore conclusions about their use and appropriateness cannot be made. Nevertheless, a few observations for those organizations considering incorporating these indices into their frameworks may be appropriate. The indices measure the highest order of democracy, and therefore are likely most suitable for measuring results at the impact level. Further, these indices may not provide the specificity needed for accurate attribution at the programme level. To the extent that international assistance efforts are effective in advancing another country's democratic development, it is likely the collective contribution of all democracy and governance actors rather than any one in particular; naturally, other political, economic and/or social factors may account for change as well. Finally, party programming may have significant impact in a given country that is simply not captured by aggregate scores or rankings.

Flimsy Indicators: another common trait is the relatively frequent inclusion of flimsy indicators to measure outputs and outcomes. One trend in particular is evident in this regard: the reliance on feedback from participants as indicators of programme achievement. While self-evaluations and participant feedback forms can offer insight into the quality of a given activity or output, they say little of the impact or outcome of that activity. Such indicators, however, are often used to measure both outputs and outcomes. Whether, for example, programme participants were “satisfied with the usefulness of a report” or a training module (measured as “low/medium/high”), means little if they did not learn anything or apply what skills they acquired. To what extent can “good internal communication between [the] national and local level” (the outcome) be measured by “satisfied politicians and administrators at both levels” (the indicator)? Is a politician's level of satisfaction a credible measure of good internal communication?

Vague or general indicators are also relatively common in these results frameworks. It is not uncommon to find indicators that themselves need to be measured. For example, an organization that seeks “enhanced engagement between political parties, civil society and the media” includes as an indicator that “political parties and the media better appreciate the role of each other.” Unfortunately, it remains unclear how to measure “better appreciation”. Another organization has among its performance indicators “increased women engagement and representation roles within parliament” and “increased women and youth participation and dialogue with political parties.” This raises the same issue as above: how is increased engagement or participation measured? In other programmes, such indicators may even constitute outcomes. Some indicators are so broad that they offer little in terms of measuring related outputs or outcomes. The “extent to which new party structures and internal processes meet strategic goals,” is so general that it does not, in fact, provide any specific, concrete measure of the expected outcome.

The appearance of such vague or general indicators is also curious given that at least some of the participating organizations have developed assistance manuals, policy documents or larger assistance frameworks that could help guide the development of programme-specific indicators. An organization could, for example, use its own guidelines to inform how indicators are categorized or specific areas of programming developed. Yet, it is not clear that existing resources were consulted or drawn from in developing the results frameworks.

Quantitatively Heavy Indicators: quantitative measures of achievement have an important role to play in results frameworks. This is particularly true of output indicators, which often lend themselves more suitably to quantitative measures. The “number of newly-formed consensus-building mechanisms that are inclusive and participatory” can be a valuable indicator of “opposition parties and coalitions develop[ing] strategies to contribute policies and alternative legislation and opinions.”

Such quantitative indicators, however, are less effective in measuring outcomes; results frameworks that attempt to quantify outcomes often provide little if any qualitative information of the impact a programme has actually achieved. Can quantitative indicators such

as the “number of political actors and CSOs who engage...in discussions and/or activities related to political finance and party law” or the “number of political actors and CSOs who downloaded or received a hard copy of...publications on political finance and party law” provide a credible measure of the “enhanced capacity of political and civil society actors to effect, implement and monitor reform regarding laws governing political parties”?

There is also a tendency for quantitative indicators to rely on static numbers, as opposed to a quantitative change over a baseline. Surely it is an increase or decrease above or below the baseline that actually demonstrates that change has occurred. Nevertheless, the following indicators are but a few of the number-based indicators found in these frameworks:

- Number of countries with improved score on Afro/Latino barometer for ‘average trust in democratic institutions’
- Number of elected women to the 2013 parliament
- Number of issues addressed, number of consultation meetings held, number of participants, and proceedings of meetings.

Additional Observations: though the following issues are less prevalent, they are also worth noting. A number of organizations omit data sources on how indicators will be measured. Detailing means of verification can help staff plan how indicators will actually be captured; this may be particularly important in conflict and fragile contexts, in which security may prohibit travel or communication more broadly. Even if included, some organizations provide very broad techniques for measuring indicators. The provider that relies on “qualitative evaluation of electoral laws,” “evaluation of political parties’ engagement in voter registration/education,” or “qualitative evaluation of party rules” has done little more than state that outputs will be measured. The process of developing data sources for monitoring purposes can also help distinguish between those programme elements that require on-going monitoring and those that require a more exhaustive evaluation.

A number of organizations also put forth seemingly unrealistic goals of what can be achieved by any single programme intervention. Consider, for example, the highly ambitious *intermediate* result that “political parties undergo strategic internal reforms to improve party organization and structure.” Similarly, as a measure of increased diversity within parties, an organization expects that “a strategy for internal equality work is adopted and implemented by the parties, centrally or locally.” That a strategy is developed may be appropriate, but that it is adopted and implemented, particularly on the topic of internal equality, may be considered optimistic. Similarly, that “women elected at local level as well as national level elections...have increased to 50 per cent of representation” appears neither realistic nor easily attributable to one organization.

Another fairly common occurrence is the omission of certain key components of a results framework. One organization, for example, fails to include outcome indicators in its framework, which makes linking outcomes to impact a significant challenge. Though not explicitly a component of most results frameworks, very few organizations submitted documents that included theories of change for their programmes. Providing a theory of change, an intervention logic or any other fundamental rationale for programming is increasingly understood as good practice in international development.

## ANNEX II

### SILC party assessment tool

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#### Section 1: Aim

SILC cooperates with a number of political parties and organizations affiliated with political parties. In order to make our work relevant, efficient and successful, there is a need for assessing and evaluating the capacity of new and potential partners as well as existing, long term partners. The party assessment tool has three focal goals:

- It should guide and help the party to develop
- It should support SILC in assessing the party we currently work with
- It should function as a base for discussions on further engagement with potential partners

#### Section 2: Main guidelines

When assessing a party, it should be kept in mind that:

- No party is perfect – the indicators are not conditions who always have to be met.
- The assessor should take into consideration the specifics and the political, economic and social development of the country.
- The assessor should evaluate both the party's stated principles and also its concrete actions.
- The evaluation should be finalized in the form of a written report. It should be written after interviewing and observing relevant groups as defined in section 3 in this assessment manual.
- A short form of the assessment criteria will be developed for quick scanning purposes.
- Assessment should be carried out by a non-partial foreign (i.e. not from the country of the assessed party) SILC-representative.

#### Section 3: Target groups

The assessor should meet with the following target groups:

- leaders of the party
- activists
- local council leaders
- network's associated to the party (women- and youth wings etc.)
- Competing parties
- NGO:s
- the local community

#### Section 4: Indicators for evaluation

The following aspects should be assessed:

1. History
  - a. Reasons to creating the party
  - b. Oppressions
  - c. Victories
2. Ideology and party programme
  - a. Democracy  
Indicator: The party's stand on frequency of elections, representative vs. direct democracy
  - b. Organization of the state  
Indicators: Views on competence of executive, legislative and judiciary powers. Views on relationship between central, regional and local government.
  - c. Human rights

- Indicator: View on death penalty in party programme
  - d. Stand on nationalism, socialism, conservatism etc.  
Indicator: any tendencies towards un-liberal ideologies in party programmes, campaigns
  - e. Market economy  
Indicator: the party's stand on free trade agreements, WTO.
  - f. LGBT rights  
Indicator: the way the party has defended these rights (party programme, campaigns, in parliament, pride parades).  
Indicator: the party's stand on discrimination towards this group (party programme, campaigns, in parliament)
  - g. Minority rights and xenophobia (Muslims, Israel/Jews, Africans etc.)  
Indicator: the way the party has defended minority rights (party programme, campaigns, in parliament)  
Indicator: the party's stand on discrimination towards minorities (party programme, campaigns, in parliament)  
Indicator: xenophobic comments/incidents
  - h. Gender equality  
Indicator: the way the party has defended these rights (party programme, campaigns, in parliament)  
Indicator: the party's stand on discrimination towards this group (party programme, campaigns, in parliament)
  - i. Cult of a person  
Indicator: has the party managed a successful change of party leader?  
Indicator: can the party leader be openly criticized within the party?
  - j. How it was developed?  
Indicator: was the programme developed in democratic order or was it created by the party leader?  
Indicator: What is the inclusion of members into programme development?
  - k. Does the party have developed policies (e.g. how to organise taxes?)  
Indicators: The party has developed policies on how to organize taxes, e.g. education, healthcare, employment
3. Party structure
- a. Internal elections  
Indicator: congress elections (frequency, last held)
  - b. Rotation of people in leading positions  
Indicator: decision on rotation in party statutes  
Indicator: practice in reality
  - c. Ability to involve new people  
Indicator: number of members and new members annually
  - d. Political ambitions  
Indicator: hold power locally, regionally and nationally  
Indicator: what compromises is the party willing to make e.g. form alliances  
Indicator: party lists with candidates exists during elections  
Indicator: number of deputies
  - e. Party in government position  
Indicator: fulfilment of political promises as set out in election campaign
  - f. Youth wing  
Indicator: what representation within the party  
Indicator: Independent or incorporated in the party  
Indicator: size of the youth wing in relation to the party  
Indicator: use of funds  
Indicator: Regional offices  
Indicator: number of women on executive positions
  - g. Women's network  
Indicator: what representation within the party  
Indicator: independent or incorporated in the party  
Indicator: size of the youth wing in relation to the party  
Indicator: use of funds  
Indicator: regional offices
  - h. Gender equality  
Indicator: number of women on executive positions

4. Administrative capacity
  - Indicator: office space and regional offices in the country
  - Indicator: annual audit report
  - Indicator: statutes
  - Indicator: membership criteria
  - Indicator: membership register
5. Relations to domestic organisations
  - a. media
    - Indicator: is free media mentioning the party
    - Indicator: are free media reporting positively or negatively about the party?
  - b. academics and cultural personnel
    - Indicator: the anticipated support among academia and intellectual for the party
    - Indicator: if academia supports the party's general policies
  - c. civil society
    - Indicator: support from civil society
    - Indicator: cooperation with civil society organizations
    - Indicator: cooperation with think tanks
  - d. Religious organizations
    - Indicator: impact on party policies
6. Relations to international organisations
  - a. Memberships
    - Indicator: members/observing members in e.g. LI, IFLRY, ELDR, LYMEC
    - Indicator: How actively involved in these organizations (frequency of attendance, last attended meeting)
  - b. Regional organisations and other parties?
    - Indicator: Cooperation with other liberal parties in the region/country
    - Indicator: Main government (coalition) partners
  - c. Relations to diaspora
    - Indicators: members abroad, chapters abroad, voters abroad
7. Voter base
  - a. Approximate support (in numbers)
  - b. Socioeconomic appeal
    - Indicator: support among uneducated/marginalized people; professions
  - c. Geographical factors
    - Indicator: support in rural areas
8. Members
  - a. Number of members
  - b. Diversity
    - Indicator: age, gender, representation of minorities, regional spread.
  - c. Communication to members (social media, newsletter, party newspaper)
9. Current trends and current political topics:
  - Indicator: what are the 3 most important issues for the party?
  - Indicator: What issues have been most debated?

## Shortlist for rapid party assessment

**History:** When, how and why was the party created?

### **Ideology and party programme:**

- Democracy: Does the party have clear views on electoral system, competence of government branches and levels of government?
- Human rights: What is the party's stand on the death penalty
- Economic freedom: is the party clearly for free trade?
- Minority rights: Is the party defending rights of sexual, ethnic and/or religious minorities?
- Gender inequality: Existence and substance of policy for gender equality
- Cult of person: Has the party had a successful leadership transition? Is it likely to have a successful transition of top leadership?
- Economic policy: does the party have its own shadow budget(s) at national, regional and local levels.

### **Party structure**

- Does the party hold internal elections? With what frequency? When were they last held?
- Rotation of people in leading positions. Are there rules on rotation in party statutes? Are rotation principles practiced in reality
- Political ambitions: Plans to hold power locally, regionally and nationally? What compromises is the party willing to make e.g. form alliances? Did the party have party lists with candidates during last elections?
- Party in government position : fulfilment of political promises as set out in election campaign
- Youth wing and women's wing: what representation within the party, size of the youth wing in relation to the party, number of women on executive positions

### **Administrative capacity**

Does the party have (1) office space and regional offices in the country (2) an annual audit report (3) statutes (4) membership criteria (5) a membership register

### **Relations to domestic organisations**

Are free media reporting positively or negatively about the party?

Are academics and cultural personalities likely supporters of the party?

What civil society organizations are supporting the agenda of the party? Does the party have relationships to likeminded CSOs?

Does the party have ties to likeminded think tank(s)?

### **International relations**

Is the party member/observing member in LI, IFLRY, ELDR, LYMEC? How actively involved in these organizations (frequency of attendance, last attended meeting)?

Relations to diaspora: does the party have members abroad, chapters abroad, likely voters abroad?

### **Voter base**

Approximate expected support (in numbers)?

Results in last elections on all levels

Socioeconomic appeal: which groups are likely voters (geographic and social distribution)?

### **Members**

Number of members ; age groups, gender, representation of minorities, regional spread.

Communication to members: social media, newsletter, party newspaper?

**Current trends and current political topics:**

What are the 3 most important issues for the party? What issues have been most debated inside the party?

### ANNEX III: NIMD's Intervention Logic (from NIMD Multi Annual Plan 2012-2015)

|                 | <i>Objectives</i>  | <i>Indicators</i>  | <i>SoV</i>  | <i>Conditions (risks)</i>   |
|-----------------|--|--|---|---|
| <i>Vision</i>   | Democratic societies in which the rule of law is observed and the public good fostered   | # programme countries with improved overall scores on the Bertelsmann Index, Freedom House Index and EIU Democracy Index   |   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Security and Stability</li> <li>• Free and fair elections</li> <li>• Separation of powers</li> </ul>   |
| <i>Impact</i>   | Legitimate political parties that operate in a functional multiparty political system which initiates, manages and implements policy based reforms | <p># reform proposal implemented</p> <p># of countries with improved scores on the EIU Democracy indicators for 'Functioning of Government' and 'Electoral Process and Pluralism'.</p> <p># of countries with improved score on BTI indicator for 'Governance Capability'.</p>   | Indexes   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political will</li> <li>• Rule of law</li> <li>• Functioning democratic institutions</li> <li>• Popular support for democracy</li> <li>• Trust in democratic institutions</li> <li>• Financial transparency</li> </ul> |
| <i>Outcomes</i> | <p>1. Functioning inter party dialogue</p> <p>2. Legitimate political parties</p>  | <p>1.1 # reform proposals adopted</p> <p>1.2 # countries with appropriate level of party representatives in dialogue platforms</p> <p>2.1 # of countries with improved score on Afro/Latino barometer for 'average trust in democratic institutions'</p> <p>2.2 # of countries with improved score on Afro/Latino barometer for 'trust in political parties'</p> <p>3.1 # of countries with improved score on Afro/Latino barometer for 'trust in the government/judiciary'</p> <p>3.2 # of countries with improved score on the EIU De-</p> | <p>National Gazettes</p> <p>Afro and Latino barometer</p> <p>Subscores from EIU and BTI indexes</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Appropriate legislation</li> <li>• Accountable officials</li> <li>• Free media</li> <li>• Commitment of political parties to dialogue</li> </ul>   |

|                      |  |   |  |   |
|----------------------|--|---|--|---|
| <p><i>Output</i></p> | <p>3. Improved interaction between political and civil society</p> <p>1.1 Organisational capacity of multi-party dialogue platforms strengthened</p> <p>1.2 Interparty dialogue on issues of shared concern facilitated</p> <p>2.1 Policy seeking capacity of political parties improved</p> <p>3.1 Engagement and interrelations between political society and civil society improved</p> | <p>3.3 # of countries with improved scores on the EIU Democracy indicators for 'Political Participation'</p> <p>3.4 # of countries with improved score on Afro/Latino barometer for 'popular support for democracy'</p> <p>3.5 # of countries with improved score on Afro/Latino barometer for 'engagement in politics'</p> <p>1.1 &gt;60% of multi-party dialogue platforms have an increased capability to achieve objectives</p> <p>a) # reform proposals developed per country</p> <p>b) # reform proposals promoted per country</p> <p>1.2 60% of multi-party dialogue platforms have increased capabilities to commit and act</p> <p>a) # of implementing partners adhering to financial and narrative reporting agreements</p> <p>b) # of implementing partners adhering to other contractual agreements</p> <p>c) # of implementing partners able to attract other funding</p> <p>2.1 60% of political parties have increased capabilities (using scores on appropriate 5c indicators)</p> <p>a) score of a political party on the 5 capabilities framework based on the policy seeking capacity of political parties</p> <p>3.1 &gt;60% of multi-party dialogue platforms have an increased capability to relate</p> <p>a) # dialogue platforms having improved relations with civil society and democratic stakeholders (parliament, election management body, legis-</p> | <p>Mission Reports</p> <p>Quarterly reports</p> <p>Dedicated monitoring tool</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Basic capacity</li> <li>• Key political actors request NIMD (demand driven)</li> <li>• Programme is feasible (e.g. NIMD core mandate and results)</li> <li>• Political space</li> <li>• Funding</li> </ul> |
|----------------------|--|---|--|---|

|                          |   |   |  |  |
|--------------------------|---|---|--|--|
| <p><b>Activities</b></p> | <p>Type 1 Activities – outputs 1.1 &amp; 2.1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• developing, maintaining &amp; equipping an interparty dialogue platform</li> <li>• organise interparty workshops, conferences, debates and training sessions</li> <li>• organise intraparty strategic planning &amp; self-assessments</li> <li>• strengthening basic capacity of parties including training and workshops</li> <li>• organise party - parliamentary group meetings</li> </ul> <p>Type 2 Activities – outputs 1.2 &amp; 3.1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• organise regular interparty dialogue meetings and debates</li> <li>• organise regular interparty conferences and debates</li> <li>• organise joint party-civil society dialogue meetings, workshops and training sessions</li> <li>• organise linking, learning &amp; networking activities</li> <li>• method development, monitoring &amp; evaluation</li> <li>• organise workshops and training on selected issues with parliamentary groups</li> </ul> | <p>trar)<br/>b) # of interparty platform members (parties) having improved relations with civil society and democratic stakeholders<br/>c) # of democracy school graduates</p> <p><b>Inputs</b></p> <p><i>Country level</i></p> | <p><b>Budget</b></p> <p>See Annex XX</p> |  |
|--------------------------|---|---|--|--|