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# Evaluation of the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy

**Political Party Assistance to Build Democracy**

**DIPD**

DANISH INSTITUTE FOR  
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# **Evaluation of the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy**

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Abstract: The Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) aims to contribute to strengthening democratic culture in individual political parties and multi-party systems in 14 developing countries. DIPD has been able to skilfully identify and make use of opportunities that open up. The projects have served as learning arenas that have given the participants the skills and self-confidence to take up political positions. Most successful in terms of results are the multi-party projects aiming at preparing the ground for the development of mutual respect among political adversaries and capacities to communicate across party lines.

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# Preface

This review was commissioned by the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy and carried out by the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research. Dr. Jørn Holm-Hansen was project leader and Dr. Marit Haug team member.

The evaluation has been designed to allow for active participation of DIPD as well as the political parties and multi-party platforms taking part in DIPD projects. Fieldwork was carried out in Palestine and Kenya and Skype interviews made with partners in Egypt and Myanmar. The Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research would like to thank all those having shared their time, information and insights with the evaluators. Special thanks to Ali Khilleh (Palestine) and Range Mwita (Kenya) for practical assistance and insightful input during fieldwork.

Oslo, November 2016

Geir Heierstad  
Research Director

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# Summary

*Jørn Holm-Hansen and Marit Haug*

## **Evaluation of the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy - Political Party Assistance to Build Democracy**

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The Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) aims to contribute to strengthening democratic culture in individual political parties and multi-party systems in 14 developing countries. With a relatively small secretariat, DIPD works in close cooperation with Danish political parties, their partner parties and multi-party platforms with funds provided by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. DIPD is in its second three-year grant period (2014-17).

DIPD's current strategy aims at two core objectives: enhancing party capacities in representation and accountability and facilitating multiparty dialogue and cooperation for joint (reform) initiatives.

The aim is to strengthen the political parties' capacity to function democratically and to enter into dialogue with each other. These are ambitious objectives because they challenge heavy structures and "culture" and run contrary to the instincts of most party leaders in the Global South. The general method applied by DIPD is to expose partners from the South to Danish practices and let them be inspired by how the Danish political parties operate and also by the system in which they operate. Peer-to-peer cooperation is another mainstay in DIPD's project design.

This evaluation assesses key elements of DIPD's current strategy in order to feed into further strategic work. The evaluation aims at learning rather than control, and has been carried out in a participative way. It has been designed as a case study to throw light on DIPD's overall approaches and methodology. Youth in

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Politics has been studied as a case exemplifying DIPD's overall work since it provides empirically rich data on DIPD's two main objectives. Theory of change and change paths have been a structuring tool. Field studies have been conducted in Palestine and Kenya, and document studies combined with Skype interviews have been conducted on the projects in Myanmar and Egypt.

The evaluation found that DIPD's strategic targeting of young, politically active people is a relevant measure to reach the overall objectives. This targets a segment of the politically active population that may be able to make use of skills and insights acquired through the projects.

DIPD has been able to skilfully identify and make use of opportunities that open up, such as in Egypt or Myanmar. The project has already led to viable networks, youth forums, civic education platforms and the emergence of youth policy programmes. In Palestine, two of the three youth organizations involved have set up a joint youth forum and are cooperating in various political actions, e.g. elections for students' councils at the universities. The projects have served as learning arenas that have given the participants the skills and self-confidence to take up political positions. In Kenya, a cross-party youth network committed to issue-based politics has been established. Youth are more involved in parties and county level politics. Youth issues are now part of party manifestos. In Egypt, willingness to cooperate among the young people taking part in the multi-party Youth Network has continued to some extent on a personal basis. The Civic Education project has given valuable practical multi-disciplinary social science training and has resulted in an alumni network. In Myanmar, a multi-party youth platform has been established that has been able to put youth issues on the political agenda in the parties. Given the contextual obstacles, the interventions have been effective.

Most successful in terms of results are the multi-party projects aiming at preparing the ground for the development of mutual respect among political adversaries and capacities to communicate across party lines. The DIPD methodology of bringing young people together for training and trips has created networks that already produce outcomes and may continue to do so going forward. Personal acquaintances and mutual respect hopefully will

survive the project period and lead to ex-post outcomes. Project partners have been inspired by the Danish parties capacity to communicate across serious political dividing lines. This capacity, however, can probably not be learnt in workshops and study tours since they are based on various preconditions that do not exist in the Global South.

The evaluation found that project activities gave the young participants new skills and self-esteem, particularly among young women in traditionalist societies. We are dealing with long-term processes and not surprisingly, so far it has been impossible to identify wider outcomes in terms of a significantly stronger position for young people in the parties (inclusion). However, there are many examples of young project participants who have risen in the party ranks. While increasing youth representation in political parties and elected bodies through capacity-building and knowledge-sharing has proved possible, and strengthening youth dialogue across parties through multi-party platforms works well, the idea of improving accountability has proved to be more challenging.

DIPD's projects have had effects not only in the Global South but also in Denmark. Danish political parties have acquired a closer insight into the practicalities and challenges related to developmental aid. Some parties have reanimated their global commitment while others have strengthened their commitment to solidarity and development aid. Moreover, the work in Party Internationals has been strengthened. Political parties have learnt more about the requirements within development aid.

The change paths envisaged in the project are logical and generally realistic because they are based on prior analyses of conditions in the countries of operation. Timing of project initiation and selection of parties to work with make DIPD strongly dependent on good analyses of opportunities (enabling situations), motives and change management capacities, for which DIPD has developed a well-thought-out methodology.

The evaluation found less intensive and more sporadic interfaces between partner parties in the party-to-party projects, and less interface with Denmark in the multi-party projects than would have been expected from the strong role of peer-to-peer thinking and inspiration in the design of the projects. This is not necessarily

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a problem because many of the project activities are carried out locally between the encounters with the Danish partners.

The evaluation recommends:

1. Continue focus on core elements in DIPD's current strategy and methodological set-up into a new strategy period, in particular further developing and applying a multi-level, integrated strategic mix of project activities
2. Continue combining party-to-party and multi-party projects
3. Consider more Nordic cooperation
4. Select partners based on careful analysis of the parties' viability and ability to present clear policy choices for the voters
5. Utilize the interfaces between Danish parties and partners in the South through more peer-to-peer activities on concrete issues
6. Give more priority to study visits to Denmark as a learning and awareness-raising method
7. Set up electronic sharing and learning platforms
8. Facilitate more South-South meeting places
9. Enhance capacities in the involved parties for project implementation
10. Promote networks among current and former project participants
11. Establish in-country mentorship schemes
12. Establish DIPD as a broad knowledge centre on democracy and parties

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 A brief description of DIPD

The Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) was established in 2010 through a bill passed by Parliament in May of that year (Act 530). DIPD's mandate is to help to strengthen the democratic culture, the political parties and the multi-party system in selected developing countries within the framework of Danish development aid. DIPD's activities are intended to complement other Danish and international efforts to strengthen democracy. Parties are singled out as vital agencies in the functioning of democracies because they channel the choices of the voters into parliament and government as well as potentially contributing to a better political culture. Parties, however, also operate in a larger context. Therefore, DIPD's mandate is also to work with independent media, think-tanks and non-governmental organizations that seek to promote the development of a democratic political culture and multi-party systems in the developing countries. DIPD cooperates with international institutions focused on the support of multi-party democracy as well as other international partners, notably the Netherlands Institute for Multi-party Democracy and IDEA International. Currently the partners involved in DIPD projects are almost exclusively parties and multi-party platforms.

DIPD is conceived as a contribution to the overall Danish democracy support. It is administered within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' framework of human rights and democracy, which means the poverty criterion in force for development aid undertakings does not apply.

The design of DIPD is inspired by two distinct models, that of the Swedish model of party-affiliated organizations (party-to-party) and that of the Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy (NIMD). This reflects varying preferences among the two Danish political parties that were the main driving forces, the Social Democrats favouring a party-to-party approach and the Liberal party preferring a multi-party approach. Therefore, half of DIPD's project funds goes to party-to-party partnerships between a political party in Denmark on the one hand and parties or party-like groupings and movements in developing countries on the other. Party-to-party project partnerships are carried out through the Danish political parties, and multi-party project partnerships through the DIPD secretariat. The current strategy aims to ensure the involvement of the Danish parties in our multi-party activities.

As of 2016, DIPD has party-to-party partnerships and multi-party platforms in 14 countries. DIPD's second three-year grant period started up in July 2014 (2014–2017). The grant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs amounts to a total DKK 75 million. The size of the multi-party projects ranges from 5.800.000 DKK (Nepal) to 825.000 DKK (Bhutan). Party-to-party projects are between 3.600.000 DKK and 1 million DKK.

Party-to-party projects take place in Bolivia, Egypt, Ghana, Swaziland, Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia. In most cases, party-to-party partnerships involve sister parties or parties close to each other ideologically. However, often sister parties turn out to be less similar in outlook than expected, partly due to the circumstances in which they operate. The Social Democrats and the Liberal Party are involved in three and two partnerships respectively. Smaller parties are involved in one each with the exception of the Red-Green Alliance that draws on an activist membership base to run two partnerships. For the party-to-party projects, one-third of the total amount is distributed equally among the parties (around DKK 400 000). Two thirds are distributed according to seats in Parliament.

The other half of the project funds is used for multi-party projects that contribute to the development of pluralistic party systems. Multi-party projects take place in Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Egypt, Tanzania, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. Most of the current project

activities are continuations of projects that started up in the 2010–14 grant period.

In addition to the project funds for party-to-party and multi-party partnerships, there is a “free pool” to cover costs in an interim period after a party has lost mandates and therefore also DIPD funding. In order to prevent project results suffering in the scaling-down period, “free pool” funds can be used. The unused funds for the Danish People’s Party accrue to the “free pool”.

DIPD concentrates its efforts on two of the main functions of democratic parties – representation and inclusion. Party politics in developing countries often show weaknesses in respect of the low level of democracy and inclusion within the parties themselves and the poor capacity for dialogue between parties. Consequently, DIPD’s first objective is to contribute to the strengthening of the capacity of political parties to function democratically and to be representative and accountable. The second objective is to contribute to the strengthening of political dialogue and cooperation between parties in multi-party systems. These objectives are to be achieved through the active involvement of Danish political parties and stakeholders as well as international partners in partnerships with political parties and multi-party platforms and other institutions in developing countries. The idea is that experiences and competencies gained by Danish political parties – and also democratic values that have become hegemonic in Denmark – can be “put into play” together with parties in the Global South.

DIPD also has the aim of ensuring that the partnerships generate results in Denmark, such as a better understanding of the challenges to democracy in the parties and a wider interest in the population at large in democracy support, as elements in Denmark’s international commitment.

DIPD’s current (2014–17) strategy is called “Ideas that can inspire”, reflecting one of the institute’s core approaches which is to inspire through exposure to Danish experiences and to democratic principles rather than presenting fixed models. Youth in politics is one of the areas where Danish practices are particularly advanced, in addition to the role of local party chapters, coalition building and women being politically active on all levels.

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The work with “Youth in Political Parties and Politics” was initiated in 2011 following a visit by a delegation of young Egyptians to Denmark.

DIPD has a staff of six. In addition, there are regional coordinators in Myanmar and Nepal and staff employed in the party-to-party projects.

DIPD’s Board is appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a four-year period. Altogether nine of 15 members are appointed at the suggestion of Parliament, two are proposed by the Danish Youth Council (DUF), one by the minister of foreign affairs, one by the Danish Rectors’ Conference, one by NGO Forum, and one by the Institute for Human Rights. DIPD’s director is appointed by the Board. The Board has met more than 30 times so far. Voting rarely occurs despite the Board’s cross-political composition. Party-to-party projects are approved by consensus.

DIPD has dual functions vis-à-vis the Danish political parties and their partners. On the one hand DIPD makes funds available to the partnership activities, and on the other hand provides expertise such as support to project development and implementation as well as reporting and access to international networks. The DIPD secretariat operates as a competence centre or knowledge hub and is well-connected to global and Nordic networks in the field of democracy support through political parties – Political Party Support – to serve the parties involved in projects. These networks are used in DIPD’s appraisals of proposals.

DIPD has engaged closely with organizations such as DEDI (Danish-Egyptian Institute for Multi-Party Democracy), NIMD, Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), with whom DIPD coordinates or implements activities. DIPD has also been active in establishing the Global Knowledge Network on Party Democracy Support - the so-called Political Party Peer Network (PPPN), of which NDI, the Oslo Centre, NIMD, IDEA, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Swedish International Liberal Centre (Silc) and DIPD form the core group.

DIPD produces knowledge products (tools and manuals) such as “How to Build a Youth Wing” and “Coalition Building Reader” and arranges trainings using these publications and other aids. This



is done in cooperation with the parties and at times on their initiative. However, DIPD is not only a competence centre but also the organization through which project proposals get funding or not. There is a dialogue between the DIPD secretariat and the parties on project proposals to be decided by the DIPD Board as well as reporting to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, the reporting systems are developed in cooperation with the parties within the requirements set by the Danish International Development Agency (Danida). Overall, the active involvement of the parties not only in project implementation but in the overall DIPD practices has increased gradually since the start.

A more direct involvement from the Danish political parties in the multi-party projects, however, has proven to be difficult to achieve. The independent review commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2013 pointed to a need to harmonize ambitions with personnel resources, leading to an action plan for capacity-building for the Danish parties.

## 1.2 Aim of the evaluation

The evaluation has taken place approximately halfway through the second funding period (2014–2017). DIPD has commissioned this evaluation in line with recommendations from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DIPD's own strategy in order to learn from past experiences and actively evaluate the efforts made. The overall aim is to assess key elements in DIPD's current Strategy 2014–2017 with the purpose of feeding into further strategic work as well as a possibly upcoming review. In line with DIPD's evaluation policy, the evaluation has emphasized learning.

The terms of reference (TOR) (see Appendix 2) asked for assessments of relevance, effectiveness, change paths and their underlying assumptions, and capacity development. They also mention sharing of ideas, ways of mobilizing youth in politics, the use of Danish party resources, partnerships, benefits and results in Denmark, DIPD's Youth in Politics in the light of the larger picture of support to youth in politics. The TOR asked for recommendations in the following areas:

- DIPD's overall strategy
- Approaches and change paths pursued in Youth in Politics
- Selection of partners and partnership
- Capacity development approaches
- Specialization
- Enhancement of results

### 1.3 The evaluation approach

DIPD is halfway through its second funding period and the evaluation is designed as a participative learning-process with broad involvement throughout the process from DIPD and involved political parties. Key elements in DIPDs Strategy 2014–2017 have been assessed. The evaluation is tailored to feed into further strategic work.

#### **Participative, learning and formative approach.**

We have carried out the evaluation as a learning/formative exercise – not merely as a control exercise. In order to facilitate openness and a learning environment, we have informed involved actors that the report will avoid open criticism of individual activities. Critical remarks have been made in general terms.

We have involved the evaluatees actively throughout the evaluation in addition to the interviews. A start-up workshop with representatives of the involved parties and Skype meetings with the Evaluation Committee have been carried out. The field visits to Palestine and Kenya were participative mainly through a start-up workshop with 12–15 people involved in the projects. The aim is to clarify and adjust our approaches to the assignment in order to present and discuss preliminary findings. In addition, in the field visits we engaged peers to take part during interviews and comment on draft fieldwork reports written by the evaluators. Range Mwita from Kenya played an active part in Palestine. Unfortunately, due to visa problems, it was not possible to make a similar arrangement for a Palestinian peer to take part in the fieldwork in Kenya.

### **Division of tasks**

The evaluation was carried out by two evaluators. Jørn Holm Hansen is team leader and in charge of writing the report. He took part in the field visit to Palestine and carried out Skype interviews about the youth components in Egypt. He was responsible for linking the evaluation to state of the art in democracy support research. Marit Haug went to Kenya for fieldwork and carried out the Skype interviews with Myanmar. Haug had the main responsibility for the systematic analysis of project documentation about projects not visited or skyped. Both evaluators are equally responsible for analyzing DIPS's strategic and methodological documents. Professor Michael Wahman will serve as a peer reviewer of the Draft Report.

## **1.4 Methods applied**

*Case studies.* The evaluation has been designed as a case study. The evaluation is a systematic evaluation of DIPD's efforts, and made use of Youth in Politics as a case to analyse DIPD's overall work. As a case, Youth in Politics is a particularly rich source of data on how to strengthen two major functions of political parties: those of representation (through involvement of youth) and accountability (through competence-building of youth and formulation of youth policies). DIPD's Youth Politics is a rich data source because DIPD has several youth projects in different countries and young people tend to be mistrusted (and not included) in mother parties. When they are welcome, it often is to serve as loud supporters at rallies, i.e. the opposite of engaging in cross-party dialogue. Therefore, selecting Youth in Politics for closer scrutiny allows for in-depth analysis of DIPD's two core objectives in ways that probably no other programme activity would. Moreover, Denmark has a well-developed system and culture for young people involving themselves in politics, which adds to the data richness. Youth in Politics also includes projects that address the capacity of individual parties as well as political dialogue and cooperation between parties in a multi-party system. Party-to-party projects as well as multi-party youth platforms are included.

*Theory of change (ToC) as a structuring tool.* Data collection, analysis and reporting have been structured to a large extent by theory of change and will follow the logical framework presented in chapter 7, “Developing Political Party Capacity – a DIPD Approach”. Fully aware that the knowledge products/results frameworks of DIPD is in a pilot phase, we did not use theory of change to “check” the capacities of the DIPD community as such but rather as a helping tool to structure interviews and analysis in line with the focus on relevance and effectiveness in the terms of reference.

*Units of analysis and data sources.* The following table shows how we have identified units of analysis and data sources in order to address the evaluation topics.

Table 1.1: Units of analysis and data sources

<b>Evaluation topics</b>	<b>Unit of analysis</b>	<b>Data sources</b>
<b>THE INTERVENTION - creating change</b>		<b>Documentation from DIPD will contribute towards answering all the questions</b>
Change paths, ToC – valid and realistic: assumptions, obstacles, inputs?	Intervention  Political parties in Denmark and partner countries	Interviews and FGDs/workshops with political parties in partner countries  Interviews with Danish political parties and Copenhagen workshop in May  Scholarly literature
Capacity development: methods, activities and results, systemic approach (org., leadership, cultural and gender barriers addressed?)		
Methods and instruments for sharing of ideas and expertise – effectiveness?		
Mobilization of youth, what has worked and why? Youth wings?		
<b>THE PARTNERSHIP</b>		
Involvement of political party resources and youth parties from Denmark, extent and characteristics?	Danish political parties	Interviews and Copenhagen workshop
Partnership: - Project cooperation - Political dialogue  Country's political dynamics and partner influence on partnership	Partner country political parties  Danish political parties	Interviews and FGDs/workshops with political parties in partner countries  Interviews with Danish political parties and Copenhagen workshop
Benefits and results in Denmark from DIPD engagement	DIPD Danish political parties	Interviews with Danish political parties and DIPD, Copenhagen workshop
<b>THE INTERVENTION IN ITS CONTEXT</b>		
Relevance	Intervention/project  DIPD's strategy  Strategies of political parties in partner countries and Denmark  Context in partner countries	Interviews with political parties in partner countries and in Denmark  Interviews with stakeholders, i.e. young people in partner countries  Interviews with key informants in partner countries, i.e. academics, activists, youth organizations
Effectiveness and effects		
Political dynamics		
Global approaches	Party support globally	The Utøya conference, May  Scholarly literature  Other evaluations
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b>		

DIPD strategy Partnerships: selection and approaches Capacity development approaches Specialization within DIPD Enhancement of results	DIPD Danish parties and parties in partner countries	Political parties in Denmark and partner countries Copenhagen workshop
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The design has been adapted to the limitations of a relatively small evaluation, which means most of the data have their origin in the participating organizations, and mainly from people directly involved. This holds true both for written and spoken sources. Fieldwork in Palestine and Kenya, however, opened up for some observation of activities. It should also be borne in mind that searching for effects at this stage is premature given DIPD's long-term and ambitious goals. Therefore, the evaluators have been looking for any preliminary results that point in the direction of the set objectives.

## 2 Recent research on political party support

### **The role of political parties**

The field of democracy assistance saw an upsurge in the early 1990's after the post-Cold War's so-called third wave of democratization. Although holding multi-party elections was the distinguishing element of the new democracies, initially democracy assistance did not prioritize party assistance. Nevertheless, the main efforts in democracy assistance are directed toward improvements of the electoral process, strengthening of the judiciary, parliament, government administration, mass media and not least civil society (Svåsand 2014:10). The third wave optimism has gradually been replaced by a recognition of democratic shrinkage. Democracy has been under attack for some years and is challenged in different ways and for different reasons in many regions of the World, Europe included.

Political parties – and in particular their members – constitute the link between society and state by combining interest aggregation and policy coordination. Therefore, political parties are key institutions in a democracy – the most important actor in the political system of contemporary democracies, according to Mair (2014). DIPD bases its change strategy on established political party theory, notably the linkage paradigm suggested by Dalton et al. (2011: 6-7) who operate with five main linkages between citizens and policy, all five enabled by political parties. Parties recruit candidates and set the parameters for the electoral campaign (campaign linkage). Parties in the South are primarily campaign organizations. Parties activate citizens as members and voters (participatory linkage). Parties offer choices between policy alternatives (ideological linkage). Parties enable congruence between voters' choices and policies in parliament and government

(representative linkage). Parties deliver on the policies they offered during election (policy linkage). These five linkages are weak in the South. DIPD is working to change the nature of youth involvement/mobilization and to address weaknesses in the policy linkages.

In democratic systems, diversity is institutionalized. In order to be a democracy, the political system must function within a set of constitutional rules. The struggle for power as well as the exercise of power must take place within binding rules of the game. A multiple party system with parties capable of dialogue and compromise is a core characteristic of a democracy. DIPD's second aim – to contribute to dialogue and cooperation between parties – addresses some of the preconditions for “institutionalized diversity” to strike roots in and between political parties.

DIPD's first aim – to strengthen parties' capacity to function democratically – touches upon a classic discussion in scholarly literature on political parties. The challenge of holding party leaders accountable was addressed as early as 1911 by German sociologist Robert Michels in his seminal work on the “Iron law of oligarchy”. He showed that even radically democratic parties (and trade unions) tend to end up being led by an “oligarchy” of people in elected positions including executive personnel and employed managers who exert power over members and voters.

The role of party members is crucial. Political parties in the Global North are not necessarily good models to emulate. Political parties in contemporary democratic societies tend to move from being membership-based to being campaign machines, and from offering distinct programmes to merely promising a more efficient administration, a trend leading to what Katz and Mair (1995) called “cartel parties”. In this perspective, making parties more democratic is not only a task for the Global South but also for the Global North.

The picture, however, should be nuanced somewhat. A recent study of 47 parties in six northwest European countries (Kölln 2016) shows that 25 per cent of the parties studied had *not* experienced membership decline during the period of study (1960–2010). Membership decline seems to be correlated with party age, or level of institutionalization. This is explained by the fact that the more a party is institutionalized, the less it needs a large grass-roots



membership base to spread the message and organize. On the other hand, in order for a political party system to function as a link between society and state, having parties with broad membership bases is an advantage. Moreover, in order to be a democratic organization with accountable leaders, members are indispensable.

Although political parties are core institutions in a democracy, not all institutions labelling themselves as parties fulfill the functions of interest aggregation and policy coordination in ways that are conducive to democracy. The cartel party phenomenon mentioned above occurs in established democracies. In non-industrialized societies, like the ones in which DIPD is active, parties often reflect politics that are more driven by identity issues (such as ethnicity and religion or support to a charismatic leader) and personalistic linkages between voters and candidates than by competing party programmes.

In a study of African political parties, Bleck and van de Walle (2013) found that “valence issues” overwhelmingly dominate the discourse of political parties and that non-party actors were more likely to engage in policy “positions” than parties but also that that opposition actors were more likely to take positions than the incumbent.

The lack of distinguishable programmes, or at least a commitment to implement a clear set of policy positions if elected – leaves voters with little power to influence issues such as the prioritization of social protection vs infrastructure, the role of religion in public affairs, redistribution, or strategies to promote growth. Programmatic and/or issue-based parties can provide voters with a choice between consistent public policy packages, which makes it possible to fulfill the classical functions of political parties – interest aggregation and policy coordination. In other words, non-programmatic parties and parties without explicit policy positions do not fulfill the function of providing voters with a choice between political alternatives beyond facilitating some elite circulation, and therefore hardly contribute to democratization. Cheeseman and Paget (2014: 88) found that programmatic parties resulted in a greater voice for marginalized groups and more emphasis on pro-poor policies. In countries where political parties mainly represent an ethnic group,

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supporting the development of a workable multi-party system may be more a way to institutionalize peaceful ethnic or tribal co-existence than to facilitate democracy.

DIPD generally does not endorse the position of the “programmatically party school” that parties need ideological commitments to be conducive to democracy. Instead, DIPD concentrates on assisting in the parties’ development of transparent, consultative and sound policy development processes in order to pave the ground for voters to be offered clearer policy choices on concrete issues. An exception to the rule of focusing on issues without bringing in ideology is the Danish Social Democrats’ DIPD project that assists their Ghanaian counterpart to develop an “ideology paper” in order for the latter to achieve a clearer political profile.

The conclusion that parties in the Global South generally lack programmes could be nuanced somewhat. In his analysis of 28 party programmes in three African countries (Namibia, Ghana and Kenya) Elischer (2012) found that programmatic ideas in the conventional left-right sense do feature in African politics. However, in most cases, programmatic ideas can be reduced to a few categories and only two of the 28 parties studied present broader programmatic manifestos. In South America, e.g. El Salvador, Brazil and Uruguay, parties with few resources to play a clientelistic game have been able to win elections on the basis of their programmes, thereby inspiring rival parties to take up programmatic politics, and eventually a programmatic party system may develop (Luna, Rosenblatt and Toro 2014:23). In a study of voting in seven African countries, 28 elections and 1900 parliamentary constituencies, Boone and Wahman (2015) show that the ethnic factor in vote choice is primarily a phenomenon in rural areas of the rulers’ home regions and clearly less so in other rural areas and in cities. For designers of political party assistance programmes it is, therefore, necessary to take into consideration the possibility that differences in individual parties’ mode of mobilization, their linkage to voters, and their organizational capacity are not only *between*, but also *within* countries.

Often multi-party systems exist in settings that only partly allow for democratic competition. Despite formal transition to democracy, former authoritarian states may still combine formally

democratic institutions, including a multi-party system, with authoritarian techniques of governance, such as electoral manipulation, a large degree of control over mass media, and discrete harassment. These so-called ‘hybrid’ (Petrov, Lipman and Hale 2014) or ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’ (Levitsky and Way 2010), however, seek to avoid direct use of repressive measures. Opposition parties actually compete, albeit under conditions that are unfair. But even when opposition parties get a considerable share of seats in the national assembly, the hybrid or competitive regime does not take the risk of letting the freely elected representative organ play an independent role. Instead, for the representative organs they “substitute” (Petrov, Lipman and Hale 2014) various types of consultative bodies composed of non-elected, individual members who are given the task of representing opinion, sector-specific insight and to a certain degree material interests (Davies et al 2016). Thus, the role of political parties is minimized.

Levitsky and Way (2010: 50ff) distinguish between ‘linkage’ and ‘leverage’ with the west to explain the trajectories of competitive authoritarian regimes. Linkage is the density of ties, a myriad network of interdependence. They may be economic, political, diplomatic, technocratic ties or based on civil society. Transnational party networks represent linkage. Leverage has to do with the capacity of external powers to press for democratization, and the vulnerability of the targeted state to the pressure. Levitsky and Way conclude that linkage increases the likelihood that democratization will ensue (2010: 50ff). Taking issue with Levitsky and Way’s structuralist account, Tolstrup (2013) explains the differences in “success rate” for democratization through linkage and leverage by the role of “gatekeeper elites”. The gatekeepers actively facilitate or restrict ties to external actors: “By upgrading or downgrading these ties, gatekeeper elites directly affect the capacity that determines the strength of the external actor” (Tolstrup 2016). The author identifies three types of gatekeeper elites: the political elites, the economic elites, and the civil society elites. By targeting parties, DIPD works with the political gatekeepers to create linkage.

### **Literature on democracy support through political parties**

Democracy support is under rapid development. The scholarly and practical literature on democracy support is evolving but the literature on political party support (democracy support *through political parties*) is still scarce. DIPD follows this literature and debate partly through its networks. In 2012, as a background for workshops with the parties, DIPD made a synthesis that summed up state of the art in the party-to-party model (Madsen 2012).

Some of the conclusions drawn in scholarly literature and evaluations inform our evaluation but are not necessarily incorporated uncritically. For instance, in his overview of current international party assistance, Lars Svåsand (2014) noted a trend away from a concentration on direct party support to indirect party support targeting parliamentary institutions, electoral management bodies and civil society organizations. Against this background, the author argues that party assistance programmes should be more closely linked to other forms of development assistance. This recommendation could be criticised for not taking into consideration the distinctive features and impact of political party support and multi-party mechanisms. Linking up with development aid, political party assistance may increase the risk of becoming what Sarah Bush (2015) calls “tame”. She argues that what she calls the professional field of organizations that design and implement democracy assistance programmes are an often overlooked actor. They take part in strategic games for funding (with own government) and for access (with target states). As they compete and professionalize, they tend to converge around a view of democracy as the result of an incremental process rather than of political struggle.

Recent evaluations of the Swedish party-affiliated organizations (Bryld et al. 2015) and the Netherland’s Institute for Multi-Party Democracy (Piron 2015) found that party-to-party approaches yield fewer easily detectable outcomes than multi-party approaches. They mainly lead to outputs on an individual level, such as individual competence building and enhanced skills related to e.g. communication and campaigning. Effects on transparency, accountability and participation have been difficult to ascertain with the evidence available. Dodsworth and Cheeseman (2016) recommend designing sister-party programmes to feed into, or link

up with multi-party programmes. This, they claim, will increase the likelihood that these programmes will foster change at the level of individual parties and at the national level.

Two evaluations of Norwegian political party support found that the value added by Norwegian parties to partner parties and multi-party arrangements was dependent on clear partnership strategies and intensive use of context insight (Braathen and Holm-Hansen 2014; Henningsen, Braathen, Holm-Hansen and Jordhus-Lier 2010). These findings are of relevance for the discussion of methods and instruments, and capacity building approaches in general.

### **Summing up**

Unlike mainstream development assistance, political party support directly targets the political sphere. Therefore, organizations like DIPD need to relate to debates and research that usually do not reach the development aid community, which tends to be society-focused and mainly involved with public administration structures. Research on political parties in established democracies show how parties' core functions are in danger of being undermined. These are valuable insights for the Danish parties in reflection on their own way of functioning when exposing partners to the Danish experience. Likewise, research on parties in the Global South, notably Africa, indicates that the political parties may be more influenced by policy and political content in their role as democracy promoters than often believed when they are analysed as primarily being "non-programmatic". The question is whether these parties can mobilize on issues relevant for local political contexts and constitute political and not only person-based alternatives for voters to choose between.

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## 3 The DIPD approach

In this section we will present DIPD's stated approach to its work as a background for the assessment and discussion in subsequent sections. The presentation is based on the following documents: the current Strategy 2014-17 "Ideas that can inspire", "How to Build a Youth Wing", "Developing political party capacity – a DIPD approach" (mainly on accountability and representation) and interviews with DIPD staff. The core elements of DIPD's approach are:

- Making use of *inspiration*
- Partnership design
- Capacity development methodology
- Change paths

The current Strategy 2014-17 "Ideas that can inspire" responds to the recommendations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after an independent review of DIPD was conducted in 2013. The strategy therefore clarifies DIPD's vision and mission as well as its theory of change.

### 3.1 Inspiration

With reference to Kerber and Buono's (2005) article on organizational change in business, DIPD has chosen to apply 'guided changing' in its change strategy. Summed up by Kerber and Buono, guided changing (as opposed to 'directed' and 'planned' change) does not tell people what to do and why to do it (logic of replacement). The underlying key is to inspire organizational members so that they are drawn to and excited by the possibility of change (logic of attraction). As reflected in the

name of its current strategy, DIPD seeks to *inspire*. Denmark is not used as a model but rather as a place for sharing relevant experience – “inspire, not export”, as one Danish party representative put it in the evaluation’s start-up workshop. In line with this, DIPD implements activities and dialogues together with the partners that guide the change in the desired directions. This means that organizational members ideally become the new change strategists.

## 3.2 Partnership

Partnerships forms the backbone of project cooperation. A partnership should be based on exchange between equal parties, as opposed to a donor-recipient model. The issue of how the partnerships work refers to two of the questions in the terms of reference for this evaluation: i) to what extent are political party resources and youth parties from Denmark engaged in the various projects, and what are the characteristics of this type of engagement, and ii) how the various partnerships are working both in terms of project cooperation and political dialogue – and how the political dynamics in the country and in the partners influence the cooperation.

The 2013 MFA review of DIPD pointed to a need to increase capacity at the DIPD secretariat and for capacity building in the Danish parties and also a stronger involvement of Danish parties in the multi-party projects. The need for capacity building in the Danish parties formed the background for an action plan (Autumn 2015). Project applications describe the process carried out by the Danish party before selecting a partner very thoroughly.

Appraisal and project application formats help partner and project selection to be made carefully, taking a variety of dimensions into consideration, such as what the Danish partner is particularly qualified to contribute with, e.g. how to work on a local level. DIPD successfully makes use of opportunities to start supporting new partner countries, such as Egypt after the Arab spring and Bhutan and Myanmar during democratization, and new parties that were set up in Nepal and Zambia, with the promise of a more democratic and youth oriented approach to politics. In the Zambian case, in the view of the Danish Liberal Party the new

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party, NAREP, represented a new, issue-based and inclusive approach to politics.

Parties select partners following a thorough process that includes country visits. All project proposals undergo an analysis based on the three criteria mentioned above, and the project identification phase is effectively supported by the DIPD staff. The process is well described in the application documents.

### 3.3 Capacity development

DIPD understands capacity development as the targeted and planned efforts to improve the human competences and organizational capacity to perform democratic functions better. DIPD's approach to capacity development is presented in the 50 page "Developing Political Party Capacity – A DIPD Approach". DIPD makes a distinction between 'competence', meaning knowledge and skills building (including attitudes and behaviour) on an individual level on the one hand, and 'capacity building' that refers to organizational practices that change due to engagement with leadership, organization and people.

DIPD combines practical skills training with awareness-raising with the aim of mutual reinforcement but also to find a balance between proponents of the two types of training.

### 3.4 Change paths

DIPD's point of departure is an understanding of political parties as key actors in parliamentary democracies. They are channels for the choices of the electorate and therefore for the influence of citizens on parliament and government. Parties with a certain degree of internal democracy function as platforms for civic participation in policy development and also as a potential mechanism for inclusion of groups hitherto underrepresented. DIPD has chosen to concentrate on youth and women in this respect. In its strategy for change, therefore, DIPD targets political parties in developing countries with the aim of helping them become more democratic and inclusive internally. In line with this, representation and accountability are the two basic functions of



individual democratic parties DIPD focuses on. On the level of party systems, DIPD seeks to facilitate cooperation and political dialogue between competing political parties and in particular to foster joint initiatives, e.g. for reform.

As emphasized in its capacity development approach (“Developing Political Party Capacity”), DIPD’s analyses aim to identify “wheel turners” that make project activities more effective. This means focusing on opportunities or the enabling situation, e.g. when resourceful internal and external stakeholders want to change the current situation.

Working through youth and youth wings to effect change in the mother parties is one of DIPD’s methods. Change is expected to happen through capacity-building to enable young people to get positions in the parties and thereby spread power in the party, and through institutionalization of youth wings that are expected to influence the mother party towards improved representation and accountability.

Multi-party platforms and multi-party activities in general are intended to be arenas for calm debate and exchange of standpoints and ideas. In most of DIPD’s countries of operation, such arenas for political parties are rare or non-existent. The normal format is rallies and combative speeches. Parties meet each other in Parliament and local councils and at times have to cooperate to reach majorities or agreements. On the multi-party platforms, the working atmosphere is more conducive to dialogue. Agendas are not set and there is no zero-sum game. Joint study trips to Denmark or neighbouring countries often contribute also to mutual respect.

DIPD and the involved parties make use of a results matrix to clarify the projects’ change paths. In the matrix, the project objectives are explicitly linked to results fields, e.g. involving youth and women actively in the parties or strengthening the internal democratic culture. The overall objectives are concretized in more specific objectives; for example, the overall objective of fostering a culture of democracy in Bhutan is concretized in three more specific objectives, e.g. encouraging and expanding public discourse and arenas for discussion on politics and democracy. The baseline is established and milestones for each of the project

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years are specified, for instance developing and publishing a democracy handbook.

### 3.5 Summing up

DIPD's approach is decentralized, leaving much to the parties involved. The Danish parties and their partners are expected to cooperate on equal terms. Inspiration, exposure to and joint reflections on Danish practices constitute a foundation of DIPD's approach.

In order to avoid stand-alone capacity-building events with no further outcomes, DIPD aims to link training to a strategic mix of interventions and activities to reach the longer term goal, where dialogue sessions, peer exchange, policy agenda setting, exposure visits and capacity development are used in a sequenced manner. This systemic and integrated multi-level approach has been applied in DIPD's Women in Political Parties projects and is also applied in the Myanmar youth project highlighted in this evaluation. The approach increases the likelihood that lessons learned through training are being applied, and also that mere awareness-raising may be linked to the training in practical skills often preferred by target groups themselves.

## 4 Assessment of projects and results

This chapter investigates the timing of projects; partnerships; how the Danish parties and their partners design their interventions to create change; how they conceptualize the change they want to achieve and how they work with their partners to affect the desired change through capacity building, exchange and other means. DIPD's overall objective are ambitious and long-term but are there discernible results at this stage?

The chapter draws on documents and interview data from the two in-depth country cases – Palestine and Kenya, and the two less comprehensive studies in Egypt and Myanmar, and the desk studies.

The terms of reference ask for a critical review of the overall change paths pursued and the underlying assumptions in the youth projects. Questions arising are whether the change paths are realistic and achievable when considering the scope and volume of the projects and in view of the local obstacles and barriers. Moreover, how do projects specifically work with capacity development in the field of youth (methods used) and with what results; are the projects similar in their approach or unique in each case? Do the projects adopt a systemic approach also addressing organizational, leadership, cultural and gender barriers to participation?

The Terms-of-Reference are further concerned with the methods and instruments the various projects use for sharing ideas that inspire and provide expertise, and their effectiveness. Furthermore, what ways of mobilizing youth in politics and in political parties are effective? Is it through youth wings or by other means? What has worked well and why?

## 4.1 Timing and context

It is DIPD's ambition to base its work on careful analyses of contextual factors in the country of intervention and the characteristics and needs of the individual parties in the South as well as the capacities of the individual Danish parties to be of help. DIPD's activities are to be firmly rooted in a political analysis of the environment and conditions determining the context of the work. In "Developing Political Party Capacity" reference is made to the insight that democracy-building is an ongoing process of struggle and contestation rather than the adoption of a standard institutional design. DIPD seeks to carry out analyses and interventions at three analytical levels, from the party system as such through inter-party relations to the individual parties. The three-level analyses are expected to enable projects to link outcomes on an individual level to more systemic change.

In order to ensure that the intervention is relevant and links up with political dynamics, it is necessary to analyze the contextual factors thoroughly. As outlined in its strategy, DIPD aims to take a systemic approach. Analyses and interventions are applied at three interconnected levels: firstly there is the general regulation of the party political system; secondly the dialogue and cooperation among political parties and other stakeholders, and finally the political parties and their democratic functions vis-à-vis members, voters and government. There may be reason to take a closer look at the parties in the context in which they operate, and ask whether it is the parties that need to be changed or rather the circumstances under which they operate. The interventions are directed at the parties while it is the circumstances that structure much of the parties' behaviour. Therefore, DIPD's activities that relate to the wider picture are of importance, as in the case of new constitutions or new governmental teams with democratic ambitions.

*Palestine.* Whereas Egypt (see below) was an example of an opportunity that opened up in 2011, Palestine may be seen as the opposite. There is currently no general opening for sweeping change. The last time national elections were held was in 2006. Palestine does not have a law on political parties. The parties are deeply marked by having operated in secrecy for long time and not having changed leadership nor style since. Parties are autocratic

and hierarchical with little leeway for bottom-up influence. However, Fatah has arranged primary elections (“primaries”).

DIPD is present in Palestine only with a party-to-party project. The project is adapted to the lack of general political dynamics towards democracy in Palestine and focuses on a narrow objective – closer cooperation between forces that potentially could constitute a third alternative in the country’s politics. The project contains a multi-party element since originally three (PPP, DFLP and FIDA), now two (PPP suspended its participation) political youth organizations on the Palestinian side took part. The biggest party on the Left, PFLP, is on EU’s list of terrorist organizations and therefore not included in the project. One of the core aims of the project is to facilitate closer cooperation on the Palestinian Left. This is in line with innumerable statements and documents produced over the last decades by the Palestinian leftwing organizations.

The Palestinian Left is small, weak and fragmented after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the culturally Conservative and Islamist wave in the Middle East and the Left’s involvement in the compromised post-Oslo Agreement Palestinian Authority. The Left has not been capable of organizing a strong third alternative to Fatah, the economically liberal “Party of Power” and the Islamist and socially-oriented Hamas. The left suffers from being secular, and tends to end up mediating between the two leading parties. Moreover, they have developed little in terms of feasible programmes. The national question dominates, and less attention is given to how to build up the Palestinian society than to rallying around slogans related to the right of return, Jerusalem’s status, dismantling the segregation wall and boycotting Israeli products . This is all the more striking in a period when social protests are taking place all over Palestine. In addition, the parties have suffered indirectly from the influx of massive aid to Palestine. Parties used to have a social base in large civic organizations, such as the Agricultural Relief Committees, that were linked to the Communist Party (now renamed PPP). Massive economic support made these organizations into “commissioned NGO’s” paying very high salaries and giving their leaders access to visas, while having no volunteers and, moreover, being detached from the parties. The Palestinian parties’ detachment from auxiliary

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organizations is an effect of the massive influx of aid to Palestine but is most probably not conducive to democracy.

The Palestinian partner organizations belong to the Left and cooperate with RGA, a recent amalgamation of several small groups to the left of the Social Democrats and the green Left, which is clearly the most left-wing party in the Danish Parliament. The Palestinian leftist parties do not want to merge. Bitter rivalries in the recent past make unification difficult in parties that often consist of entire families that dominate the parties and ensure that historical memories are kept alive. These are “memories that have developed in the struggle, and have become our personal identities”, as one young project participant put it. Another reason not to merge is that representation in the structures of the Palestinian authority is made per organization without reference to size. Merging then means weaker presence in the Palestinian authority structures. Through DIPD’s and other foreign-funded projects such as those run by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, members of leftist parties come together with the approval of the party leadership. Thus the condition is that the cooperation is based on a joint programme and not the idea of creating a new, merged party.

*Egypt.* The relevance was obvious at the start-up as this was in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Developments later have seen political freedom curtailed, and political polarization is on the rise. This makes multi-party projects among Egyptian youth difficult. There is little in terms of political dynamics to link up to. Most of the foreign supporters of democracy have left and one of DIPD’s partners, NIMD, is about to leave. Through DEDI, DIPD has a local anchorage that makes it possible to stay on and work with a certain segment of the political scale.

DIPD’s activities in Egypt is an example of making use of opportunities (the Arab Spring) that open up at short notice, but also of projects being very vulnerable to contextual development. The Egyptian context has changed significantly since the beginning of the project. Keeping up a project that is multi-party and pluri-religious, however, has become more and more difficult. In respect of economic policies, the involved Egyptian parties span from right to left, not without rivalries. The religiously conservative

parties are absent although two of them have been involved previously.

In Denmark, all parties apart from the Danish People's Party Youth and the Socialist Youth Front are engaged. DIPD is in dialogue with the missing two.

*Kenya.* In Kenya, the new Constitution of 2012 created a sense of opportunity and optimism among youth politicians and an acceptance among politicians more generally that youth should have their say, at least to a minimal degree. The Constitution was progressive on the question of inclusion, and referred to youth as one of several excluded groups. Representation of youth in the Kenyan parliament is relatively good for older youth who have 47 seats in Parliament out of a total of 349 MPs.

The county assemblies created opportunities for building political leadership, also for young people. County level dynamics are different from national level dynamics; being more about community development and social services, county dynamics also allow space for regional parties where ethnicity is no longer the dominant factor. Political parties have taken a number of steps to promote youth participation; youth leagues have been established or strengthened, and parties have youth representatives at the national level. While youth had been used earlier to perpetrate violence during election campaigns, youth are becoming incorporated into party outreach activities, and recently the expansion of social media has given youth a competitive advantage.

Nonetheless, numerous features of the Kenyan multi-party system continue to make it challenging for young people to break into politics.

*Myanmar.* In Myanmar, lack of political room for youth over many years has meant that most youth have had few opportunities to join political parties. Consequently, there is a generation gap and an ability and confidence gap between young and old politicians. At the same time, due to the limited availability of jobs and education, it is difficult for youth to build the required competence and qualifications. Limited party funds and a lack of understanding for the role of youth in politics, means that little funding is channeled to the youth wings. Moreover, there are legal constraints

on the participation of students in politics, so students are hesitant to engage. Myanmar has one dominant party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), which holds a majority of seats in the House of Nationalities and only the NLD has an institutionalized youth league (with the exception of two small parties).

In Tanzania and Chadema, youth play an important role in the party's strategic plan from 2011–2016. In Zambia, the young party leader has singled out youth as a target constituency.

*Denmark.* The need for contextual awareness does not only apply for the countries in the South but for Denmark as well. The ability of competing political parties to communicate peacefully and respectfully is one of the main features of Danish political life that DIPD wants to show partners as a source of inspiration. Also partners themselves pick up the message and report that they are struck by the Danish parties' capacity for peaceful coexistence, as they observe them communicate and cooperate during trainings and study trips. These practices are due to characteristics of the parties themselves but the pre-conditions for dialogue-based practices are also found in the context in which parties operate.

Deep-seated interest conflicts in Denmark are taking place within well-regulated and well-established systems and practices and do not primarily involve parties directly. This system includes tripartite and other commissions, for example different interest groups, hearings, contact meetings between ministries and interest groups and NGO's. Moreover, Denmark's electoral system that secures proportional representation makes it rational for parties not to let hostility develop that might impede future coalition-building and development of joint, multi-party governmental policies. Yet another explanatory factor is the fact that clientelism and nepotism is less developed in Nordic countries than in most countries of the Global South, which means that in terms of economic gain less is at stake for politicians and their supporters in the North. Also the fact that Denmark does not apply the "spoils system" whereby not only political but also administrative positions are distributed anew by newly elected governments contributes to the lower level of animosity in Danish politics.



## 4.2 Change paths in the projects

In the case studies' countries in this evaluation, the percentage of inhabitants below 24 years varies between 59.5 per cent in Kenya and 43.5 per cent in Myanmar, with Palestine at 58.5 per cent and Egypt at 52.5 per cent. In Denmark, 30 per cent are younger than 24 years. Young people are grossly underrepresented in political parties. Therefore, projects that make youth more active and eligible to take on responsibilities in the parties may be expected to lead to parties that better reflect the composition of the population. Their presence may also be expected to lead to improved capacities for the party to communicate and receive input from young segments of the population. Likewise, in order to change the political culture towards more dialogue, our intuition tells us that it is right to target young people who have fewer vested interests and may be more open-minded. Targeting young people, therefore stands out as a highly relevant choice for DIPD.

Moreover, targeting young people for inclusion may be expected to be relatively uncontroversial in the party leadership as long as the young members reflect the profile of the mother party regarding social strata or ethnicity. In practice, however, inclusion of young people as members on a par with adults is generally not given priority by the political parties of the Global South. In many countries, young people are allowed into politics mainly to serve as noisy and at times violent supporters at rallies. In the case study countries, the evaluation found that "adult-ageism" prevailed. Although party leaderships approved and welcomed the projects with DIPD, young party members found themselves mistrusted by the mother parties for being "volatile", or "inexperienced".

How do we retain openness and the ability to listen to and cooperate across party lines? As one Palestinian project participant said: "Now I've got a position in the party leadership and share its identity". The party leaderships on the Palestinian Left make reference to "identity" as an argument against closer organizational cooperation. A practical tool to counteract centrifugal tendencies post-project has been developed in the Egyptian Civic Education (former Democracy Schools) project through "alumni networks".

The theory of change in RGA's project with partners in Palestine is simple. Facilitating projects that bring young people together will

lead to trust and friendship that in the next instance will make joint action possible also in real life outside the project sphere. Young people do not have vested interests in chairs and positions and can come together more freely. When age cohorts of the involved youth organizations come together and carry out activities based on the political views they share, barriers for cooperation in the future will be lower. As one project participant said in an evaluation workshop: “We want to be a pilot for our mother parties to show that closer cooperation is possible”. Some proof that the mechanism is functioning is given by the fact that the members of PPP’s youth committee (PPP does not have a youth wing) would like to maintain contact with the project group even if they have suspended their active participation.

RGA’s approach is to leave training to locals and not impose their own presence. Their contribution is mainly to explain how they succeeded in merging a number of leftist groups into one party. Activity-wise, emphasis is put on Palestinian study visits to Denmark, including visits to RGA’s Swedish sister party. Palestinian youth have taken part in the three latest congresses of the RGA.

Before setting out to stimulate closer cooperation between the leftist youth groups, RGA and partners could refer to several declarations from parties on the Palestinian Left on the need for unity (not unification). A five-party declaration on unity was made recently. In other words, the opportunity for change was present – at least in formal terms, and the parties endorsed it.

Nonetheless, the process towards closer cooperation between the Palestinian youth groups was more tortuous than expectations from project documents indicate. A crucial factor is whether the youth wing have their own by-laws, and whether they define the relations between the party and the youth wing. Also, it would have been useful to know more about the relations between the various blocs (thematic “organizations” within the parties) from the beginning. Youth constitutes one bloc, and students’, women’s, and workers’ blocs are other examples. The activists in the blocs are party members but the blocs do not have separate membership registers.

In Egypt, DIPD originally considered helping to set up a multi-party platform but due to the political circumstances, the idea was

dropped. The Civic Education for Participation Programme (CEFP) and Youth Network (DEPPYN) function as multi-party platforms “light” and are tolerated by the parties and authorities. Moreover, most Egyptians are young (52.5 per cent below 24 years). Therefore, the project aims at creating networks with and across the parties rather than helping to set up separate youth wings.

The DLDP-CMD-Kenya youth programme aims to empower youth wings to participate in policy formulation and champion issue-based politics. More specifically, the programme has targeted youth leaders in the youth wings of the member parties of CMD – around 200 youths altogether. The idea of formulating a youth agenda through debate and dialogue across parties is key to creating change. Through this process, youth leaders also learn to work together through discussion and productive interaction across party lines. In addition, members of the national executive committee of the parties participate in workshops to draw them into a dialogue process with youth to enhance their understanding of and respect for youth. The programme has also organized activities at the county level, based on the idea of facilitating dialogue between youth and the party leaders around political issues. The basic idea is to link the mobilization of youth with issue-based politics, so that the long-term change envisaged is for political dynamics in Kenya to revolve around issues, rather than personalities and ethnic identities. Moreover, activities have been adapted to the electoral cycle, so for example while town hall debates were held before elections, capacity-building for elected members took place afterwards. CMD has also facilitated the formulation of important policy documents, most notably “The right to youth participation policy”, “The youth charter” and “The baseline on youth participation in politics”. A baseline study was followed up through CMD facilitated workshops to formulate party action plans on how the recommendations of the survey could be realized at the party level. CMD had organized one national conference to present the youth baseline study.

The role of the Danish party is to be an inspiration to Kenyan youth through demonstrating different approaches to politics. Joint meeting places are created when Kenyan youth visit Denmark and when Danish youth visit Kenya.

In Myanmar, DIPD has developed a multi-pronged ToC whereby it strives to facilitate more accommodation of youth in parties through high-level dialogue with party leadership. MMDP holds multi-party dialogues involving party youth – both at national and regional/state level; they provide training for political party youth, help to build youth wings, and assess internal party procedures and nominations to facilitate youth participation. DIPD also builds the linkages with the youth organizations in the CSO field.

This work has now led to DIPD being invited into the national process of the formulation of a national youth policy, which is a breakthrough opportunity for the political parties to contribute. DIPD plans to use the multi-party youth dialogue platforms they have established to collect the ideas and recommendations of the parties and of youth. DIPD is using its trainings to explain about national youth processes so that young people understand the public policy process and content better, and DIPD is using access to top political party leadership and prominent MPs to reach full circle in this process.

Programme staff stress the importance of working multi-laterally and bilaterally at the same time, thereby ensuring that spaces for cross-party dialogue are created and sustained, while recognizing that each party is unique. Timing and flexibility are important to ensure that activities are adapted to the election cycle and that MMDP is able to exploit opportunities as they arise. Thus, programme activities reflect the election cycle.

The project documents from Zambia indicate that the Liberal Party's approach is similar in Zambia where the partner, NAREP and its leader, has promoted the participation of youth, the formation of a youth wing and issue-based politics. The driver for change is the party leader who, in cooperation with a young and empowered membership, is expected to create change in Zambian politics.

Similarly, in Tanzania, Chadema, the partner of the Conservative party, enjoys strong support among youth, and the Conservative party prioritizes practical training for newly elected leaders, and training and strategizing before elections in order to empower youth to achieve elections success and to become effective elected leaders. Moreover, grassroots organization to extend the party network nationally is another priority.

## Assessment

The application of the ToC at the country level shows strong similarities across countries. The idea of engaging with youth, either in multi-party networks or in their role as party members, through building their capacity to shape parties and politics is explicit and found in Myanmar, Egypt, Palestine and Kenya. Thus, the foundation for creating change has been established: committed youth who participate in the youth networks where they learn and exchange views. The change theory for the next step – the application of this knowledge to shape a national youth agenda and to build the strengths of youth organizations within the political parties is harder to trace and appears less well defined.

The ToC assumes that competence at the individual level coupled with a conducive context in the party (Zambia, Tanzania, Palestine) or in the country (Kenya, Myanmar and Egypt) will contribute to improvements in representation, accountability and dialogue. Experience acquired from the country cases suggests that the ToC for putting into practice what youth has learnt lacks detail.

### 4.3 Capacity development in the projects

As suggested in the previous section on the ToC, capacity development of youth members of political parties is a key element of the change strategy. This section explores how the partner parties work on capacity development, and identifies differences and similarities across countries and parties. It also touches on results, but the chapter on effectiveness provides more detail on results.

Civic Education for Participation (CEFP) in Egypt: This project aims at supporting a democratic culture, enhancing the democratic understanding among young people in Egypt and training young Egyptians to become active agents of change in their interaction with political parties and institutions of the state.

CEPF was inspired by NIMD's democracy schools in Indonesia. DIPD arranged a visit together with young people from Egypt to study NIMD's experiences in Indonesia. Although Egypt and Indonesia share structural features, such as Islam and a strong military, the curriculum in CEPT has been developed from scratch

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by Egyptian scholars to fit the local contexts. CEFP has a broader scope than the democracy schools in e.g. Tunisia and Myanmar that are more clearly directed at the needs of politicians.

The project's objectives are to be achieved by giving the students knowledge, understanding, and tools. This is more than the typical developmental aid "competence-building" and is more like a formalized school. In line with this, the intervention has consisted of offering specially developed, intensive training modules given by trainers from the two implementing partner organizations (IP). The training offered amounts to 300 hours of training including out-of-class activities.

There are around 30 students between the age of 18 and 35 per cycle and school, and very few of them drop out, a maximum of 10 per cent. The educational activities have taken place during the Egyptian weekend, Friday and Saturday. The structure of the education is under revision in order to make it more flexible and intensive, and also open up for a large number of students.

The project's objectives are in line with DIPD's overall goals: 1. Build democratic competence among young people 2. Create more democratic and accountable political parties (and public administrations).

The Youth Network in Egypt (DEPPYN) aims to strengthen the involvement of young people in the formal decision-making processes of their parties, and support a multi-party dialogue among young political party members. Although the project primarily involves multi-party institutions (DEDI; DUF and DIPD), Danish political youth organizations take part in the project – for example in the Steering Committee – and create direct interfaces between them and young representatives of Egyptian parties. This takes place on a multi-party platform but there is also some direct work with individual Egyptian parties to develop tools to be applied in their own organization. Also, representatives of individual organizations pick up tools through the cooperation and introduce them in their own organization. For instance, one representative from an Egyptian youth organization put what he/she had learnt from training in how to carry out a political action and applied it in a campaign against sexual harassment in his/her organization. The concentration on organizational aspects rather than policy contents enables active

cooperation across the differences that exist between the political realities of Egypt and Denmark. It has, nonetheless, been a challenge to find out what is feasible in the Egyptian context, and also what is feasible within an Egyptian-Danish context.

In the DEPPYN, there are two interlinked tracks: national meetings and international seminars. At the national meetings, DEDI (in Egypt) and DIPD/DUF (in Denmark) coordinate planning and offer trainings and cross-political discussions for the involved parties. Both national and international activities follow the same planning track and support the overall development process.

At the international seminars, three different focus areas are always incorporated: cross-political, cross-national dialogue; technical capacity building on relevant issues identified by the network participants themselves; and inspirational exposure to political events and/or institutions such as local or parliamentary elections, municipality visits or participation in party congresses. The aim is to offer a diverse mix of capacity development elements that support and reinforce each other.

CEFP and the Youth networks differ in that CEFP does not make use of Danish parties. No direct linkages have been made between the two projects but participants in the two are aware of each other. Interaction might have created positive synergy.

In Palestine, the project participants have gained self-confidence through acquiring skills from e.g. arranging summer camps and workshops. The project's training in campaigning has been appreciated. Training has been conducted by locals, not the RGA.

A female participant in the project said that there has been a "safe and big space to be a woman and a decision-maker" in a society that in general does not favour active female political participation. The discussion style and socializing atmosphere during workshops with the participants as part of the evaluation confirms this. Girls and boys were on equal terms in the project setting with girls verbally most active. One evaluation workshop participant said: "Come on! Who else dares to run a workshop on gender in this country?"

There are strong tendencies in Palestine, also in the leftist mother parties not to trust young people, referring to their lack of experience among other things (“age-adultism”). Despite this, after persistent lobbying efforts and with the support of RGA’s local consultant, some of the young project participants have been added to local election lists. They are quite far down on the lists, but this is still a huge step forward.

CMD-Kenya runs most capacity development activities at the national level where youth wings are most active. Due to limited resources, few activities are carried out at the county level, despite intentions expressed in the programme document to exploit opportunities arising at the county level as a result of the new decentralized governance structure. Nevertheless, CMD organized town hall meetings in the run-up to the 2013 elections. These meetings were held in nearly all the 47 counties of Kenya, and most informants say the meetings succeeded in creating a platform where youth could engage with senior party members in political debates on issues of relevance to each county. The county debates also served to remind the young people of the importance of having peaceful elections given the history of post-election violence in 2007/08. After the elections, CMD focused on capacity building for the newly elected representatives as well as youth leaders. One of the key concerns of CMD was to ensure that youth continued to work for the issues launched through the party manifestos.

Since the start of the collaboration, CMD has run workshops for youth and members of the National Executive Committees (NEC) in each party, in order to create a platform for communication and dialogue between party and youth leaders. Workshop topics include participatory and issue-based policy-making and how to develop action plans on youth issues in the parties.

The selection of participants in the workshop included key persons in the CMD member parties and encompassed around 200 participants in all. Topics are relevant and participants were positive in their assessments of the workshop effectiveness. Yet participants asked for more skills-based training that would concretely address challenges in running election campaigns. Concerns mainly related to the turnover among participants due to



crossovers and a lack of consistency in who the parties send for training, preventing a more long term build-up of capacities.

There were at least ten training programmes across Myanmar in 2015 ahead of the elections and in 2014, four training programmes were organized. In 2016, six regional training programmes have been held. The Global Platform has been contracted to carry out training activities; they use youth friendly and participatory methods. Often resource persons are invited to the meetings. Target groups for training are leaders of youth wings or youth committees in selected parties. Altogether there tend to be around 40-50 participants in the workshops. With regard to regional training programmes, all the political parties in the selected region are invited.

Participants felt that training should be more intensive in order to build skills (and not only awareness), for example building skills to enable youth to assess the extent to which party policies are youth friendly, how to work on the ground, how to build youth wings, more practical training before elections. For instance, the programme could invite elected MPs for a more practical insight into how to become an elected representative and how to cultivate their constituency.

### **Assessment**

Capacity development is aimed at party members to enable them to work cross party, to more effectively promote and lobby for youth issues inside their parties and nationally, to achieve success in elections, or to become effective elected representatives once elected. The use of capacity building in the form of workshops aimed at young leaders is common across the country contexts, except perhaps for the Egyptian example of the party school, which represents a more intensive and systematic form of training. Many examples of how individuals have benefitted from the capacity building in terms of awareness and competence and their success in elections, have emerged through the interviews. A typical feedback from local partners and target groups is that training should be as practical as possible. Lectures and long presentations from experts should be kept to a minimum.

Given limited resources, results depend on the selection of potential leaders as participants, their continued participation in

politics, and their willingness and capacity to bring lessons learned back to their parties. It is not clear to what extent the partners from the South are positioned to bring new skills and insight back into their organizations. This is particularly a problem in youth projects with parties whose leadership is reluctant to let young people play an active and independent role in the organization, despite having approved the DIPD project. Although it is evident that participants include powerful party activists, it was beyond the scope of the evaluation to make an overall assessment of the relevance of the participants to the objectives of the workshops and the turnover among youth in politics. On the Danish side, there is a certain guarantee in the fact that all Danish participants have to be approved by the parties or youth wings' leadership and they will have to report back.

#### 4.4 Involvement of political party resources and youth parties from Denmark

DIPD's work is based on the active involvement of Danish political parties and political youth organizations. With one exception, all Danish political parties represented in Parliament take part actively in project activities. Denmark's second largest party, the Danish People's Party (parliamentary election 2015) does not have projects but has a member on DIPD's Board. The most recent newcomer – the Alternative – which entered Parliament only in 2015, is already engaged in a feasibility study in Nepal.

DIPD arranges democracy workshops, experience-sharing workshops and capacity-building courses in project management and accounting with the Danish party personnel involved, primarily the project coordinators.

In general, the parties perceive themselves as competent and ready to contribute in the field of democracy promotion. Parties feel particularly competent in including young people and women or politics at local level and as a rule prefer to work with these areas and not with policy development in the partner parties, for example, although the latter often lack policies and programmes. Policy development requires youth influence in the parties that may not be present as yet, such as in Myanmar, but there are examples from Kenya of youth policies being formulated.

### **Party-to-party**

Each party has a designated project coordinator assisted by an advisory group or committee that provide professional assistance to projects. High-ranking and experienced party member often sit on these committees. A former minister of foreign affairs and an EU commissioner for development aid are among the committee members in addition to people with relevant experience e.g. from development aid, solidarity work and political organization among young people. The concrete design of how parties anchor the DIPD projects differ: the Social Democrats with the party's International Committee, and the Liberal Party with a separate legal entity, the Liberal Democracy Programme, with an experienced development consultant and practitioner as project manager.

The Danish parties have working groups or steering committees developing, implementing and monitoring the project. RGA has a steering committee covering all its three DIPD projects and which is answerable to the party's National Board. The RGA projects stand out by involving a relatively large number of party activists.

The DIPD approach of “showing, not telling” and being a source of inspiration makes the study visits to Denmark pivotal for the success of the projects. The parties operate with a network, list or “database” of party members – including members of the youth wings – ready to involve themselves during study tours and trainings in Denmark.

Different echelons and chapters of the party organization are involved, from MPs to employees at the party office to volunteers at the local level. Mayors and members of city councils are involved. A smaller group of party members are involved in training in the partner parties' home countries.

The only one of the four case studies that exemplifies a pure party-to-party approach is the Palestinian case. Danish Red-Green Alliance invites its Palestinian partners to its annual congresses and arranges study trips to the provinces. Political meetings on international issues and solidarity are arranged. Efforts are being made to include Danish-Palestinian members of the RGA in the project activities. Efforts are also being made to include the youth organization close to the RGA, the Socialist Youth Front (SUF)

more actively. SUF took part in meetings on by-laws in the first year of the project. RGA has a strong tradition of engaging in the Palestine / Israel conflict on the Palestinian side. This is reflected in the role played by RGA's Palestinian Committee in the project e.g. during visits to Denmark where also RGA local branches and Parliament are visited. The Palestinian youth organizations' main interface with RGA, however, is the Project Group. The RGA case is a good example of how a Danish party may create effects at home (information about Palestine and mobilization of support as an indirect effect). There is reason, perhaps, to ask whether the aim of supporting closer cooperation between Palestinian youth organizations is best achieved through a contact interface with RGA consisting mainly of people engaged in solidarity work with Palestine and not with someone more directly involved with the party's everyday operation. RGA can probably offer valuable advice on how to make leftist groups with strong individual identities unite and grow strong.

The RGA project has entered into cooperation with a compatible project run by the International Forum (VIF) which is the party-affiliated organization of its Swedish sister party, the Left Party. VIF supports the gender aspects of the RGA project, more precisely a female self-defence project that has been particularly popular.

The Palestinians report to RGA for the entire project and RGA reports to VIF about the gender module to reduce the administrative burdens of the Palestinian partners.

The partnership with VIF is close and very concrete. The interface with RGA is less distinct and intense. The idea of peers coming together is not applied. The interface with RGA on issues related to the everyday work of a party or organization is weak. RGA comes to Palestine to work primarily with partners on project proposals, reporting etc. RGA avoids imposing its will upon the partners and mainly explains how projects must be designed to fit the funds requirements and the overall strategy of DIPD. The balance between avoiding being "imperialistic" on the one hand and missing out on the opportunity to add value through assertiveness is delicate. By failing to push, the party risks missing out on the opportunity to contribute. This is a general problem in

most party-to-party projects but RGA is particularly explicit in its problematizing of the issue.

### **Multi party**

Administratively, the multi-party projects are managed directly by DIPD. Experienced and competent party members, among them retired ministers, take their turn at workshops and trainings in the multi-party platforms. Danish party members contribute during multi-party-visits to Denmark and are used at trainings in the South. Nonetheless, the Danish parties as such are clearly less active here than in the party-to-party projects. One exception is the Danish-Egyptian Youth Network, where the youth organizations are highly involved and where at least one mother party is involved in each international seminar.

### **Assessment**

Even if the general picture is that the projects benefit from the participation of experienced, activist and insightful members of the Danish parties in study visits and training for partner parties and information about democracy support to a wider Danish audience, there is always a need to broaden the number of party members involved in one way or another. Young party activists and retired politicians are perhaps the most likely to be engaged. Members of Parliament may be too busy but in the apparatus around them, there might be people with useful experiences to share. Real peer-to-peer methodology with intense cooperation between people with similar responsibilities in two or more parties (e.g. for membership registers, arranging congresses, local election campaigns or the like) has not been tried out systematically. Instead, the periods between North-South encounters are filled with project activities run by the partners from the South themselves and funded through the project.

The degree to which the project coordinator has a wider group of party members to work with may differ from party to party. Anchoring the projects in the party organization through the leadership is one of the objectives of DIPD's meetings with party leaders.

There are different types of motivation and mixes of motivations in the parties, including the wish to support development aid efforts, belief in democracy, a wish to show solidarity, an urge to

learn more about global issues. There is reason to believe that projects that are in line with the political motivation of the Danish party members will be able to draw on additional resources and value added. For instance, for the RGA, the work with Palestinian counterparts can draw on these mechanisms. Solidarity with the Palestinian cause is one of the reasons people join this party. In other Danish parties, members may be motivated by the opportunity to contribute to the consolidation of democracy as such and pay less attention to the fact that they work with parties that are far from their own political worldview or are programmatically indistinguishable.

#### 4.5 Project cooperation and political dialogue in the partnerships

The projects start out as a dialogue between the prospective partners. In conformity with the traditional project cycle model, separate funds are given for the preliminary preparation of project proposals. The parties are urged by DIPD to speak in depth with each other, and to make sure that both parties understand that the project will provide support to party democracy, not to the party's electoral victory.

In the Results Framework (2015) the annual results are based on how not only DIPD but also the partners understand what has been achieved. Thus DIPD's reporting of results is used as an opportunity for active learning and also involvement of partners – one of several tools in the dialogue with partners to assess and improve results.

##### **Party-to-party**

The everyday running of the projects is carried out by the project managers and their counterparts, and project managers and local coordinators in the partner parties.

The Palestinian youth organizations appreciate what they experience as planning and implementing together with RGA. They have a clear ownership attitude to the project contents. The Palestinian coordinators report that needs are formulated together with RGA and submitted. This often takes place during workshops where representatives from the Danish project group are present.

At other times, the Palestinian project participants have their own workshops on this.

In Palestine, RGA works with the local coordinators, two per youth organization involved. The coordinators are also members of the elected leadership in their respective organizations. In addition, RGA works with the international secretaries of the youth organizations. One of the three youth organizations left the project and the cooperation with the two remaining organizations. RGA is aware of the conflict and has participated in discussions on possible solutions. During winter 2015 and spring 2016, the project group has conducted project visits and during both visits they had bilateral meetings with representatives from the PPP board and youth committee, discussing the issue. RGA's counterparts are well-positioned and RGA is a trusted partner with a proven commitment to the Palestinian cause in general and that of Palestine's Left in particular. Nonetheless, it has been difficult to get the full background picture regarding why one of the three organizations withdrew.

The collaboration between CMD in Kenya and the Danish Liberal Party is a hybrid model whereby the Danish Liberal Party supports a multi-party platform in Kenya that existed prior to Danish support.

The CMD coordinator finds that DLDP has been very open, engaging in substantive discussions on selecting and shaping activities to achieve the objectives. There is constant conversation on email and Whatsapp between the CMD coordinator and the DLDP coordinator. CMD-Kenya formulates the work plan through close engagement and consultation with DLDP, for example, how many workshops should CMD organize, how will they add value, what are the criteria for selecting participants. In the process, the CMD-Kenya secretariat also consults with the youth committee on the youth issues to focus on.

### **Multi-party**

The multi-party programmes are structured differently, in three main ways. 1) In Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Malawi DIPD has entered into partnership with one locally based and pre-existing multi-party platform in each of the countries. 2) In Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar the projects have been developed from scratch. In

Bhutan and Nepal there are several partners. In Myanmar, the vision is to foster a multi-party platform, and a project team running the Myanmar Multi-party Democracy Programme (MMDP) had to be established from scratch and is managed directly by DIPD. 3) DIPD conducts two multi-party projects in Egypt, the Danish Egyptian Political Party Youth Network (DEPPYN) and the Civic Education for Participation Programme (formerly the Democracy Schools). Here a locally-based Danish-Egyptian organization – the Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI) plays a central role, as organizer but also as a legal entry point that allows DIPD to implement our activities in Egypt and with Egyptian parties. The Youth Network is carried out by DIPD in cooperation with DEDI and DUF. The Civic Education for Participation (CEFP) is carried out by DIPD, DEDI and NIMD with DEDI as a co-funding organization with management responsibility.

The Egyptian case is interesting because of the role played by DEDI and also the large number of actors involved. NIMD, however, will withdraw by the end of 2016 due to prioritizations (general selection of countries to work with) made by the Dutch government. Egyptian NGO's are involved as implementing partners in CEFP. Implementation was originally licensed to two local organizations (formally private companies). The profile of the two NGO's differ, one being academic, the other being more activist. The differences are reflected in corresponding differences between the training offered. Due to the tightening of the application of the NGO Act's provisions on foreign funding, DEDI's risk analysis led to the conclusion that the two implementing organizations no longer could be contracted. Moreover, the fact that the cooperation between DEDI and the implementing partners has been problematic is part of the picture. Among other things, implementing partners have had strong views on whom to include whereas DEDI is strictly inclusive.

After a boom of international engagement in Egypt immediately after the Arab Spring, most international organizations have withdrawn. DIPD remains, and refers to the local anchorage through DEDI as a factor that makes this possible due both to its legal status and its combined knowledge of the local and the Danish context combined with supra-party neutrality. DUF brings in strong competence on multi-party youth activities organized by



young people themselves. NIMD is a purely multi-party professional organization. The set-up in Egypt illustrates DIPD's ability to work with local institutions in combination with international multi-party actors.

The Centre for Multi-Party Democracy in Kenya (CMD Kenya) is a membership organization made up of 22 political parties. One coordinator funded by the Danish Liberal Party carries responsibility for CMD Kenya's youth programme. CMD Kenya has set up a seven member youth committee, which is a standing committee of the Board, to take the lead on its work with youth.

### **Assessment**

Sustainable and dynamic working relations party-to-party have been difficult to achieve. Some of the parties said that not much happens between visits, and that following up decisions and communication in between visits is a challenge. Some argued that the relationship had more the character of a donor-recipient relationship, that the partner tended to agree to all suggestions coming from the Danish party, and that ownership on the South partner side was weak. The Danish parties also questioned whether the entry point should be a project coordinator or a party contact.

DIPD's partnership principles are demanding and it may prove to be difficult to fulfill them in real life especially when applied to DIPD's quite radical objectives on inclusion, internal democracy, and accountability. As one of the Danish party activists engaged in a partnership said: "Not everything is process, there is also struggle. We are messing with the core of how parties function. We risk being destructive. We interfere with nepotism, in-fighting between party factions and the like, usually not being aware of it. This is also the case when we try to promote women and young people in the parties. We unsettle the power structures."

Organizational set-ups influence partnership and dialogue. Cooperation is vulnerable to the characteristics and quality of the project entry points into the parties. The Danish parties differ in the type of entry point. There is, for instance, a big difference between the model chosen by the Liberal party in Zambia and Kenya, where a professional consultant fulfills the role of entry point, and the model chosen by the Red-Green Alliance for their project in Palestine, which has a volunteer-based Project Group.

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Like the Liberal party, the RGA has a professional consultant (who is also coordinator and project administrator), only he is based in the region (previously in Palestine, now in Jordan).

Both models work and are easily justified given the profile of the respective projects, the countries of operation and the characteristics of the parties involved. Partner parties, however, may be structured such that it is difficult to find good entry points, i.e. entry points with change capacities in their own right, or at least that enjoy confidence with decision-makers in the party. Some parties may have a very small party organization, instead having almost all administrative resources concentrated in the party group in Parliament (or Government). In some countries, parliamentarians may cut loose from their party organization as soon as they are elected. Many parties experience a conflict between the party organization and the parliamentarians. For a project aiming at strengthening the party organization, it would be appropriate to work with the party organization. This, however, could prove to be more controversial than communicated during initial and later meetings.

#### 4.6 How the South partner influences the partnership

One of DIPD's ambitious goals is to set up partnerships based on equality. This is also one of the main criteria set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There are two main obstacles to the achievement of this goal. Firstly, the Danish parties are closer to the funders and to DIPD. This may materialize in partnerships where partners in the South do not feel they have access to all information, especially about the budget, which may create a practice of being recipients rather than partners. Secondly, the priorities of the Danish parties are closer to the overall objectives of DIPD. The obstacles, however, are balanced by the fact that DIPD responds positively to initiatives from the partners in the South. For instance, a women's project in Nepal came into being after an initiative from the Nepalese side that referred to the fact the Constitution is in place and asked how to make sure women get involved in politics in the new democracy.

The partner party leadership may be more interested in learning how to win an election than in how to include new social strata, age groups or identity groups into party activities or how to secure more rank-and-file influence within the party. However, DIPD's aim is to strengthen democratic practices in individual parties or on a multi-party basis in order to make the parties as an institution more democratic, and thereby also strengthen the democratic fundamentals of the entire political system. The aspects of Danish democracy that the Danish counterparts would like to present as a source of inspiration are not necessarily needs shared by a wider audience in the partner party, i.e. beyond those directly involved in the project. The fact that participants in study tours report that they find certain aspects of how Danish political parties function of interest is not enough to make these ideas strike roots.

The underlying tension, although mainly latent, between Danish wishes and wishes in the South has been noted in the Danish MFA's Concept Note (2014) on DIPD:

“DIPD works with a particular emphasis on women in political office, youth in political parties, local level party structures and coalition building - areas where Denmark has a solid democratic experience. To what extent should DIPD specialize further in these intervention areas as particular DIPD “niches” as opposed to responding to different local demands?”

Even when there is a genuine wish in the partner party for change, making full use of the repertoire of working methods and interventions may be hampered. For instance, leaders may prefer to retain the familiar method of carrying out workshops in the provinces. The opportunity offered through the project for arranging workshops may be welcome not only for the agreed contents of the training but also because it gives leaders an opportunity to travel to the provinces and meet their audience. Also bolstering a clientele by offering training is a key aspect. This is one of the reasons there is a certain inflation in workshops as a working method/intervention even when this may prove not to be the most efficient method, e.g. when follow-up activities after trainings are needed to make outputs become outcomes. One example of this is the Socialist People's Party cooperation with the Movement for Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia on developing conflict-

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solving mechanisms and capacity to enter into dialogue with forces outside the party. The Danish partner would like to move from workshops and have MAS itself work on developing conflict-solving mechanisms for use internally in the party and with rival parties and groups.

#### 4.7 Methods and instruments for sharing of ideas and expertise

A typical feedback from local partners and target groups is that training should be as practical as possible. There should be a minimum number of lecture and long presentations from experts. Short introductions can be given by practitioners in the Danish parties responsible for the issue discussed, e.g. electoral campaigns, membership registers, or by experienced local councillors, followed by practical exercises that are tool-oriented. This is particularly useful in multi-party settings, and when Danes and locals do practical exercises together. One example from the Youth network project in Egypt: An exercise where participants had to render the arguments of a political opponent in a way that the latter accepted as valid. Another example: Danes and Egyptian prepare an action during a study visit in Denmark with a time frame, budget etc. and carry it out there. On their return, the Egyptian visitor carries out an action at home applying similar planning techniques as practiced in Denmark. Especially in the case of youth projects, the learning effect is better if the young people themselves organize and take responsibility for as much as possible.

Tools “How to Build a Youth Wing” has been described as “a dead document” by some, and very “helpful” by others. Some partners (Egypt) held workshops on the basis of the document and structured them accordingly but found this did not work and feedback from participants were negative. In this case the organizer switched to what is called a “needs based” approach, asking what the participants would like to learn. Feedback improved. In Palestine “How to Build a Youth Wing” was distributed and used in the preliminary talks on establishing the Youth Forum.

In Kenya, the DIPD manual on how to build a youth-wing had been frequently used during workshops, and was described by the CMD coordinator as extremely useful. The coordinator also found DIPD policy documents that elaborated on the importance of cross-party platforms and dialogue intended to reduce tensions to be very useful to guide his work. Several of the respondents in Myanmar referred to their use of books and materials from the MMDP programme, in particular “How to build a youth wing”. The MMDP has adapted materials to the Myanmar context, for example by using examples from the region, in addition to Danish examples.

Participants from Kenya were enthusiastic about the benefits of the exchange visit in December 2015. Through the visit, they had gained insights into a different political culture where politicians act like ordinary people, where trust and collaboration is part of the political model and where youth get into politics very early. They had learnt about resource mobilization and had picked up concrete ideas about party funding. They had seen issue-based politics in practice. Moreover, they had drawn inspiration on how to organize and strategize to come into position. Participants explained how they had launched a youth candidate to head the Political Parties Liaison Committee. The committee encompasses all registered political parties in Kenya and is a public institute established under the Political Parties Act. The principal function of the Political Parties Liaison Committee is to provide a platform for dialogue between the Registrar, Electoral Commission and political parties. The youth candidate succeeded after intense lobbying of all the political party leaders.

Young politicians from Myanmar had learnt about national and local politics, election campaigning and about the independence and influence of the youth wings. One party representative recounted how he had travelled around the country sharing his experiences with youth in the party, for example on how to build social relations with other political parties and how to use social media. Overall, young politicians were positive in their assessment of the exchange

## 4.8 Mobilization of youth

Youth were mobilized in their individual capacities and through the strengthening of youth representation in party structures. As suggested above, there were many examples of successful youth politicians whose capacities had been strengthened, some of whom had become elected members of assemblies. Yet, the extent to which the position of youth had been strengthened within the political parties is harder to assess and such assessment would have required a more in-depth study of partner parties. With this limitation in mind, is it possible to conclude whether youth wings represent a better organizational solution than, say, youth committees?

The two main models are youth wings with full or partial autonomy and youth committees appointed by the mother party's congress, central committee or other.

In Egypt, only two of the parties have youth wings. Egypt's Liberal party went from a youth wing model to youth committee and then back again. Among the three parties that took part in the RGA project in Palestine, one had a youth committee and two a youth wing. The large majority of the parties in Myanmar did not have a youth wing, with the exception of the largest party and two smaller parties. Nevertheless, progress has been made in Myanmar, where opposition to youth may have more to do with a lack of understanding of the role of youth and their perceived low capacity than with entrenched party structures. There is little evidence from the case studies of this evaluation to conclude whether wing or committee is to be preferred. What matters most is that young people are offered environments for political activity where they feel at home as young people. Mobilizing and training youth representatives to run for elected office in Parliament or sub-national bodies is another strategy that has shown promise.

Among youth in Kenya, there is more emphasis on running for positions than building youth wings, and this probably reflects the weak institutionalization of political parties in Kenya. Political parties are campaign organizations. The focus and enthusiasm is around elections and the objective of young people is to succeed in elections. The strategy of issue-based politics is employed by youth politicians to win elections. The idea is that youth should

subsequently be accountable for delivering on the issues on which they campaigned. Decision-making, budget allocations etc. are carried out once party members become elected to political bodies. Given the divergence between the county and national assemblies and the political parties (youth baseline study), the question that arises is whether the focus on promoting issue-based politics within the political parties is the most effective, or whether the focus should be on how to run issue-based campaigns.

#### 4.9 Benefits and results in Denmark from DIPD engagement

For the Danish parties and even more so for the youth wings, the DIPD project contributes to the institutionalization of international activities. DIPD has been an incentive to global engagement for parties that have concentrated on party links intra-Europe over the last decades. The Liberal party has set up its own Liberal Democracy Programme (DLDP) that is well grounded in the Liberal party and in the work of the liberal party youth. The coordinator is located at the Liberalt Oplysningsforbund (Liberal Information Association), [www.lof.dk](http://www.lof.dk) office, and one of his tasks is to explain the party's Africa programme to party members. Parties with a constant global outlook have been able to do more practical work thanks to DIPD, not least in the field of information for a domestic audience. An example of this is that the Red-Green Alliance links its project work with the Palestinian solidarity group within the party, and visitors from Palestine to Denmark take part in meetings to inform about the situation in their home country. The Socialist People's Party is strongly involved in solidarity work with Latin America and has been able to bring new insight on the situation in Bolivia back to Denmark. The Social Democrats, the Social Liberals and Conservatives have strengthened links to their sister parties in Egypt, Ghana and Tanzania.

Visitors from the South take part in congresses, electoral campaigns and the annual political festival on Bornholm island. This creates some visibility but competition for attention is fierce.

Political parties are busy winning elections and international activities are not directly conducive to electoral success.

Nonetheless, information about the projects has been through Facebook, at congresses, newsletter and the party's homepage. Party members with an engagement in international issues have made use of the projects to gain more insight and personal contacts. The young people involved in particular seem to have been appreciated this and in some cases it has influenced their study plans. Some Danish youth wings report that the DIPD projects have contributed directly to institutionalizing the international engagement of the organizations.

Although political party support is not mainstream development aid, the DIPD projects have given Danish parties first-hand experience of aspects and dilemmas of development aid. Usually this type of insight has been offered by development NGOs.

#### 4.10 Effectiveness and effects

This section concentrates on results from the four case studies because this is where the team has had sufficient data to assess effectiveness and results.

##### **Palestine**

A joint Palestinian Democratic Left Forum was established in May 2016 between IYU and PDYU with statutes that leave positions vacant in case PPP's youth organization, which has suspended its cooperation, decides to join at a later stage. This has been formally welcomed in the mother parties that have "unity" as a goal but also want to retain "identities". The Forum is based on the youth blocs in the two parties but is dominated by students.

According to the Youth Forum's statutes at least one of the members of the Board must be a woman. Its first chairperson was elected by drawing lots between the candidates from the two youth organizations.

There have been joint activities during electoral campaigns at the universities. This is the second arena for cross-party Leftist youth activism besides the RGA project, and in several cases campaigners met during the RGA project. The alliances are largely due to the project, which has worked systematically on their establishment, although other alliances have also been established.



The young people involved also go together to demonstrations. If they get to know about an interesting meeting, they inform each other across party lines. They also take part in each other's activities. Beneficiaries report that they have developed a broader contact net outside their own organization and have developed skills in listening to other people's opinions.

DFLP has more young people and more women in its leadership structures now than when the project started up in 2012. FIDA is very small, and young people have had a stronger position there from the outset than in other parties, partly thanks to quotas for youth and women. Young people taking part in the project are among the young people in the party leadership. It remains to be seen whether joining the leadership means that the young people adopt the traditional "identity-based" approach of the parties or whether they are able to sustain the cross-party network.

Some of the project activities have been replicated beyond the youth sections of the involved parties, for example in the workers' section, but with funding from other sources.

The cooperation with VIF has led to altogether eight trainings in self-defence for women. This has been arranged not only with the parties but also with a broader group of young women.

### **Egypt**

Willingness to cooperate across party lines has increased among the participating parties in the Youth network project and there is even a willingness to open up for moderate Islamists. Reportedly, even those who used to be most anti-Islamist now are open for dialogue. Including Islamist parties would be difficult since they do not share the basic idea of including young people and women, and even inviting moderate Islamists such as the Strong Egypt Party has proven difficult due to recommendations from the security police. Nonetheless, DIPD and its partners have retained the networks that will make it possible to invite the moderate Islamists if the opportunity arises again. These people are considered useful contacts into the Islamists circles. As of now, the two projects function as a "safe haven" at a period of time when political activity among young people is dangerous and unpopular. The projects function as platforms for political activity and dialogue. DIPD being a foreign actor makes this possible.

In the core group of participants a degree of cross-party respect on a personal basis has developed. It should be noted, however, that truly cross-party activities have been difficult to implement and more of the activities lately have consisted in developing tools that each party can make use of. Bilateral contacts have also developed between politically likeminded Egyptians and Danes, e.g. members of the Free Egyptian Party's youth wing and the youth wings of the Danish Liberal Party and Liberal Alliance. Social democratic network participants have met with Danish social democrats through a bilateral project. These contacts have been additional to the network project and not initiated by it. Study visits during electoral campaigns and elections have been summed up as useful.

The Civic Education for Participation Programme has a pool of 210 alumni, many of them politically active in their communities. Alumni are brought together for a joint meeting annually to sustain the network. Alumni are recruited as trainers-of-trainers, which contributes to strengthening the network. There is potential spillover thanks to e-learning offered as open source, and each of the two schools has websites that are actively used. There are several examples of students on the Civic Education for Participation Programme being able to make use of acquired skills to conduct, for example, an efficient electoral campaign or to take up important positions as parliamentary staff. E-learning models, and the resulting curricula are results that can be replicated elsewhere in the Middle East.

### **Kenya**

Through its workshops and other activities, CMD Kenya has facilitated the formation of a cross-party youth network that is committed to issue-based politics, according to the youth who were interviewed. Moreover, issue-based politics has become part-and-parcel of the language of many of the youth politicians who have participated in CMD training. The DLDP project focused on communication and youth. The policy orientation was advocated by CMD, and CMD runs youth activities beyond the DLDP involvement

Issue-based politics is championed by smaller political parties who try to appeal to voters across ethnic borders, as expressed in the following quote from one of the youths who had taken part in

CMD workshops: “I am from a minority group. I can only win through issue-based politics”.

The issue-based approach has the best chance of winning in multi-cultural counties, such as Nairobi. For example, one of the contenders for governor of Nairobi in the next election is running on a platform of issue-based politics. He is seen by the CMD youth as representing an alternative approach to politics, he has promoted two bills on youth, is from a minority tribe and is admired and well known.

CMD has contributed towards the inclusion of youth and the promotion of issue-based politics in several areas:

#### Changes in the political parties

- Youth politicians are represented in the NECs (one to two), youth are able to speak out in the party and to argue for their points of view
- Youth wings are stronger in three of four of the 22 members of CMD, including the three large parties, such as ODM. The idea of youth wings of political parties has become accepted with the exception of the TNA (TNA, the President’s party does not believe in youth and/or women leagues, preferring a single integrated party where all members engage).
- Youth have become involved in county level politics. Pre-2013 outreach to the county level through county level debates had not been done before and led to peaceful elections in 47 counties in 2013
- Youth issues have become part of party manifestos (and youth are members of the manifesto committees), parties have adopted action plans for youth, and youth charters have been adopted
- Appreciation among leaders that youth may add to the parties, but action is slow
- Increase in membership and grass-roots training on democracy

- Small parties have youth-friendly leaders and youth find that they have influence

Individual level changes: Empowerment and leadership skills, capacity to speak with the party leadership, run meetings, debating skills.

Media publicity. Several youth members explained how they had successfully worked with the media to raise awareness on youth issues. Several respondents found the media to be receptive on youth issues.

Inspiration to contest elections: More youth elected to Parliament in 2013, one MP had participated in CMD training, youth politicians who had participated in CMD events had been elected as county level representatives

Contribution to legal and policy changes: Successful lobbying for legislation of importance to youth in Parliament: 1) National Employment Authority Act 2016, and 2) legislation on access to procurement opportunities for youth

## **Myanmar**

Despite the short time the Myanmar programme has been operational, progress has been made in several areas, reflecting the multi-pronged approach to capacity-building that has been adopted by DIPD in Myanmar, and perhaps also the relative receptivity to new ideas as parties and electoral institutions are being formed or are adapting to opportunities that have opened up in recent years. MMDP's convening power is recognized and MMDP has been invited to take part in national level processes.

*The convening power of MMDP.* MMDP has created a platform for youth from political parties to meet with each other, to discuss issues of youth participation, youth leadership, and the formulation of youth policies. The MMDP programme has also brought together youth and other stakeholders, such as the Union Election Commission, representatives of ministries.

- *Skills in youth organization.* The MMDP has helped youth to develop strategies for organizing themselves, and has created room for collaboration across parties. In particular, youth politicians have learnt about building inclusive youth

wings and the importance of independent youth wings. There were also examples of parties who were recruiting youth leaders in preparation for the next elections (the National Democratic Forces Party)

- *Increased acceptance among some parties of the role of youth.* Some parties have taken an interest in creating youth wings, or have accepted the organization of youth within the parties, for example in the form of youth committees or working groups (Union Solidarity and Development Party, National Brotherhood Federation). While some youth groups enjoy a high degree of autonomy, in other parties the leadership resists and say they do not have the resources. Large parties appear to be more interested than smaller parties. Party leaderships do not see youth as a threat but believe they need to build their capacities.
- *Multi-party dialogue and collaboration.* Youth have learnt about the multi-party system and have become aware of the value of a multi-party dialogue at the local and national level. The multi-party meetings increased the dialogue and collaboration among the youth representatives of political parties.
- *Policy formulation at the party and national government levels.* Youth in political parties have begun to think in terms of party policies, for example MMDP provided inputs to the NLD policy manifesto. Moreover, the government has put in place a process for developing a national youth policy with inputs from the MMDP.

*Youth participation in the 2015 elections.* There is a very high percentage of youth in Parliament after the 2015 elections. MMDP contributed to this result by working with the parties before elections to advocate for the nomination of youth. Moreover, there was a high level of youth participation in elections as polling agents, in campaigning, and as voter educators as a result of capacities built by MMDP. The MMDP developed strategies and materials, and coordinated with two or three other major institutions.

## 4.11 Summary

The models for project cooperation vary a great deal across the parties due to differences in modalities between the bilateral and multi-party approaches. In bilateral cooperation, the Danish side of the project cooperation is managed on a day-to-day basis by project coordinators who are advised by an advisory group or steering committee. Danish resources are mobilized mostly in relation to visits to Denmark when the party is more broadly involved, and to some extent in connections with visits to partners in the South.

As for the partners in the South, the entry points vary greatly, and thus the potential for anchoring the project in the South differs across the partnerships. Identifying genuinely common interests and interpreting the objectives in broadly similar ways have given rise to declarations of intentions which are not necessarily easy to implement. This is concern in light of DIPD's ambitious objectives. This raises issues about the sustainability, motivation and the change management capacity in the parties in the South.

Overall, there appears to be much scope for anchoring the projects better on both sides of the partnership and for broadening the interface between the Danish parties and their partners in the South.

In general, the change paths chosen are similar across countries, with capacity building of youth through in-country training and exchange visits. The idea is that trained youth should become change agents through improving the climate for cross-party dialogue, running for office to elected assemblies, bringing about change in the mother party, and through shaping a national youth agenda. Danish parties have contributed to building the skills of youth through training, and there is evidence that that the Danish parties have contributed to greater acceptance of youth in politics and youth have attained positions previously reserved for senior party members.

The RGA project illustrates the need for careful analysis, including of purely formal aspects, as part of the project management. The project would have gained from taking into account the differences in the formal set-up of the youth work between the

three parties and also how the youth and other target groups may overlap. Although RGA was aware of the differences in formal structures, it would have been useful to have known more beforehand about the relations between the youth wing (called “youth blocs” in the parties involved in Palestine) and the mother party (and the implications of PPP’s model of having a youth committee instead of a youth wing).

There is probably no universal model to recommend across contextual realities with regard to whether youth wings or youth committees is a better option. In some parties even a semi-autonomous youth wing would be unheard of due to a perceived need to control the entire party organization from above. Some parties have a very young membership and voter base. This is particularly the case for some new parties in countries that have undergone a democratic upheaval. Youth wings may be expected to be more capable of creating much-needed youth-friendly environments for political activity since many parties in the Global South are very old-fashioned in style and have old leaders. On the other hand, youth committees may be expected to enjoy more trust from party leaders and also provide easier access for young people to positions in the party.

Many examples of how individuals have benefitted from the capacity building in terms of awareness and competence and being successfully elected have emerged through the interviews. The selection of youth leaders for the DIPD funded projects include potential change makers. Yet, it is not clear to what extent the partners from the South are positioned to bring new skills and insight back into their own parties. Training included party leaders as well, but it is unclear how systematically they were involved in the training, and the results of their involvement.

Participants in exchange visits to Denmark were enthusiastic and had been inspired to implement ideas in their home country. With regard to the learning materials from DIPD, views were mixed, with some project countries finding them very useful and others not.

From the two in-depth case studies (Palestine and Kenya) and the two Skype and document case studies (Myanmar and Egypt) it is possible to identify results in line with the set objectives. In Palestine, involved youth groups have come closer in their day-to-

day activities. In Egypt, relevant training and networks have survived and developed despite the difficult conditions for multi-party activities in the country. In Kenya the project has contributed to the establishment of a cross-party youth network that is committed to issue-based politics. In Myanmar, within a short time a platform for youth has been established.



## 5 Conclusions

The Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy's (DIPD) strategy highlights two main objectives: improved representation and accountability within the parties and more dialogue between them. The two objectives go right to the core of what potentially makes parties drivers for democracy. Halfway into the current strategy period, this evaluation found that DIPD and the involved political parties by and large are on the right track towards strengthening representation, accountability and dialogue. DIPD's emphasis on developing methods and approaches helps make interventions effective.

The evaluation used Youth in Politics as a case to highlight both specific and general aspects of DIPD's work. Targeting youth proved to be conducive to achieving DIPD's objectives, in particular on inclusion and dialogue. Young people are a segment of the politically active population that may be able to make use of skills and insights acquired through the projects.

The projects examined in detail by the evaluation – in Palestine, Kenya, Myanmar and Egypt – are already showing results. This applies to both party-to-party and multi-party projects. The DIPD project has brought young politically-active people together in joint activities, such as youth forums and multi-party platforms and networks as well as civic education programmes. Youth policies have been developed and young people have obtained positions in the parties. The results form part of a strategic mix of project activities, where dialogue sessions, peer exchange, policy agenda setting, exposure visits and capacity development are used in a sequenced manner to reach the longer term goal.

The evaluation found that project activities gave the young participants new skills and self-esteem, particularly young women in traditionalist societies. Evidence of wider outcomes in terms of

a stronger position for young people in decision-making positions and in influencing policy in political parties is scantier, but young people have been admitted to the party leadership. The idea of youth organization within parties has gained acceptance; some parties have developed youth policies and have contributed to the formulation of a national youth agenda, and more young people have been elected to national parliaments and local bodies (inclusion). Most successful in terms of results are the multi-party projects aiming at preparing the ground for the development of mutual respect between political adversaries and capacities to communicate across party lines. The DIPD methodology of bringing young people together for training and study trips has created networks that may lead to outcomes.

The change paths as outlined in project descriptions and results frameworks are logical and by and large seem to survive the encounter with real-life. Objectives indicated in the Results Framework are realistic and closely linked to project activities. The change paths are well adapted to what DIPD and partners know about the contextual circumstances at the outset. The analyses of possible obstacles and barriers made prior to project start-up are good but projects would benefit from more knowledge about the formal structures of the parties, power issues within the parties and the actual function of the partner party and parties in general in the project country.

The efforts of DIPD and the individual Danish parties to inspire partners to peaceful cooperation between rivaling political parties is of great value, and an example of DIPD's "inspiration method" at work. At the same time, it illustrates the potential limits of the method. The fact that Danish political parties are able to co-exist peacefully can be ascribed to structural reasons that go beyond mere wishes. Nonetheless, in combination with other elements in DIPD's strategic mix of project activities, the inspirational method may lead to the desired outcomes.

DIPD seeks to identify opportunities or dynamics to tap into, and influence. In Myanmar and Egypt opportunities opened up thanks to protests against authoritarianism and the new openings for political parties to play a role. In Kenya the introduction of a multi-party system and also the wish to avoid a repetition of the post-election violence of 2007/08 in which young people were

fighting in the streets, opens up for multi-party projects targeting youth. However, the general dynamics that DIPD could tap into to bring young people into party politics have not been dominant in either country. In Myanmar, the party leaderships are sceptical to young people in politics, perhaps mostly because youth are seen to have little capacity. At the same time, however, significant progress has been in building the skills to organize youth wings and some parties have taken an interest in creating youth wings or have accepted the organization of youth. In Egypt, democratization was halted.

Also in Palestine the project lacks positive political dynamics to link up with. Nor did the evaluation find pro-youth dynamics in other countries with DIPD youth projects or youth elements in the projects. Nonetheless, the evaluation found that DIPD projects have created spaces for politically active young people to strengthen skills and develop insights based on democratic principles. DIPD's Youth in Politics projects help to direct the attention of young politically active people to political education and technical capacity-building.

The evaluation found that DIPD skillfully identifies and boldly makes use of the first type of wheel-turners, i.e. the enabling situations. DIPD is skilful at making use of opportunities and getting the timing right. One recent example is a high quality lecture on local self-government for Egyptian youth in Denmark as Egypt's local government law is being drafted. Local councils were dissolved in 2011, and a new law is needed before the holding of local elections in 2017.

As for the second category – the motivation of the parties – DIPD enters into careful dialogue with party leaderships to strengthen their motivation by referring to the overall gains to the party. However, motives are less detectable, and they are volatile. One example of a clear motivation to increase the influence of young people is given by a party in Zambia that is involved in a DIPD project. Also for the third type of wheel-turners – change management capacity and leadership commitment – it is less clear what has been achieved. The wheel-turners approach could probably also be successfully applied to the Danish parties, not least regarding types of motivation inspiring people to participate.

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This could help make the most out of the specificity of each party to set as much positive forces into play as possible.

The competencies developed through the projects are of two kinds: skills vs insights. In general, acquiring skills is the immediate wish of the partners in the South whereas the Danish partners are more eager to inspire, aiming to create new democratic insights. DIPD seeks to combine the two kinds of competence building to add mutual value and encourage a model linking knowledge, attitudes and behaviour. Study visits to Denmark at the time of concrete events, such as electoral campaigns, elections and congresses, seem to be a particularly effective method of inspiring new insights. Likewise, respondents may refer to how they have been able to use what they learned at workshops when these have been practical and down-to-earth. Such workshops have been useful in arranging campaigns during university elections, campaigning for young candidates in general elections, learning how to moderate a meeting, conflict-solving, or becoming qualified to take a job in the parliamentary apparatus. Experiences from Egypt indicate that comprehensive and school-like training is one method that yields results more than the event-like traditional aid development workshop. Traditional lectures are less appreciated and often respondents have difficulties recalling what they learned from them. In some cases, however, lectures given during visits to Denmark, e.g. on local government or the election system have been mentioned as thought-provoking.

The two main models for organizing young people separately in political parties are youth wings with full or partial autonomy and youth committees appointed by the mother party's congress, central committee or other. DIPD does not promote one specific model, and there is probably no universal model that can be recommended across contextual realities, like size of the party, average age of its members and voters, age of the party as such, fear of factionalism in the leadership and other.

Given the strong role of peer-to-peer thinking in the design of the party-to-party project, one might have expected more intense interfaces between the Danish parties and their partner parties. Apart from administrative communication between project coordinators, the interface between the Danish parties and the parties in the South mainly takes place during visits to Denmark,

when the Danish parties do a good job in preparation, implementation and hosting. These visits are successful but one might have expected more day-to-day cooperation between peers in the parties in both countries. It should be noted that in between the North-South encounters, the partners in the South run project activities on their own, funded by the project.

Informants from the South hardly mentioned visits by Danish delegations. This could be related to a selection bias among respondents. Yet this omission stands in stark contrast to the enthusiasm with which participants talked about their visits to Denmark.

Through working with political party support, Danish political parties have acquired a closer insight into the practicalities and challenges related to development aid. While preparing study visits and presentations for the partners from the South, the involved Danish party members have become more aware of the specificities and preconditions of Danish party democracy. The opportunities offered by DIPD have reanimated the global commitment of some parties that may have concentrated on the European party scene for the last decades. For parties for whom international engagement is a mainstay and a basis for recruiting members, DIPD has offered excellent opportunities to turn engagement into practical deeds. The same holds true for political parties with strong links to sister parties and Internationals. If sustained and developed further, the political contacts established through party-to-party and multi-party projects may become additional channels for dialogue, alliance building and conflict-resolution in unforeseen future situations. By working directly with the political level, political party support differs from traditional developmental aid. A very cooperative working style has emerged among the involved Danish parties with regular meetings to exchange experiences.

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## 6 Recommendations

### **DIPD strategy**

#### *Continuation*

The core objectives in DIPD's current strategy go to the core of what makes political parties potential cornerstones for democracy and should be continued into the next strategy period. The development of methodology should build on what has been achieved under the current strategy. DIPD's multi-level, integrated strategic mix of project activities should be given particular attention as a way to link outputs to outcomes and impacts. In this regard, contextual insights will have to be emphasized.

DIPD's work on youth is timely and relevant and should be continued and developed. Youth constitute a very high share of the population in most countries in the South; many have been mobilized through student politics and street protests, and they are potentially a volatile segment of the population. At the same time, youth are highly under-represented in political parties and elected bodies.

#### *Party-to-party and multi-party*

The combination of party-to-party and multi-party projects should be maintained. The creation of multi-party arenas for dialogue has worked well, and DIPD should continue its work in this area, and be careful to ensure its sustainability. Youth networks should be explored further as platforms for sharing of experiences, for promoting youth issues on the national policy agenda, and for exploring alliances with other youth platforms. Bilateral cooperation is needed when the objectives are to strengthen the position of youth within parties, such as by creating youth wings and formulating youth friendly policies. Such efforts require a more detailed assessment of internal party dynamics and a long term commitment from the Danish party.

*Nordic cooperation*

DIPD should consider systematic Nordic cooperation. The shrinking space, the limited funds and the considerations of partner needs and improved impact, all point in the direction of seeking more Nordic joint initiatives, both at the Nordic level, and at country level in the cooperation countries.

**The partnerships: selection and approaches***Selection of southern partners*

The selection of partners based on democratic windows of opportunity should continue, and DIPD's recognition of the need to take risks is commendable. The approach has potentially significant benefits, illustrated in the case of Myanmar where MMDP has established itself as an important convener across parties. However, windows of opportunity may also narrow as in Egypt, although Danish parties have retained an important foothold there despite the limited political space available.

The selection of partners involves trade-offs. On the one hand, parties that represent new and innovative approaches and that could emerge as new models for parties in the South are attractive due to their potential for creating change. Nevertheless, there are often huge barriers to the entry of new parties in established democracies, so careful assessments of the viability of new parties are needed. On the other hand, the potential benefits of effecting even a small change in a dominant, large and traditional party are substantial.

DIPD needs to discuss whether democracy can be supported through assistance to political parties that are, and apparently remain, without clear policies on immediate political challenges related to, for example, the economy, education or infrastructure. Although such parties may have a function in designing peaceful multi-tribal or multi-ethnic co-existence, they do not offer voters coherent alternatives to choose between, and fail to fulfil the core functions of parties in a democracy. Without the party having clarified its policy positions on concrete issues, voters have few ways of holding it accountable. Therefore in selection, preference should be given to parties that are issue-based or on their way to formulating policy alternatives.

The challenges involved in moving beyond the strengthening of individual capacities and networks towards creating sustainable institutional changes have been highlighted. The recommendations below address this challenge:

- For bilateral cooperation, a more detailed analysis should be made of the partner parties, with a view to developing a typology of parties. This typology should be the basis for developing a theory of change adapted to each partnership and the characteristics of the partner party. For example, strategies would differ depending on whether the partner is an issue-based or an ethnically-based party, a small or a large party, a democratic or an authoritarian party.
- A more detailed theory of change for each partnership should be developed as part of a mid-term review when the Danish partner has gained insight into the internal working of the partner party, and has identified the key actors involved in youth politics in the respective country.
- The partnership should be based on a clear Memorandum of Understanding listing the objectives and the resources that each party shall commit in order to avoid the partnership turning into an NGO-like project.

*Broader and more permanent interfaces*

Broadening the interface between the Danish parties and the parties in partner countries should be considered. The projects, not only the youth projects, need to secure a better link between individual capacity-building and effects on the party. Knowledge and skills must be channelled from the individual project beneficiary to the organization. This goes for the partners in both Denmark and the South. More targeted peer-to-peer methodology could be applied on an individual level between peers with similar responsibilities in Denmark and the South. This will make transfer of knowledge from the beneficiary to the party more likely to happen than for more general and vaguely targeted training. The Danish peers could be experienced people no longer holding the position in question. The task could be to develop specific projects on urgent issues that need to be solved in the partner party in the South, such as registration of members, how to plan annual



general meetings arrange a congress, prepare a local election campaign and the like.

DIPD could consider matching and creating partnerships between youth parties in cases where the partner in the South has a youth wing, to tap into the energy, time and skills available to youth. This would also ensure that the Danish party has a stronger footprint in the South.

### **Capacity development approaches**

#### *Priority to study visits in Denmark*

The exchange visits were perceived not only as inspirational but also as responding better to the need for technical skills. Exchange visits to Denmark are highly appreciated and effective, and ways and means of expanding them in a low cost way should be explored. Prioritization of visits by delegations from the South to Denmark, and Danish delegations to the South needs to be discussed given the limited footprint of Danish delegations in the South.

#### *South-South cooperation*

South-South collaboration should be strengthened through e.g. an exploration of South-South exchange visits, and through the use of their experiences of learning materials.

#### *Electronic sharing and learning platforms*

The DIPD networks perform well nationally, but there is a potential for cross-country sharing that has not been exploited. DIPD projects should find ways of using social media for the exchange of experiences among Danish partner parties across countries in the North and South through sharing and learning platforms.

#### *Enhance capacities in the parties for cooperation*

There is still a need for more competence in the parties to run projects. The party-to-party projects are demanding for the individual parties involved. Measures to secure stronger continuity among project coordinators should be taken.

### **Enhancement of results**

#### *Promote networks among current and former project participants*

The parties may consider including former DIPD programme participants as alumni who could serve as resource persons for

current participants, along the lines of what has been done in Egypt. Moreover, DIPD may consider using its good offices to set up an international network of youth participants, linked up through Facebook or another platform that may allow for exchange of information and sharing of experiences. Another route forward may be for DIPD or the parties to facilitate linkages with youth parties in other countries to allow for the exchange of experiences.

*In-country mentorship schemes*

The second key result is the election of youth representatives to national and sub-national elected bodies. Elected representatives who are former participants in DIPD-funded programmes should be seen as “allied insiders” and wheel turners in pushing the youth agenda forward. For instance, the work to promote the election of even more youth representatives could be strengthened through the use of in-country mentorship schemes, e.g. by drawing on the resources of elected representatives/the alumni association and shadowing and internships in Denmark.

*DIPD as a knowledge centre on democracy and parties*

Democracy support through the engagement with political parties is an important and independent area of work within development cooperation. DIPD should continue fulfilling the function of knowledge node in this area of work in Denmark. In addition, and in order to increase effects in Denmark, DIPD can establish itself as a source of inside and down-to-earth information about the political life and parties in its countries of operation and on party politics in general. As a knowledge centre on democracy and parties, DIPD could increase its relevance to the Danish political dialogue culture.

During elections or crises in its countries of operation, DIPD and the individual Danish parties should offer mass media access to their partners in the South for comments and also deliver analyses itself.

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# Appendix 1

## Interviews

Meeting with DIPD staff (Bjørn Førde, Hanne Lund Madsen, Flemming Astrup, Mathias Parsbæk Skibdal, Mette Bloch Hansen, Heidi Jørgensen, Petra Herdlova Hassen), Copenhagen May

Separate meetings with DIPD staff (Hanne Lund Madsen 11 May),

Danish party representatives, Information from workshop and group work sessions, workshop in Copenhagen 10 May

Jane Werngreen Rosales, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (11 May)

Henrik Bach Mortensen, Chairman of the DIPD Board (11 May)

Inger V. Johansen and Randa Ruben Jaber Sebelin, RGA

Bent Nicolajsen, project manager, Liberal Democracy Programme (Liberal Party)

Three skype meetings with the evaluation committee

### **Field visit Palestine 22- 26 May**

Ali Khilleh, locally based project consultant for RGA's project

Rubia Hilal, project coordinator

Upstart workshop, Ramallah, 11 participants (6 IYU, 5 PDYU)

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Salam Hamdan, Program Manager & Deputy Director, Rosa  
Luxemburg Stiftung, Ramallah,

Walid Atatrah and Muhammad Salameh, international secretaries  
in FIDA and DFLP respectively

Observation of VIF's workshop, 10 participants from IYU and  
PDYU

Joel Nilsson (international secretary) and Josefin Morge  
(chairwoman), VIF

Palestinian Centre for Peace and Development, director Naseef  
Muallem

Workshop with beneficiaries, 10 participants (4 PDYU, 6 IYU)

Field visit to Nablus: Majida al-Masri and Sana Shbatah, Nablus,  
DFLP and Mother School Society, extended education  
programme

Validation workshop, mainly the same participants as on the  
upstart workshop plus the two international secretaries

### **Case Kenya**

Range Mwita, Programme coordinator CMD

Dr. Carey F. Onyango, Executive director CMD

Hon. Ominga Magara, Chairman CMD

Dr. Richard Bosire, Professor in political science, Nairobi  
University

Hon. Chege Mwaura, Member of County Assembly Nairobi

Billy Mijungu, National Youth Council

Focus group discussion with 7 participants in the exchange visit to  
Denmark, December 2015 and CMD youth committee  
members



Focus group discussion with John Melita, Hussein Mohamed, Gideon Keser, and Lucy Oguti, members of the United Republican Party

Focus group discussion with Stephen R.K. Namusyule and Winnie Masiga, FORD Kenya

Focus group discussion with Cyrus Litswa, Esemele Amugune Moses, Honrad Makunja, Margaret K. Ndanyi, members of Amani National Congress

Field visit to Machakos County: Justus Kilonzo, Klambua Mutuku, Ruth Waryiru, Mercy Mutwiri, Virginia Muoni, and Charles Mudili, CCU members

### **Case Egypt**

Interview Youth Network Egypt 10 mai, Fredrik Brogaard, Rad ungdom, Maiken Kristensen, Lib all, Niklas Lauritzen, ssd, Aleksander Ryle, Lib Allianses Ungdom

Katarina Pultz, DUF - Danish Youth Council, 24 September

Debbie Vermeij, projects manager, NIMD

Shahdan Arram, Program Officer: Politics and Democratization, The Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI)

Reem Abuzaid, former Project Officer: Politics and Democratization, The Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI)

Mohamed M. Farid, chairperson Youth Wing of Free Egyptian Party and deputy chair of the Economic Policy Commission of the party

Tamer Samy, International Secretariat, Social Democratic Party of Egypt

### **Case Myanmar**

Ran Lunn Aung, Youth Project Coordinator

Salai Myo Chit, Youth Leader of National Brotherhood Federation

Zar Chi Lin, Youth Leader of Union Solidarity and Development  
Party

Soe Moe Thu, President of NLD youth wing, MP

Kyaw Thu Ya, Youth Leader of National Democratic Forces Party

Jeremy Liebowitz, Political Party and Dialogue Adviser, MMDP